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ABSTRACT
Information and Communication Technology is commonly recognized as one of the key
enablers in improving the quality of life in our modern society. By including citizens in the
digital world, the efficiency of existing services has already been improved. In a second wave,
the technological advances of mobile phones promise to further bridge the gap between
physical world and cyberspace. Using sensors embedded in mobile phones, a torrent of data
about the physical world can be collected. The inclusion of the gathered data into the digital
world contributes to the realization of the vision of so-called smart spaces, ranging from smart
homes to smart cities and beyond. These smart spaces can substantially increase the quality of
life by leveraging the participation of billions of citizens by, e.g., monitoring traffic congestion
and noise pollution. The collection of sensor readings in participatory sensing applications
however puts the privacy of the users at risk, as they may reveal sensitive information about
themselves, such as the locations they visited. Users aware of such threats may decide to opt
out of the application, thus decreasing the quantity and quality of the gathered data. Privacy
protection is therefore mandatory to encourage potential contributions.
Most existing privacy-preserving solutions specifically tailored to participatory sensing
applications fail to include users in the loop, despite the individual nature of the conception
of privacy. They are mainly preconfigured by application administrators and cannot be per-
sonalized by users according to their privacy preferences. Moreover, a majority of existing
approaches relies on a central entity responsible for the users’ privacy protection. In addition
to be a single point of failure, users need to entrust them not to disclose sensitive information
to unauthorized third parties. In order to address these shortcomings and ultimately foster
the users’ contributions, we propose three privacy-preserving solutions in which users are in
control of their privacy protection and can adapt the underlying mechanisms to their own pref-
erences. Furthermore, the provided privacy protection is independent of the trustworthiness
of the application server.
In particular, we present a scheme in which users mutually preserve their privacy by
physically exchanging sensor readings, along with the time and location of their collection,
during opportunistic meetings. By breaking the association between users’ identities and
sensor readings, the exchanges prevent curious application administrators from inferring the
locations visited by the participants based on the uploaded sensor readings. This scheme,
however, relies on the collaboration of all participating users. In order to assess the users’
degrees of collaboration, we therefore propose mechanisms based on user ratings that readily
identify and quarantine malicious users. Using both schemes, users are hence able to determine
the applied exchange strategy based the assessed trust levels of encountered users as well
as their individual preferences. As a result, the collected data are obfuscated prior to their
upload to the application server.
Furthermore, we propose an innovative scheme based on periodic pseudonyms that allows
the application server to assess the trustworthiness of the contributed sensor readings without
endangering the users’ privacy. In addition to rely on blind signatures, our scheme introduces
the concept of reputation cloaking in order to prevent curious application administrators
from linking consecutive pseudonyms based on an analysis of their reputation. By applying
different proposed cloaking schemes, users can control and balance the inherent trade-off
between anonymity protection and loss in reputation according to their personal preferences.
In addition to proposing these three schemes, we investigate the degree of privacy protection
achieved by the devised solutions by means of extensive simulations under realistic scenarios
and conditions. Besides, we assess the applicability of our contributions in participatory
sensing applications by using real-world data traces and through prototypical implementation.
Based on our thorough evaluation, we provide guidelines for the parametrization of the
proposed schemes by considering both the user and application perspectives.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie wird als einer der wichtigsten Wegbereiter zur
Verbesserung der Lebensqualität in unserer modernen Gesellschaft gesehen. Insbesondere die
verstärkte Einbindung der Bürger in die digitale Welt führt zu neuartigen Möglichkeiten der
Erfassung und Verarbeitung nutzergenerierter Inhalte. Gleichzeitig trägt der technologische
Fortschritt bei Mobiltelefonen dazu bei, dass die Grenzen zwischen physikalischer Umgebung
und der virtuellen Welt nach und nach verschwimmen. So können mit Hilfe von in heutigen
Mobiltelefonen eingebetteten Sensoren große Datenmengen über die Umgebung der Nutzer
gesammelt werden. Die Integration dieser Daten in die digitale Welt kann zur Realisierung
der Vision intelligenter Umgebungen genutzt werden. Diese Vision reicht von intelligenten
Gebäuden bis hin zu ganzen intelligenten Städten und darüber hinaus. Eine Realisierung
solcher intelligenter Umgebungen ermöglicht die Beteiligung von Milliarden von Einwohnern,
etwa zur Erfassung von Lärmbelästigungen, und kann so zu einer signifikanten Verbesserung
der Lebensqualität aller führen. Die derartige Sammlung von Messwerten in den so genannten
partizipativen Sensornetzen kann jedoch die Privatsphäre der Nutzer gefährden, da durch sie
sensible Informationen über die Nutzer, z.B. besuchte Orte, preisgegeben werden können. Die
Kenntnis solcher Bedrohungen der Privatsphäre kann die Teilnahmebereitschaft der Nutzer
negativ beeinflussen und damit sowohl Quantität als auch Qualität der gesammelten Daten
mindern. Es ist daher ein adäquater Schutz der Privatsphäre vonnöten, um entsprechende
Nutzerbeiträge zu fördern.
In den meisten existierenden partizipativen Sensornetzen werden die Nutzer in Entscheidun-
gen über den Schutz ihrer Privatsphäre nicht einbezogen, trotz des nachweislich individuellen
Charakters des Konzepts der Privatsphäre. Stattdessen werden die Entscheidungen hauptsäch-
lich von Anwendungsadministratoren getroffen und können nicht von Benutzern personalisiert
oder ihren Präferenzen entsprechend konfiguriert werden. Zudem beruht die Mehrheit vor-
handener Ansätze auf einer zentralen Instanz, die für den Schutz der Privatsphäre der Nutzer
verantwortlich ist. Diese zentrale Instanz stellt allerdings nicht nur einen “single point of
failure” dar, die Nutzer müssen darüber hinaus auch darauf vertrauen, dass von dieser Instanz
keine sensiblen Nutzerinformationen an unbefugte Dritte weitergeben werden.
Um diese Einschränkungen aufzuheben und somit letztendlich die Beteiligung von Nutzern
in partizipativen Sensornetzen zu steigern, werden im Rahmen dieser Arbeit drei Lösungen
vorgeschlagen, mit welchen die Nutzer ihre Privatsphäre wirksam schützen und die zugrunde
liegenden Mechanismen an ihre eigenen Wünsche anpassen können. Darüber hinaus ist der
erzielte Schutz der Privatsphäre in den vorgestellten Verfahren unabhängig von der Vertrau-
enswürdigkeit eines Anwendungsservers. Zunächst wird eine Lösung zur Verschleierung
von Bewegungsmustern vorgestellt, in der Nutzer kollaborieren, um ihre Privatsphäre durch
den opportunistischen Austausch zeitlich und örtlich annotierter Sensorwerte zu schützen.
Durch diesen Vorgang wird die Verbindung zwischen Nutzeridentitäten und gesammelten
Sensorwerten aufgehoben, sodass auch Anwendungsadministratoren auf Basis zur Verfügung
gestellter Sensorwerte nicht mehr auf besuchte Orte schließen können.
Die Effektivität der vorgeschlagenen Lösung hängt von der Zusammenarbeit aller betei-
ligten Nutzer ab. Entsprechend werden zusätzliche Mechanismen vorgestellt, mit denen der
Kollaborationsgrad von Nutzern bewertet werden kann und bösartige Nutzer identifiziert und
gezielt ausgeschlossen werden können. Durch die Verwendung dieser Mechanismen können
Nutzer ihre Strategien zum Datenaustausch anhand von Vertrauensbewertungen und ihren
individuellen Präferenzen festlegen.
Schließlich wird im Rahmen dieser Arbeit ein Verfahren vorgestellt, das es einem An-
wendungsserver ermöglicht, auf Basis periodischer Pseudonyme die Vertrauenswürdigkeit
der übertragenen Sensorwerte ohne Gefährdung der Privatsphäre der Nutzer zu beurteilen.
Hierzu wird das Konzept der “Reputationsverschleierung” eingeführt, um zu verhindern,
dass Anwendungsadministratoren aufeinanderfolgende Pseudonyme durch eine Analyse ihrer
Reputationswerte in Verbindung zueinander bringen können. Durch die Verwendung ver-
schiedener Methoden zur Reputationsverschleierung können die Nutzer selbst das Verhältnis
zwischen Anonymität und dem Reputationsverlust, der mit einer Reputationsverschleierung
einhergeht, auf Basis ihrer persönlichen Präferenzen festlegen.
Für alle vorgestellten Lösungen wird der erreichte Grad des Schutzes der Privatsphäre
mittels umfangreicher Simulationen anhand von realistischen Szenarien untersucht. Außerdem
wird die Anwendbarkeit der Lösungen durch Anwendung realer Datensätze und prototypi-
scher Implementierungen evaluiert.
vi
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1INTRODUCTION
The beginning is the most
important part of any work.
Plato
1.1 motivation
Mobile phones have been riding the wave of Moore’s Law with rapid improvements in
processing power, embedded sensors, storage capacities, and network data rates. The mobile
phones of today have evolved from merely being phones to full-fledged computing, sensing,
and communication devices. It is thus hardly surprising that almost 6 billion people globally
have access to mobile phones [Int11]. These advances in mobile phone technology, coupled
with their ubiquity have paved the way for an exciting new paradigm for accomplishing
large-scale sensing, known in literature as participatory sensing1 [BEH+06, CEL+06]. The key
idea behind participatory sensing is to empower ordinary citizens to collect and share sensed
data from their surrounding environment using their mobile phones. Mobile phones, though
not built specifically for sensing, can in fact readily function as sophisticated sensors. The
cameras on mobile phones can be used as video and image sensors. The microphone on the
mobile phone, when it is not used for voice conversations, can double up as an acoustic sensor.
The embedded Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers on the phone can provide location
information. Other embedded sensors such as gyroscopes, accelerometers, and proximity
sensors can collectively be used to estimate useful contextual information (e.g., if the user is
walking or traveling on a bicycle). Further, additional sensors can be easily interfaced with the
phone via Bluetooth or wired connections, e.g., air pollution or biometric sensors. The collected
sensor readings can then be transferred to the application using standard communication
infrastructures, such as Wi-Fi or 3rd Generation (3G) connectivity.
A plethora of novel and exciting participatory sensing applications have emerged in re-
cent years. CarTel [HBZ+06] is a system that uses mobile phones carried in vehicles to
collect information about traffic, quality of en-route Wi-Fi access points, and potholes on
the road. Micro-Blog [GLC+08] is an architecture which allows users to share multimedia
blogs enhanced with inputs from other physical sensors of the mobile phone. Other applica-
tions of participatory sensing include the collection and sharing of information about urban
air [PHG07] and noise pollution [RCK+10], cyclist experiences [EML+09], diets [RPH+07], or
consumer pricing information in offline markets [DKCB08]. A typical participatory sensing
application operates in a centralized fashion, i.e., the sensor data collected by the phones of
volunteers are reported (using wireless data communications) to a central server for process-
ing, as illustrated in Figure 1. The sensing tasks on the phones can be triggered manually,
automatically, or based on the current context. On the server, the data are analyzed and made
available in various forms, such as graphical representations or maps showing the sensing
results at individual and/or community scale. Simultaneously, the results may be displayed
locally on the carriers’ mobile phones or accessed by the larger public through web-portals
depending on the application needs.
1 Without loss of generality, we use the generic term participatory sensing to designate applications using mobile
phones as sensors (or as data sink for interfaced sensors) where participants voluntarily contribute sensor data
for their own benefit and/or the benefit of the community. The notion of participatory sensing therefore includes
mobiscopes [AAB+07] and opportunistic sensing [CEL+06], and also covers specific terminologies focusing on particular
monitoring subjects, such as urban sensing [CEL+06], participatory urbanism [PHG07], citizen sensing [BEH+06], people-
centric sensing [CEL+06, CEL+08], and community sensing [KHKZ08].
1
2 introduction
Application server 
End user 
Participant!
Mobile phones 
•  GPS 
•  Camera 
•  Microphone 
•  Accelerometers!
 
•  Camera 
•  Microphone!
•  Peripheral 
pollution and 
biometric sensors 
Participants 
Statistics 
Map 
Figure 1: Architectural overview of a typical participatory sensing application
Participatory sensing therefore offers a number of advantages over traditional sensor net-
works which entails deploying a large number of static wireless sensor devices, particularly
in urban areas [CH11]. First, since participatory sensing leverages existing sensing (mobile
phones) and communication (cellular or Wi-Fi) infrastructure, the deployment costs are vir-
tually zero. Second, the inherent mobility of the phone carriers provides unprecedented
spatiotemporal coverage and also makes it possible to observe unpredictable events. Third, us-
ing mobile phones as sensors intrinsically affords economies of scale. Fourth, the widespread
availability of software development tools for mobile phone platforms and established dis-
tribution channels in the form of App stores (e.g., Apple iTunes Store [App13] and Google
Play Store [Goo13]) makes application development and deployment relatively easy. Finally,
by including people in the sensing loop, it is now possible to design applications that can
dramatically improve the day-to-day lives of individuals and communities.
Current participatory sensing applications primarily focus on the collection of data on a large
scale. Without any suitable protection mechanism, the mobile phones are transformed into
miniature spies, possibly revealing private information about their owners. Possible intrusions
into a user’s privacy include the recording of intimate discussions, taking photographs of
private scenes, or tracing a user’s path and monitoring the locations she has visited. In
the face of such significant threats to privacy, persuading users to willingly contribute data
may be difficult. However, participatory sensing exclusively depends on user-provided data.
Hence, a large number of participants is required. The users’ reluctance to contribute would
diminish the impact and relevance of sensing campaigns deployed at large scale, as well as
limiting the benefits to the users. Mechanisms to preserve user privacy are hence mandatory
in order to both encounter the risk that a user’s privacy might be compromised and encourage
contribution as well as gain widespread acceptance among participants.
1.2 goals
As highlighted in our survey [CRKH11], most existing privacy-preserving mechanisms tailored
to the requirements of participatory sensing applications do not involve the users in any
decisions related to the protection of their privacy. The users can therefore not apply any
control on their data and configure the proposed solutions according to their own privacy
preferences, despite the individual nature of the conception of privacy [Wes67]. Indeed, the
conception of privacy is influenced by multiple factors, such as the user’s context [FHHK+11],
age, gender, and cultural background [LS93, GHW+11]. Moreover, most schemes rely on a
central entity, either the application server or a trusted third party, to which users entrust their
sensor readings (along with the location coordinates and the time of their collection). Users
are hence obliged to trust these entities not to violate their privacy by disclosing these data
to unauthorized parties. Furthermore, these entities must protect user privacy by applying
appropriate schemes to the reported data, since users loose the control over them once they
are uploaded.
Driven by these shortcomings, the key objective of this thesis is to investigate novel privacy-
preserving approaches that are customizable by the users and reduce the users’ dependency
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on central entities to protect their privacy. In particular, our objective can be decomposed into
the following three research goals pursued throughout this thesis.
. To investigate how to give more control to the users over their data and decouple the
privacy-protection schemes from any central entity, while simultaneously maintaining
the normal function of the underlying participatory sensing applications.
. To design and build privacy-preserving schemes that can be configured by the users
according to their preferences in terms of privacy.
. To measure the impact of the designed schemes on the function and associated pa-
rameters of typical participatory sensing scenarios and evaluate the provided privacy
protection under realistic conditions.
1.3 methodology
In order to achieve the aforementioned research goals, we have first conducted a literature
study and identified the shortcomings of existing solutions. We have next designed novel
schemes that address the identified shortcomings based on a systematic and thorough analysis
of the design space. We have implemented the designed schemes and evaluated them by
means of extensive simulations. We have chosen to evaluate the performance of our schemes
based on simulations, as they allow a better exploration of the space of parameter values as
compared to analytical modeling and measurement. Moreover, due to the lack of available
participatory sensing systems, it was not possible to integrate and measure the performance
of our developed schemes in real-world applications. We have, however, adopted realistic
conditions as basis for our simulations in order to model a real-world participatory sensing
system as faithfully as possible. For example, this includes the utilization of a GPS dataset
collected by users. We have chosen not to analytically model our schemes, as this would
have required us to introduce additional simplifications and assumptions. Additionally, we
intended to recreate the same conditions as in existing participatory sensing applications,
i.e., the reporting of sensor readings collected by the users to an application server. We have
furthermore implemented a proof-of-concept of one of our designed solutions on state-of-the-
art mobile phones in order to demonstrated its feasibility under real-world conditions. We
have finally analyzed the results of the performance evaluation of our schemes and discussed
them in this thesis, before drawing the corresponding conclusions.
1.4 contributions
In order to overcome the identified shortcomings, we make the following contributions that
follow the line defined by our research goals and can be summarized as follows.
1.4.1 Path Jumbling: A Privacy-preserving Collaborative Scheme for Path Hiding
We present an application-agnostic, decentralized, and collaborative mechanism to preserve
location privacy during the collection of sensor readings and more particularly, the paths
followed by the users. As most sensor readings are geotagged, we propose to exchange the
collected sensor readings between users in physical proximity. By exchanging their sensor
readings, users jumble their paths; the prior path of one participant becomes that of another
participant and vice versa. The repetition of the jumbling process at each encounter results
in the construction of paths composed of concatenated subpaths from multiple users. As a
result, the sensor readings, which are reported to the server by the users, do not disclose the
actual paths, but instead a path jumbled with other users. Based on a design space analysis,
we select and implement different strategies for exchanging and reporting the sensor readings.
These strategies can be adjusted to the desired level of privacy and reporting latency by the
users. We analyze the impact of these strategies on the incurred overhead, reached jumbling
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degree, and the distance between original and jumbled paths using real-world GPS traces of
mobile users. We quantify the provided privacy protection by means of extensive simulations,
in which malicious application administrators attempt to identify jumbled triplets from
original ones based on the associated spatiotemporal information. The results demonstrate the
feasibility and efficacy of our scheme, which prevents malicious application administrators
from recognizing most of the locations actually visited by the users.
1.4.2 TrustMeter: A Trust Assessment Scheme for Collaborative Path Hiding
As the above concept of path jumbling relies on the collaboration of all participating users,
we further propose TrustMeter, an application-agnostic scheme that assesses the behavior of
the users contributing to the collaborative path hiding process. It attributes a trust level to
each user based on statistics provided by the users about past exchanges. Malicious users
can be clearly identified based on their low trust ratings and subsequently excluded from the
data jumbling process. Ultimately, users can leverage these ratings to select the appropriate
exchange strategy to apply when meeting other users based on their preferences. At the
same time, the ratings provide as little information as possible about the exchanges in order
to preserve the provided privacy protection. We implement the TrustMeter scheme and
investigate its performance in identifying malicious users in a realistic application scenario. By
means of extensive simulations, we analyze various attack scenarios and show that TrustMeter
identifies most malicious users in the studied scenarios. We further analyze the robustness
of TrustMeter against threats to reputation and quantify the overheads introduced by our
approach.
1.4.3 IncogniSense: An Anonymity-preserving Reputation Framework
Participatory sensing applications are exposed to incorrect contributions due to their inherent
open nature [HKH10a]. For example, participants may inadvertently position the phone in an
undesirable position while collecting sensor readings, or deliberately contribute bad data. Both
behaviors result in erroneous contributions, which need to be identified and eliminated to
ensure the reliability of the computed summaries. Reputation systems assign reputation scores
to the users based on the quality of their contributions and then, use these scores to weed out
bad contributions. However, such systems need to observe the contributions made by each
device for an extended period of time to compute the reputation. They hence require linkability
across multiple contributions from the same device. Attackers, especially malicious application
administrators, can exploit these links to de-anonymize the volunteers and compromise their
privacy, since the sensor readings usually include spatiotemporal meta-data [CRKH11]. We
thus propose IncogniSense, an anonymity-preserving reputation framework based on blind
signatures [Cha83], that addresses this inherent conflict between privacy and reputation
requirements and is agnostic to both the reputation assignment algorithm and the application.
In IncogniSense, each user picks a new pseudonym for each time period, which is used to
report sensor readings. Before the next period starts, the user transfers the reputation score
associated with his current pseudonym to his next pseudonym. This allows the user to conserve
his reputation across multiple periods, while limiting associations between his contributions
to a unique period. IncogniSense cloaks the reputation to be transferred to prevent malicious
application administrators from linking multiple pseudonyms. As reputation cloaking has an
inherent trade-off between anonymity protection and loss in reputation, we explore this design
space by undertaking a detailed simulation-based analysis of several cloaking mechanisms
and we especially study their resilience against linking attacks. Based on this analysis, we
provide guidelines for the choice of the appropriate cloaking scheme in accordance with the
application requirements and the preferences of the users. We conduct a thorough threat
analysis showing the robustness of IncogniSense against reputation corruption and show the
feasibility of our approach in a practical setup.
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1.5 outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 “Foundations” presents a detailed introduction to participatory sensing. We introduce
the notion of privacy and highlight threats to privacy raised in this particular scenario.
Chapter 3 “Related Work” summarizes related work to the field of countermeasures to threats to
privacy in participatory sensing applications and highlights shortcomings of existing privacy-
preserving solutions.
Chapter 4 “Problem Statement” refines the identified shortcomings into research questions
addressed throughout this thesis.
Chapter 5 “Path Jumbling: A Privacy-preserving Collaborative Scheme for Path Hiding” presents
the design and the evaluation of our scheme based on physical exchanges of sensor readings
between users in an opportunistic fashion.
Chapter 6 “TrustMeter: A Trust Assessment Scheme for Collaborative Path Hiding” supplements
the path jumbling approach by providing a scheme that assesses the behavior of the users in
the proposed collaborative privacy-preserving scheme based on peer-based ratings.
Chapter 7 “IncogniSense: An Anonymity-preserving Reputation Framework” details our approach
that addresses the inherent conflict between reputation and privacy, while not trusting the
central entities in presence.
Chapter 8 “Conclusions and Outlook” concludes this thesis with a summary of our contributions
and possible future extensions.

2FOUNDATIONS
If you have built castles in the air, your work
need not be lost; that is where they should
be. Now put the foundations under them.
H. D. Thoreau
This chapter presents an introduction to participatory sensing based on our previous publi-
cation [CRKH11]. In Section 2.1, we first provide an overview of more than 30 representative
applications. In this overview, we specially examine the different sensing modalities of each
application. Based on this overview, we derive a general system model and present the result-
ing architecture components as well as the involved stakeholders in Section 2.2. We finally
discuss the notion of privacy in participatory sensing systems. This includes the introduction
of our definition of privacy tailored to the specificities of participatory sensing systems, in
order to address the lack of a common understanding of privacy [New95]. We also conduct
a privacy analysis in order to determine actors and processes that represent threats to the
privacy of the participants of participatory sensing applications, before highlighting possible
consequences resulting from the disclosure of sensitive information.
2.1 participatory sensing applications
The emergence of the participatory sensing paradigm has resulted in a broad range of novel
sensing applications, which can be categorized as either people-centric or environment-centric
sensing. People-centric applications mainly focus on documenting activities (e.g., sport
experiences) and understanding the behavior (e.g., eating disorders) of individuals. In contrast,
environment-centric sensing applications collect environmental parameters (e.g., air quality or
noise pollution). As many of the applications make use of the same sensing modalities, we
confine our discussion to a selection of representative applications and illustrate the varied
usage models of participatory sensing in this thesis.
2.1.1 People-centric Sensing Applications
People-centric sensing uses the sensor devices integrated in mobile phones to collect data
about the user. We discuss a representative selection of existing people-centric participatory
sensing applications and analyze the sensing modalities used.
Personal Health Monitoring
In personal health monitoring, mobile phones are used to monitor the physiological state and
health of patients/users using embedded or external sensors (e.g., wearable accelerometers
or air pollution sensors). For example, DietSense [RPH+07] assists participants who want to
lose weight by documenting their dietary choices through images and sound samples. The
mobile phones are worn on necklaces and automatically take images of the dishes in front
of the participants. The images document the participants’ food selections and allow for an
estimation of the food weight and waste on the plates. Moreover, the mobile phones capture
the participants’ context during their meals by recording time of day, location, and sound
samples to infer potential relationships between the participants’ behavior and their context
(e.g., having lunch in a restaurant or eating chips late at night on the sofa). All captured data
are uploaded to a personal repository, where the participants can review them in order to
select or discard the information to be shared with their doctors and nutritionists.
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A system to monitor pediatric obesity through multimodal activity detection is presented
in [AMM+08]. The system is based on a heterogeneous wireless body-area network which em-
ploys sensors for heart frequency, acceleration, electrocardiography, blood oxygen saturation,
and the user’s galvanic skin response. All sensor data are tagged with location information,
and optionally with audio and video tags. Adult obesity often results from an imbalance
between calorie intake and calorie expenditure. The BALANCE system [DAC+09] combines
an intuitive entry form for calorie intake with a body-area sensor which caters for activity
classification. The system relies on the analysis of acceleration patterns to classify the partici-
pants’ activities, e.g., sitting, running, walking, or bicycling. By correlating activity types and
their corresponding durations, the participants’ calorie expenditures are estimated. Activity
and calorie monitoring is also combined in the Jog Falls project [NBB+10], which is based on
the combination of body-area sensors (acceleration and heart rate) with a simple interface for
entering calorie intake. Both functionalities are integrated within a mobile phone application.
Complemented by separate blood pressure and weight measurements, participants and their
nutritionists are notified of the overall achievements with regard to their diet and targeted
weight loss.
The HealthSense project [SDAB08] targets the automated detection of health-related events
that cannot be directly observed by current sensor technology, like tow conditions, pain, or
depression. Acceleration data are being used in conjunction with machine learning approaches
to detect correlations, e.g., to diagnose itching as the source for a user’s scratching motions.
MobAsthma [KBRL09] monitors the asthma condition of the patients and their exposure to
pollution. A peak flow meter and a pollution sensor are interfaced to the mobile phone via a
Bluetooth connection, and measure both the volume of air inhaled and expired by the patients
as well as the airborne particle concentration. These measurements are coupled with the
patients’ location and made available to allergists and asthma specialists to investigate the
personal relationships between asthma attacks and exposure to air pollution. In addition to in-
vestigation purposes, MobAsthma can detect asthma attacks in early stages and autonomously
alert remote medical staff.
Mobile phones can also be applied to remotely monitor the activity and posture of patients
(e.g., elderly people living alone) using peripheral or the embedded accelerometers [GFH09].
For example, medical staff can gather the physical condition of elderly people by analyzing
the temporal repartition of their postures among, e.g., sitting, standing, or lying. The gran-
ularity and accuracy of the activity recognition depend on the amount and position of the
accelerometers (worn, e.g., on the hips, or in front/back pockets). Similarly to MobAsthma,
medical staff may be directly alerted via the mobile phones in case of abnormal behavior or
when participants fall with SenSay [SSF+03].
Calculating Environmental Impact and Exposure to Particles
PEIR (Personal Environmental Impact Report) is a system that allows participants to use
their mobile phone to determine their exposure to environmental pollutants [MRS+09]. A
sensing module installed on the phone determines the current location of the user as well as
information about the currently used mode of transportation (e.g., bus vs. car), and transfers
this information to a central server. In return, the server provides the participants with
information about the environmental impact of their traveling in terms of carbon and particle
emissions. Additionally, the server estimates the participants’ exposure to particle emissions
generated by other vehicles and the distance to fast food restaurants while commuting. The
latter may be useful for health conscious participants who may want to avoid the temptation of
stopping by such restaurants. The mode of transport is inferred using accelerometer readings,
while the route travelled is extracted from the captured location traces. Additional input
parameters and models are considered for determining the environmental factors, such as
weather conditions collected by weather stations, road traffic flow models, and vehicle emission
models.
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Monitoring and Documenting Sport Experiences
The BikeNet [EML+07, EML+09], Biketastic [Shi09], and SkiScape [EC06, ELM+06] projects
monitor the sport experiences of the participants. Both BikeNet and Biketastic document the
bicycling experiences of the participants. BikeNet draws a fine-grained portrait of the cyclist
by measuring his current location, speed, burnt calories, and galvanic skin response. Multiple
peripheral sensors are used to obtain this information: Microphone, magnetometer, pedal
speed sensor, inclinometer, lateral tilt, stress monitor, speedometer/odometer, and a sensor for
CO2 concentration. The peripheral sensors form a body area network and interact with the
mobile phone over a wireless connection. In comparison, Biketastic concentrates on the road
conditions, including the roughness of the road and the noise level along the road captured by
on-board accelerometers and microphones, respectively. The captured data can be reviewed
by the cyclists themselves, but can also be merged with other participants’ data or combined
with additional parameters, such as air quality and traffic properties, in order to construct
complete maps for the cycling community.
In contrast, SkiScape focuses on winter sports and is deployed in ski resorts. Peripheral
sensors (temperature sensor, accelerometers, and microphones) are attached either to skis or
personal equipment to measure the body temperature, the maximum acceleration, and the
travelled distance. Besides the sensors bound to the user, several static nodes are located along
the trail and cater for the localization of the user within the ski resort. Using SkiScape, the
participants can document their traces, locate their friends, and select lifts depending on the
queue length. Simultaneously, the manager can optimize the maintenance operations, and
emergency staff can easily localize users in case of accidents.
Enhancing Social Media
A large pool of applications utilizes data captured by sensors to enrich the contents shared
in social media, such as blogs, social networks, or virtual worlds. With Micro-Blog [GLC+08],
participants can create geotagged blog entries and enhance them with multimedia information
(e.g., audio records, pictures, accelerometer data, or Wi-Fi coverage) captured via their mobile
phones. The created entries are then uploaded to a server, which may position them at their
capture location on a global map accessible by the public. Users can browse the entries
displayed on the map to find information about particular points of interests (e.g., audio
reviews about restaurants, or pictures of the nearest beaches). If the information required is
not contained in existing entries, the participants can send queries (e.g., “how is the Wi-Fi
coverage near this beach?”) to the server, which relays them to mobile phones currently
located in this area.
Similarly, CenceMe [MLF+08, MML+08] integrates virtual representations of a participants’
current states and context in social networks and virtual worlds. Based on multimodal
information (acceleration, audio samples, pictures, neighboring devices, and location) captured
by the mobile phone, context information is inferred in various dimensions, including the
user’s mood, location, and habits, as well as information about the currently performed
activity and the environment. The inferred information is then posted as status message in
social networks or translated into the virtual representation of participants in virtual worlds.
Price Auditing
LiveCompare [DC09] and PetrolWatch [DKCB08] facilitate price comparisons of grocery products
and fuel at different locations. Instead of manually reporting the prices, the participants use
their mobile phones to take pictures of the displayed prices. In LiveCompare, the participants
only need to take pictures of a product’s price tag and its barcode. The barcode is decoded
into a textual representation on the mobile phone, and transferred to the server along with
capture time, location information, and the picture displaying the current price. In order to
compare prices, users can search for products in the application, which then retrieves the
corresponding price reports, selects the stores in proximity of the user’s current location and
displays the pictures of the corresponding price tags.
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In comparison, the price collection process is not only simplified in PetrolWatch, but also
automated. Each mobile phone is mounted on the passenger seat of a car and faces the
road to automatically photograph fuel price boards (using GPS and Geographic Information
System (GIS) data) when the vehicle approaches service stations. The pictures are then
uploaded to a central entity, which is responsible for image processing and price extraction.
The brand of the service station is first inferred from the capture location in order to reduce
the image processing complexity, as price boards of different brands differ in colors and
dimensions. Assisted by this information, computer vision algorithms extract the fuel prices,
which are then uploaded to the database. Users can query the system to determine the
cheapest fuel that is available in their area of interest.
2.1.2 Environment-centric Sensing Applications
In environment-centric scenarios, the mobile phones capture information via their embedded
sensors and additional peripheral sensors about the surroundings of the participants. In
contrast to most people-centric sensing scenarios, the captured data are mainly exploited at a
community scale, e.g., to monitor the evolution of environmental parameters like air quality,
thermal columns, noise, road and traffic conditions in cities, or to detect socially interesting
events.
Air Quality Monitoring
In Haze Watch [CYCS10], mobile phones were interfaced to external pollution sensors in order
to measure the concentration of carbon monoxide, ozone, sulphur dioxide, and nitrogen
dioxide concentration in the air. In comparison to meteorological stations, the mobile phones
may collect less accurate measurements. However, their inherent mobility provides large
spatial coverage and allows them to observe unpredictable events (e.g., accidental pollution),
which can seldom be detected by static stations. The mobile phones can thus complement static
high-fidelity data captured by traditional meteorological stations by providing finer-grained
readings. In addition to pollution measurements, the mobile phones can capture temperature
and wind speed, such as shown in PollutionSpy [KBRL09] and by [PHG07]. The timestamped
and geotagged measurements are then uploaded to a server to build maps accessible by the
public that summarize the readings of all participants. Individual measurements may also
be displayed on each user’s mobile phone. Despite a common interest in air pollution, this
application scenario and the related applications differ from the PEIR project presented in
Section 2.1.1, as the pollutant concentrations are actually sensed with real sensors carried by
the participants and not inferred based on weather conditions, traffic condition, and emission
models.
Monitoring Thermal Columns
Ikarus is a participatory sensing application for paraglider pilots [vKSW11]. It collects in-
formation about thermal columns, which are used by pilots to gain in altitude during their
flights. Ikarus is based on the collection of barometric pressure information, annotated with
the time and location of sampling. Thermal maps are then extracted from the contributed
sensor data, and processed for visualization on web-based maps and distribution on other
pilots’ navigation units.
Monitoring Noise and Ambiance
Microphones in mobile phones can be configured to measure the surrounding noise level and
give insights about the nature of contextual events. InNoiseTube [MSNS09], Ear-Phone [RCK+10],
NoiseSpy [KBRL09], and NoiseMap [SBS+11], noise levels are used to monitor noise pollution,
which can, e.g., affect human hearing and behavior. The data are then used to build repre-
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sentative pollution maps to enable specialists to understand the relationships between noise
exposition and behavioral problems.
In addition to noise level, the sound samples can be further analyzed to determine,
e.g., whether human voices were recorded in order to recognize the sound context in Sound-
Sense [LPL+09]. Depending on the recognized context, the corresponding sound samples may
be used to document audio diaries or indicate places where music is currently played to other
users in online social networks.
Furthermore, inMoVi [BC10], the mobile phones collectively sense the surrounding ambiance
to detect precursor signs (e.g., outburst of laughter, moves in the same directions) of relevant
social events (e.g., speeches) and trigger a video recording of the upcoming events in case of
positive detection. The recordings collected by different mobile phones can then be timely and
automatically assembled in a common video clip, which may potentially reduce cumbersome
manual video edition. As the video recordings are automatically triggered, the participants
can focus on the events instead of having to focus on taking recordings.
MetroTrack [AML+10] is used to track mobile noise sources in outdoor environments. Similar
to the aforementioned approaches, mobile phones carried by participants are used as mobile
noise sensors. Collaboration between neighboring mobile phones is used to estimate the
future trajectory of a noise source through the application of distributed Kalman filtering. The
tracking task is automatically forwarded to nodes in proximity to the estimated trajectory to
ensure accurate detection of the mobile noise source.
Monitoring Road and Traffic Conditions
The mobile phones can be exploited to document road and traffic conditions. In Neri-
cell [MPR08], the embedded accelerometer, microphone, and positioning system (GPS or
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) radio) are used to detect and localize
traffic and road conditions, e.g., potholes, bumps, or braking and honking (which are both
considered as implicit indicators of traffic congestion). The application integrates the provided
information about the surface roughness of the roads, the surrounding noise, and the traffic
conditions into traffic maps, which are available to the public. In addition to parameters
related to a cyclist’s activity and his physical condition, the BikeNet project (cf. Section 2.1.1)
measures environmental parameters such as pollution, noise levels, and irregularities of the
roads. Hence, this project can be regarded as a hybrid application, combining components
from both people-centric and environment-centric sensing.
Current solutions for automotive traffic monitoring, such as inductive loops, are usually
expensive in deployment and maintenance costs, and often prone to errors. The concept
of Virtual Trip Lines [HGH+08, HIJ+12] targets to replace these conventional monitoring
solutions by smartphones mounted within vehicles. Instead of deploying costly monitoring
infrastructure, the locations of street segments of interest are modeled as virtual trip lines
and forwarded to the participants’ smartphones. A phone application constantly monitors its
current location, and transmits its position and velocity to the traffic monitoring infrastructure
whenever a virtual trip line has been crossed. A similar approach for traffic monitoring is
based on the use of multiple positioning sensors (GPS, Wi-Fi, and cellular radios) in [TRL+09].
The VTrack system relies on mobile devices which deliver timestamped location estimates to a
server, in order to estimate driving times on different road segments at a fine spatiotemporal
granularity. Based on the availability of traffic information, roads with unusually high
travel times are identified, and real-time information about these traffic hotspots is then
used for route planning. An extension to the approach is presented in [TBGE10], where
the concept of cooperative transit tracking is presented. The lack of public information about
the timeliness of public transportation is encountered by a participatory approach to report
the current location of transit vehicles by the participants on board. A background task on
smartphones automatically detects if the user has entered a transit vehicle, both above ground
and underground, and uploads its current location coordinates to the tracking server.
Although the CarTel [HBZ+06] and GreenGPS [GPA+10] projects utilize dedicated sensing
devices with more resources than current mobile phones, both rely on contributions by partic-
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ipants and can thus be considered as implementations of participatory sensing. GreenGPS
targets to provide a map of the least fuel-consuming routes to drivers. The fuel consumption is
measured via specific sensors accessing the gauges and instrumentation of the vehicles, and is
correlated with location information from an external positioning system. The sensor readings
are stored on a memory card and are manually uploaded to the application by the participants
themselves. The obtained results have shown that high speed and long distance routes do not
necessarily reduce the fuel consumption. Using an embedded computer coupled with sensors,
CarTel analyzes the time it takes a user to commute to work, determines traffic congestion,
and represents jammed roads on a map. Additionally, driving patterns and readings from
automotive on-board diagnosis systems can be taken into account.
2.2 system model
From the analysis of the previous people-centric and environment-centric sensing applications,
we derive the following general system model including stakeholders and architectural
components. Figure 2 summarizes the resulting model and the interactions between its
elements.
2.2.1 Stakeholders
In the above applications, we identify the following stakeholders:
. application administrators They are members of organization, research groups
or individuals who initiate the participatory sensing campaigns. They design, implement,
and deploy the application and are responsible for the maintenance and the management
of the infrastructure. For example, this includes making available the application for
download on the campaigns’ websites or in App Stores and setting up the application
server to collect and process the data.
. participants install the sensing application on their mobile devices and voluntarily
contribute to the participatory sensing campaigns by gathering sensor readings using
the mobile phones they own and carry. Besides being driven by the motivation to benefit
from the data provided by themselves and other participants, their contributions to the
campaigns can be motivated by different factors primarily influenced by the nature
of the campaign. At an individual scale, they may be willing to, e.g., improve their
health conditions, monitor their impact on the environment, or document their sport
experiences. In contrast at a community scale, they may aim at monitoring pollution and
thermal columns to help scientists to understand the monitored phenomena, or helping
other users by providing information about road and traffic conditions. Consequently,
their motivations can be either self-centered (e.g., in Jog Falls), altruistic (such as in
PollutionSpy), or a combination of both (e.g., in Ikarus). Note that the degree of
involvement of the participants in the sensing process depends on the application
characteristics, as discussed in detail in Section 2.2.2.
. end users access and consult the data gathered by the participants according to their
interests and preferences. End users include, e.g., participants willing to consult their
own collected data, application administrators verifying the actual contributions and
results, specialized scientists attempting to gain insights about the monitored phenomena,
health professionals checking patient data, or the general public.
2.2.2 Architecture
In Figure 2, we have identified typical architectural components common to the existing
participatory sensing architectures and determined their function in the general system model.
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Figure 2: Stakeholders and architectural components of participatory sensing applications
The components are generally organized into a client-server architecture and interact from the
sensing process to the presentation of the results to the end users.
. sensing component It is located on the participants’ mobile phones and captures
different kinds of sensor data, prevalently time, location, pictures, sound samples, ac-
celerometer data, pollution data, biometric data, and barometric pressure. We summarize
the sensing modalities used in the presented applications in Table 1. The sensor data
can be captured according to one of the following sensing modes: Manual, automatic,
and context-aware [Est10]. In the manual mode, the participants trigger the collection of
sensor readings themselves when they detect relevant events, such as noise pollution
or traffic congestion. This mode is also referred as participatory sensing in the litera-
ture [BEH+06], as the participants directly participate in the sensing process. On the
contrary, the participants are not directly involved in the automatic and context-aware
modes. In the automatic mode (also known as continuous mode [EML+09]), the sensor
readings are collected at a constant sampling frequency, while their collection depends
on the surrounding environment in the context-aware mode (also known as opportunistic
sensing [CEL+06]), where the embedded sensors monitor their environment and activate
the sensing function when previously set thresholds are exceeded.
. tasking component It supports the above sensing component by distributing the
sensing tasks to the mobile phones. These tasks specify the sensing modalities based
on the application requirements including criteria in order to fulfill to start the capture,
the sensors to be used, and the sampling frequency. One example of such requirements
could be phones equipped with GPS and with embedded cameras that can capture three
megapixel images. The tasks also contain information about location and/or time frame
of interest.
. reporting component It ensures the transmission of the sensor readings collected
by the sensing component to the application server. The data transfers mostly make
use of communication infrastructure available to the mobile phone, such as Wi-Fi, or
GSM/General Packet Radio Service (GPRS)/3G connectivity. For example, the sensor
readings can be transmitted to the server using Short Message Service (SMS), Transport
Control Protocol (TCP) connections [GLC+08], or remote procedure calls [MLF+08].
. storage component It ensures the storage of the collected data on the mobile phone
and the reported data on the server. While the server manages long-term storage of the
reported data, the mobile phone ensures short-term storage of the data to be processed
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Table 1: Comparison of applications and sensing modalities
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g User health
DietSense [RPH+07] x x x x
Pediatric obesity [AMM+08] x x x x x
BALANCE [DAC+09] x x x x
Jog Falls [NBB+10] x x x x
HealthSense [SDAB08] x x
MobAsthma [KBRL09] x x x x
SenSay [SSF+03] x x x
Personal impact PEIR [MRS+09] x x
Sport experiences
BikeNet [EML+07, EML+09] x x x x x x
Biketastic [Shi09] x x x x
SkiScape [EC06, ELM+06] x x x x
Social media Micro-Blog [GLC
+08] x x x x x x
CenceMe [MLF+08, MML+08] x x x x x
Price auditing LiveCompare [DC09] x x x
PetrolWatch [DKCB08] x x
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g
Air pollution
Haze Watch [CYCS10] x x x
PollutionSpy [KBRL09] x x x
[PHG07] x x x
Thermal columns Ikarus [vKSW11] x x x x
Noise and ambiance
NoiseTube [MSNS09] x x x
Ear-Phone [RCK+10] x x x
NoiseSpy [KBRL09] x x x
NoiseMap [SBS+11] x x x
SoundSense [LPL+09] x x x
MoVi [BC10] x x x x
MetroTrack [AML+10] x x x
Road conditions
Nericell [MPR08] x x x x
Virtual Trip Lines [HGH+08, HIJ+12] x x
VTrack [TRL+09] x x
Transit tracking [TBGE10] x x x
CarTel [HBZ+06] x x x x x
GreenGPS [GPA+10] x x
or transmitted to the server. On the server side, the data are commonly stored in
relational databases [GLC+08, HBZ+06, KGZ07] or databases specially adapted to the
management of sensor readings, e.g., sensedDB [GKN+07] and SensorBase [CYHE06].
. processing component Depending on the application, the function of the processing
component is distributed between the mobile phones and the application server. For
example, features of interest, such as the noise level, can be directly extracted from the
sound samples on the mobile phones on an individual basis. On the server side, the
reported sensor readings are processed at larger scale to, e.g., compute statistics and
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build summaries over several users. It hence prepares the data for the presentation
component.
. presentation component It presents the results obtained by the processing compo-
nents to the end users. Individual results stored and processed locally can be directly
display on the mobile phones of the respective participants. Alternatively, consolidated
results of multiple users can be presented through web-portals to a larger public, de-
pending on the characteristics of the applications. The results are presented in forms of
raw data to allow end users to analyze them themselves, or in forms of graphs, maps,
and geographic overlays [HBZ+06]. End users can also send queries to the application
server in order to access sensor readings collected by other users.
2.3 privacy
As we have illustrated in Table 1, virtually all participatory sensing systems collect sensor
readings related to the participants and/or their environments. Obviously, the collected data
may be used to extract or infer sensitive information about a user’s “private life, habits, act and
relations” – the basic definition of privacy by Brandeis [BW90]. Simultaneously, contributed
sensor data are vital to any participatory sensing application, and their deficiency endangers
the success of participatory sensing systems. Application administrators therefore need to
increase the user awareness of the consequences of the disclosure of sensor data as well as
provide solutions to maintain user privacy in order to ensure the durability of the campaign
and prevent participants from opting out.
In this section, we first present our definition of privacy, specially tailored to participatory
sensing systems, and used throughout the remainder of this thesis. We then conduct a privacy
analysis and highlight actors and processes that represent threats to privacy. We finally outline
possible consequences resulting from the disclosure of privacy-sensitive information.
2.3.1 Definition
With the rise of communication equipment and computing systems, the notion of information
privacy has emerged, which has been initially defined as “the claim of individuals [. . . ] to deter-
mine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated
to others” by Westin [Wes67]. Although the field of privacy is multifaceted and comprises
several other dimensions [RGC10], user-level control over sensitive sensor data represents
the major concern in participatory sensing systems. In consequence, we refer to information
privacy whenever the term “privacy” is being used in this thesis.
In order to cater for the specific characteristics of participatory sensing systems, we propose
an adapted version of the above definition of information privacy, which we apply in the
remainder of this thesis:
Privacy in participatory sensing is the guarantee that participants maintain control
over the release of their sensitive information. This includes the protection of
information that can be inferred from both the sensor readings themselves as well
as from the interaction of the participants with the participatory sensing system.
Our definition implies that participants continuously need to control the release of their
sensor readings to third parties (including the participatory sensing application) and have full
control over the provided type of sensor readings, the degree of granularity, the spatiotemporal
context, and the data recipients. In addition to the direct protection of the sensor readings,
the proposed definition includes the protection of the participants against the inference of
sensitive information resulting from their interactions with the participatory sensing system.
This implies that potential adversaries are unable to determine the spatiotemporal information
about the participants, when they download tasks or report data to the application, or link
their real identity with the pseudonyms they use.
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2.3.2 Privacy Analysis
To further understand the privacy concerns in participatory sensing, we analyze participa-
tory systems from a privacy perspective. We base our analysis on the theory of contextual
integrity [Nis04], which comprises the dimensions of appropriateness and distribution. Appro-
priateness defines if the revelation of a particular piece of information is appropriate in a
given context, while distribution focuses on the occurrence of an information transfer from
one party to another. The concept of contextual integrity defines breaches of appropriateness or
distribution as violations to a user’s privacy.
Socio-cultural and contextual differences have a strong impact on the individual perception
of data sensitivity. For example, participants make different privacy decisions depending
on the number of recipients of their data [TLH+10]. While it has been shown that users
pragmatically determine whether they share their locations with a single person, additional
parameters like their willingness to attract attention or boost their self-presentation are taken
into account when they decide about sharing their whereabouts with a larger group of people.
In consequence, the appropriateness entirely depends on the individual privacy conception of
each user. We thus discuss this dimension at a high level and confine our privacy analysis
to a thorough examination of distribution aspects for the stakeholders present in typical
participatory sensing applications. In all cases, we assume that the analyzed participatory
sensing systems collect sensor readings including pictures, sound samples, acceleration,
pollution data, biometric data, and barometric pressure (see Table 1), which are tagged with
spatiotemporal information.
. who gathers the sensor readings? The sensor readings initially collected by
the participants are reported to the application server, which is run by the application
administrators. The administrators therefore have a direct access and control over the
collected sensor readings. While the distribution of the sensor readings to the application
administrators is part of participatory sensing systems and the participants are aware
of this fact, the reported sensor readings may reveal sensitive information about the
participants, if no privacy-preserving processing is locally applied on the mobile phones.
The participants are the only ones able to judge the appropriateness of the revealed
information, as it depends on their personal privacy conception as well as the nature and
the context of the revealed information. However, the users may encounter difficulty in
translating their own conception of privacy into, e.g., privacy settings, and to understand
the implications of their settings and actions on their privacy [DLHH09]. For example,
participants are often unaware of the technical details of the underlying architecture.
They may underestimate the risks related to their privacy [AG05], and pay little attention
to policies and end user licensing agreement, both of which are often laid out in technical
terms and thus hard to understand [GDG+05]. In summary, a combination of the
inconsistent behavior of the users and the lack of existing solutions to clarify privacy
implications may lead to sub-optimal privacy protection.
. who analyzes the sensor readings? The sensor readings are analyzed after
having been reported to the servers. The application administrators determine and
implement the processing applied on the sensor readings. Particular privacy-aware
functions can be applied to anonymize the users and/or remove sensitive information
about them before their release to the analysts. However, the sensor readings can
still contain private information about the users. After this preparatory processing,
the sensor readings can be analyzed by different groups of people depending on the
application scenario. These include the users themselves, the application administrators,
doctors, researchers in the field, etc. The users maintain different relationships with
the groups of analysts that directly impact the appropriateness. For example, it is
considered as appropriate for users to share personal information related to their health
conditions with their doctors [Nis04], whereas sharing the same information with a
different analyst, such as a application administrator, may be inappropriate. By reporting
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their sensor readings to the application, the users are aware that they can be analyzed
by the application (i.e., the application administrators). However, they may ignore that
the distribution of their sensor readings can be extended to external analysts potentially
unknown to them, endangering the appropriateness.
. who accesses the processed sensor readings? The analyzed sensor readings
are released by the application administrators to the end users. The access to the sensor
readings is determined by access control rules defined by either the users themselves or
the campaign type. The authorized persons can be restricted to only the users themselves
or extended to their relatives, friends, or a larger public, depending on the application.
In the worst case, the circle of authorized persons is thus enlarged from the application
administrators and analysts to the general public, raising the issue of appropriateness
to its climax. The level of appropriateness can be moderated by proposing different
degrees of granularity at which the data are released depending on the nature of the
relationships between the users and the end users. However, the distribution of the
sensor readings is performed by the application administrators. The users must thus
trust them not to disclose sensitive information about themselves to untrusted parties.
In summary, the respect of the privacy of the users therefore primarily depends on the
application administrators who have direct access to the reported sensor readings and ensure
their distribution to potential analysts and end users. Malicious application administrators
or inefficient mechanisms to both remove private information from the sensor readings and
control their access can thus contribute to the violation of the privacy of the users.
2.3.3 Privacy Threats
Let us assume that a worst case scenario where application administrators break the trusted
relationship to the users and reveal sensitive information about them. We examine the potential
social consequences of such disclosure by successively considering the sensing modalities
listed in Table 1:
. time and location It is evident by examining the table that virtually all applications
(except for Jog Falls, HealthSense, and BALANCE) collect time and location information
independently of their people-centric or environmental-centric nature, thus underpinning
the importance of these two contextual factors. GPS receivers embedded in most current
smartphones provide very accurate location coordinates. However, in the absence of
GPS (due to lack of coverage or if the user does not want to reveal fine-grained location
information), Wi-Fi, or cellular network based triangulation can be used to obtain coarse-
grained location information [LCC+05]. Contextual information collected from other
embedded sensors (such as points of interest [ACC09], light, and noise) can also be used
to identify a person’s location. Furthermore, temporal annotations of sensor data can
provide insights about the habits of the users.
Given their importance, the disclosure of data from these two modalities has been
shown to leak privacy-sensitive information about the users, including their home and
workplace locations, as well as their routines and habits [Shi09]. For example, frequent
visits to hospitals may allow employers to infer the medical condition of their employees,
and similarly, attendance at political events may provide information about the political
views of users [Liu07]. In summary, without any protection mechanism, the disclosure
of location information may lead to severe consequences ranging from social to safety
and security threats [Shi09]. Additionally, the threats resulting from location/time traces
are not confined to applications where authentication is required. Even in the case of
anonymous contributions, location traces may be analyzed to infer the identity of the
users based on their residence location and reverse white page lookups [Kru07].
. sound samples Besides inferring identities and preferences from spatiotemporal data
only, the portrait of the user can be refined by complementing these data by samples of
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other sensing modalities. In several of the aforementioned applications, sound samples
are either recorded intentionally by the users, or captured automatically by the mobile
phones. While users can easily preserve their privacy by only recording non-sensitive
events in the former case, mobile phones effectively behave as smart spies in the case of
automated recordings. Dedicated user interaction is required to prevent the applications
from recording private conversations about intimate or confidential subjects. Even in
public locations, the recognition of characteristic sound patterns that are unique to
certain events and locations may allow adversaries to determine a user’s current context.
. pictures and videos The content of contributed pictures and recorded videos is also
likely to reveal personal information about the users and their environment. Although
DietSense [RPH+07] targets to take photos of consumed meals, no countermeasures are
taken to conceal the faces of persons sharing their meal with the users. In all scenarios, in
which the camera is oriented away from the user, faces of other people in the vicinity are
possibly captured in the images, and thus conclusions about the number and identity of
the user’s social relations can be drawn. The publication of captured pictures may lead
to similar consequences as in online social networks, such as Facebook, where a teacher
was suspended due to a picture showing her holding glasses filled with alcohol [CBS11],
or a depressed woman who lost benefits from her health insurance for pictures showing
her attending parties and relaxing on the beach [CBC09]. Similar to sound recordings,
the current user context and the surrounding environment may also be extracted from
sensor data. For example, pictures showing points of interest may easily establish the
user’s presence at those locations.
. acceleration Raw accelerometer readings may appear less threatening in revealing
private information about the users. However, this hypothesis is not always true and may
often only serve as a false sense of security. For example, if the mobile phone is carried on
the hip, information about the gait, and thus possible indications about a user’s identity,
may be inferred [DNBB10]. Additionally, the research field of activity recognition also
makes extensive use of accelerometer readings [GFH09]. The exploitation of these data
by malicious users may have negative consequences. For example, employers may want
to verify that their employees are actually working during their working hours. If the
employers detect anomalies, they might suspend the respective employees. Moreover,
acceleration data may be exploited to infer the current activity of the users or text
sequences they entered on their mobile phone [OHD+12].
. environmental data Recording particles and gas concentrations or barometric
pressure may not directly threaten the privacy of the users by themselves. However,
particular air compositions combined with secondary information, such as precise air
temperature, might identify the location of the users at a level of granularity as fine
as room levels within buildings, where location information can be inaccurate due to
non-availability of GPS or other location services.
. biometric data Biometric sensor data can be used for a diagnosis of a user’s current
physiological state. Similarly to medical staff, adversaries may identify health anomalies
or diseases based on the captured sensor data. Leaked medical information may then be
used by health insurance companies or employers to revoke contracts, if an impairment
of the physiological conditions of the users is identified. Biometric data can also be used
in authentication mechanisms. Their leakage therefore poses the risks that unauthorized
persons access sensitive data or locations.
Privacy threats represent an inherent problem of any participatory sensing application.
Although the subjects of interests of environment-centric applications are not the users
themselves, all considered applications monitor the spatiotemporal context of the users and
therefore represent a danger to their privacy. Furthermore, additionally captured sensing
modalities may provide further insights about the users. As a result, environment-centric
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applications can similarly endanger the privacy of the users, even if the threats are less
perceptible at first sight than in the case of people-centric applications. Further sensor
modalities can be anticipated in future, such as using stylus or touch screens or wireless
interfaces (e.g., Near Field Communication (NFC), Wi-Fi, or Bluetooth) for capturing personal
information about the users and other users in their surroundings.
Location privacy has been predominately addressed in the literature in comparison with
the other sensing modalities. The particular interest for location privacy may be due to the
sharing of similar concerns with orthogonal domains addressing this issue, such as vehicular
networks [RH07], location-based services [MFD03], pervasive computing [BS03], ubiquitous
computing [Ber05], etc. In contrast, the remaining sensing modalities are less represented
in the literature, as they are one of the particularities of participatory sensing applications.
However, we have shown in this section that their combinations may leak sensitive information
about the users and people in their vicinity, or provide information about their locations, even
if those are protected by privacy-preserving mechanisms.
2.4 summary
Participatory sensing leverages the ubiquity of mobile phones to open new perspectives in
terms of sensing. Within the scope of this chapter, we have analyzed existing participatory
sensing applications. As a result, we have identified the different sensor modalities contributed
by the participants of such applications and mapped the components of these applications
into a generic system model. Our analysis has revealed that virtually all applications capture
location and time information. This information is used either as self-contained data, or to
geo-tag and timestamp other collected sensor readings including pictures, sound samples,
acceleration, pollution, and biometric data. We have examined the extent of personal infor-
mation that can be inferred from the collected sensing modalities, both individually and in
combination. Finally, we have provided a definition of privacy in participatory sensing and
highlighted potential threats to user privacy resulting from the uncontrolled disclosure of
personal information to untrusted people.

3RELATED WORK
A single leaf working alone provides no shade.
C. Page
After having outlined the privacy threats and the corresponding need for privacy-protecting
mechanisms to encourage user participation, we examine the current state-of-the-art solutions
which attempt to address these threats. We conduct a cross-analysis of the architectural
elements present in typical sensing applications and present existing countermeasures based
on our work [CRKH11]. In particular, we focus on solutions that have been applied in the
specific domain of participatory sensing. Figure 3 depicts the several stages through which
the sensed data pass between its collection and the consumption by the target audience and
summarizes potential countermeasures to privacy threats applied at each step. By tracing the
distribution path of sensor data, we outline how privacy can be maintained and improved
at these steps. Firstly, we address the implications on privacy as outlined in Chapter 2
by discussing tailored sensing and anonymous task distribution in Sections 3.1 and 3.2,
respectively. We then consider different schemes to anonymize and protect the privacy of the
users while the data are reported to the application server (see Section 3.3). Subsequently,
we detail solutions for privacy-aware data processing in Section 3.4 and storage including
mechanisms to review, delete, and control the retention of sensed data in Section 3.5. We
next present current solutions to control and audit their access in Section 3.6 and conclude
the discussion of countermeasures by focusing on data queries in Section 3.7. Note that we
subsequently discuss related work specific to our contributions in each corresponding chapter.
3.1 tailored sensing and user preferences
A first measure to encounter the privacy threats discussed in Section 2.3.3 is to control the data
collection process at the user level and allow the users to express their privacy preferences. In
the presented scenarios, this control is applied to different extents. Although some solutions
allow users to fully disable the sensing function [MLF+08, SBE+08], doing so is of little use
for participatory sensing, since users would be unable to contribute any data. As proposed
in [DMP+10], this binary scheme (full access to sensor data, or none at all) can be extended by
introducing additional intermediate levels. For example, the users may decide to selectively
enable sensor measurements depending on a variety of factors, such as presence in sensitive
locations (home or office), or their current social surroundings (presence of friends or family
members). The selection of theses factors allows users to explicitly indicate the type of
information that they are happy with being collected in different contexts. They thus define
their personal conception of appropriateness as defined in Section 2.3.2.
To reflect the user’s privacy preferences whilst optimizing data fidelity, a finer-grained
scheme allows users to adjust the sensing granularity and the time resolution. For example,
samples may be collected every hour instead of every 15 seconds, or location information
be captured at different degrees of granularity [SLB+03]. Table 2 illustrates possible degrees
of granularity and related examples which may be applied in the context of some of the
applications discussed in Section 2.1. Starting with the finest granularity on top, i.e., the
unaltered original/raw data, the data resolution decreases towards the bottom of the table
until reaching the coarsest meaningful degree of granularity. Depending on the application
characteristics, the granularity of the different sensing modalities can be tuned in different
ways, with the ones presented in the table only serving as illustrative examples.
Although this scheme does not provide a generic trade-off between privacy and disclosed
data, it is expected to improve the overall acceptance of the solution by offering additional
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Figure 3: Countermeasures and their relationships to the architectural components
Table 2: Example of granularity degrees for different sensing modalities
granularity location sound photo acceleration
Fine-grained Precise position Original sample Original image Raw data
···· Street Voices removed Faces blurred Activity type
·· District Spectral properties Number of persons Activity category
Coarse City Loudness level Environment (indoor/outdoor) Motion (yes/no)
resolutions of granularity to the users. From the perspective of the application, coarse-grained
data are still better than no data. For example, the location of air pollution measurements can
be released at the granularity of a district. It should also be noted that sensing granularity
has a direct impact on the energy consumption of the mobile phone. Whenever a sensor is
activated for collecting data, it consumes energy from the phone’s battery. As such, sampling
at a coarser granularity implies that the sensors may be turned off for longer periods of
time, thus resulting in energy savings. Simultaneously, both the size and quantity of the
data to be transmitted are reduced. Transmitting data also consumes energy for the radio
(3G or Wi-Fi) transmission, thus less data volume also results in additional energy savings.
However, additional processing may be required to filter the data and report them with a
coarser granularity (e.g., recognizing the presence of faces on the images to eliminate them)
leading to supplementary energy consumption, which needs to be regarded specifically.
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3.2 privacy-preserving task distribution
Sensor data collection is generally triggered through tasks, which specify the sensing modalities
(e.g., regions of interest, criteria to fulfill to start the capture, sensors used, and sampling
frequency) based on the application’s requirements. The tasks are subsequently distributed
to the mobile phones that satisfy the tasking requirements. The distribution of tasks can,
however, threaten the privacy of the participants. In this section, we first outline the different
existing modalities to distribute sensing tasks, before highlighting specific threats to privacy
and summarizing existing solutions.
The tasks are initially downloaded from the application server. A central tasking component
located on the application server or a dedicated tasking server [KGZ07] selects appropriate
devices based on predetermined criteria to optimize the sensing process, such as the current
location of the mobile phone or its available resources (embedded sensors, battery lifetime,
currently executed tasks, or processing capabilities) [RSB+09]. Once the devices are selected
in a centralized task distribution model, the application server deploys the sensing tasks on
the devices, e.g., via a push model based on executable binaries [DMP+10].
In case of decentralized task distribution, mobile phones autonomously manage and dis-
tribute tasks to devices in their proximity, depending on the availability of the required sensors,
such as proposed in [ELC08]. For example, a mobile phone A, which is not equipped with
the sensors required by the tasks, transfers its tasks to other mobile phones embedding such
sensors in the vicinity. A initiates the task transfer by broadcasting requests including the
task to execute and the corresponding sensors to mobile phones B and C in its proximity. At
the reception of these requests, B and C verify if they can fulfill the included task conditions.
Assuming that only B possesses the required sensors, A transfers its sensing task to B. B can
fulfill the transferred task either instantly if both mobile phones are located in the task’s region
of interest or remotely when B enters the region of interest.
The Bubble-sensing model [LLEC08, LLEC10] is a hybrid alternative to the purely central-
ized and decentralized schemes. Although mainly based on decentralized distribution of
tasks, the concept also requires the presence of a central entity to maintain the sensing tasks.
Users, designated as bubble creators, can create persistent sensing areas at defined places of
interests. They initiate a sensing request including the geographical region, duration, and
sensing modality corresponding to each bubble and broadcast it to potential bubble carriers
(i.e., other users) in a distributed fashion. Bubble carriers may then move to the specified
location, perform the sensing, and report the collected data to the central entity, the bubble
server, from where the data can be retrieved by the bubble creator. The persistence of bubbles
during the sensing period is ensured by designating bubble carriers with low expected node
mobility as bubble anchors, which maintain bubbles on behalf of their creators, should they
become disconnected from the bubble. Nevertheless, bubbles may disappear in absence of
anchors. In order to address this issue and restore orphaned bubbles, the users additionally
contact the bubble server in regular time intervals to search for bubbles near their current
location, and join them if the required sensing modalities match.
In all three presented approaches for task distribution, the tasking and downloading
processes may endanger the privacy of the users in several ways. First, downloading tasks
provides information to the tasking server about the location of the users at precise timestamps,
while the nature of the tasks provides hints about the devices used. Additionally, even when
pseudonyms are used, the tasking server may infer the identity of the users by tracking their
locations across multiple downloads, as the locations of their workplaces and homes may
be exposed [Kru07]. In order to protect the users, the following mechanisms for ensuring
anonymity and location-privacy have been proposed:
. tasking beacons The participating devices receive the broadcast beacons including
the sensing tasks without having to register/authenticate themselves to a central en-
tity [KKT09]. As a result, users do not expose their identity to the server through the
broadcast nature of the beacons.
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. tasks downloads in densely populated locations The high density of peo-
ple present at such locations makes the identification of the users by the server difficult,
and hence conceals their identities [SCP+10]. As a downside, users can only download
tasks in highly populated areas.
. attribute-based authentication Instead of using their precise identity, the users
can use cryptographic-based credentials showing their memberships to a particular
group (e.g., students registered in the cycling club of the university) [KKT09], as realized
in [CS97]. Again, the identities are hidden within the group of users and the level of
protection depends on the size of this group.
. location privacy-preserving routing schemes Although not directly anony-
mizing the users, these schemes hide their location using specific router/relay or-
ganization [AMCK+02, DMS04]. For example, the TOR-based routing scheme used
in [SCP+10] anonymizes the connections to the tasking server using multiple relays and
onion routing to hide the Internet Protocol (IP) address, and thus information about the
current location of the users [KKT09].
Moreover, a malicious tasking entity may submit tasks with restrictive acceptance conditions
including, e.g., a rare sensor type or specific mobile phone brands. Known as narrow task-
ing [SCP+10], this attack may allow the attacker to de-anonymize the mobile phones accepting
these highly device-specific tasks, as only one or few mobile phones share these restrictive
conditions. A countermeasure to the narrow tasking attack consists of introducing a trusted
third party storing the attributes of all mobile phones and verifying that a sufficient number of
mobile phones (above a predetermined threshold) are able to fulfill the acceptance conditions
in order to protect the anonymity of the mobile phones and their users accepting the tasks.
Furthermore, a malicious tasking entity may attempt to differentiate and identify anonymous
users by launching selective tasking attacks [SCP+10], where the tasking entity distributes a
task to only a restricted pool of mobile phones. The selective tasking attack differs from the
narrow tasking attack, as the selective tasking attack aims at linking the anonymous mobile
phones uploading the tasking reports to the reports themselves, while the narrow tasking
attack straightforwardly infers the identity of the devices/users based on the task acceptance.
As the number of tasked devices is restricted, the adversary can easily link each anonymous
mobile phone to the reports it has uploaded. A further analysis of the uploaded reports may
then breach the anonymity of mobile phones. In order to prevent this attack, the responsibility
of selecting the tasks can be transferred from the tasking server to the users themselves, who
select a random amount of available tasks to execute.
3.3 anonymous and privacy-preserving data reporting
In most applications, captured sensor data are reported to the central server directly after
they have been recorded. We have identified that almost exclusively, all participatory sensing
applications record location and time information (cf. Section 2.3.3). A prominent attack is thus
the inference of location traces. The collection of location information over several reports may
allow to identify the paths followed and the locations visited by the participants. The disclosure
of the raw location data is likely to reveal the identity of users and may thus endanger their
privacy. Besides the actual data contained in the reports, reporting data to the application
server may also threaten the privacy of the users. In fact, users’ locations can be inferred from
the IP address associated with each upload using IP address geolocation. By analyzing the
reporting pattern across multiple reports, additional conclusions about the whereabouts of
the users can be drawn that may lead to their identification and de-anonymization [SCP+10].
In this section, we summarize existing mechanisms used to protect the privacy of the users
against the analysis of both report contents and reporting patterns.
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3.3.1 Pseudonymity
A common mechanism to protect the anonymity and privacy of the users is the use of
pseudonyms (cf. Section 3.2). Instead of transmitting names in plain text, all interaction
with the application is performed under an alias. Pseudonymity is currently used in various
applications, including [SBE+08, Shi09, DC09]. When used in conjunction with authentica-
tion mechanisms, pseudonym-based solutions suggest anonymity and confidentiality to the
user [SBE+08]. The users tend to share their sensor readings without apprehension as they feel
more protected behind pseudonyms. This subjective feeling however leads to a false perception
of security, as the use of pseudonyms does not necessarily guarantee privacy in location-based
applications. As demonstrated in [Kru07], an analysis of the reported data in conjunction with
the reporting patterns may allow identifying the users’ residences among other significant
places, such as workplaces and favorite entertainment centers, based on their location traces.
The residence addresses may then be exploited to find the corresponding users’ real names
using reverse address lookups. Pseudonyms must therefore be complemented by additional
mechanisms to protect the users’ locations (during both the sensing and reporting processes)
to efficiently provide privacy guarantees. The anonymity-based TOR network [DMS04] is used
in [SCP+10] to hide the origins of reports and prevent an identification of the real identities of
the users from their locations. Before transmitting reports, the mobile phones select random
relays along the path to the application server, instead of a direct route. The selected routes
are then appended to the reports using a layered scheme, similar to onion layers. At each relay
on the selected routes, a layer is removed using a symmetric key shared between this relay
and the mobile phone. As a result, no relay knows the complete path from the report’s source
to the application server, but only the identities of preceding and following hops/relays.
3.3.2 Spatial Cloaking
In addition to privacy-aware routing (e.g., TOR-based networks), mechanisms based on k-
anonymity [Swe02] can be applied to protect the location privacy of the users who upload
reports. The key idea behind k-anonymity is to build groups of k users or reports such that
they share a common attribute (e.g., k users located in the same district), rendering them
indistinguishable from each other. Different methods can be used to find an appropriate and
common attribute in order to construct groups of k users. These methods can be classified
into the two main categories of generalization and perturbation [HKH10b].
In the former, the original value of the attribute is generalized by a value with less degree
of detail. For example, the exact coordinates of the k users are replaced by the name of the
district of their current location. In contrast, perturbation is based on replacing the original
sensor data by new values resulting from a function applied to the k sensor readings of the
group members. For example, the location of each group member can be replaced by the
average location of all members.
Tessellation is a form of generalization based on the division of a geographic area into
multiple tiles. It is applied in [SCP+10], where tiles are established by applying Voronoi
partitioning to a map of Wireless LAN access points. The access point in the center of each
tile keeps track of the average number of connected devices, which is equal to the maximum
value of kt that can be achieved within the tile. To guarantee k-anonymity throughout the
network, neighboring tiles with kt < k are combined into cells with an effective value equal to
the sum of each individual tile. Once the cells have been defined, the users tag their sensor
data with the geographical boundary of their current cell instead of supplying their exact
coordinates. Alternatively, instead of transmitting the dimensions of the cell, the users may
report the geographical center of the cell, as proposed in [HKH10b].
In contrast, microaggregation [DFMS02] does not generalize the user location to a cell,
but replaces the real location by the averaged location of the k nearest users, the so called
equivalence class. Setting up equivalence classes is known to be NP-hard [Bru78], and among
the proposed heuristics, the Maximum Distance to Average Vector (MDAV) algorithm has
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been shown to be very efficient in setting up equivalence classes. However, as user mobility is
inherent in participatory sensing applications, equivalence classes may need to be changed
dynamically and thus protect new users less efficiently. Frequent re-computations in turn
may negate the efficiency advantage of MDAV. The Variable-size Maximum Distance to
Average Vector (V-MDAV) [SMBDF06] algorithm offers variable class sizes and improves
the performance of its predecessor in dynamic environments. The recursive algorithm is
composed of two main steps. In the first step, k users are clustered based on their locations
and the relative Euclidean distances. Once the clusters are formed, additional users can join
the clusters in the second step, even if each cluster already contains k members and thereby
fulfills the k-anonymity requirement.
A risk to k-anonymity is the possibility of homogeneity attacks, as outlined in [MKGV07].
Such attacks exploit the monotony of certain attributes to identify individuals from the set
of k users. The authors thus present an extension to k-anonymity, termed l-diversity, which
additionally requires the group members to provide at least l different values for the sensed
attribute of interest. As a result, at least l distinct values for the sensitive attributes are present
within each user group, which represents an effective countermeasure to homogeneity attacks.
The principle of l-diversity is employed in [HKH10b], where an l-diverse extension to the
aforementioned V-MDAV algorithm is proposed and evaluated. The authors also extend the
V-MDAV scheme further by introducing Hybrid V-MDAV, which combines V-MDAV with
tessellation (with tile center reporting). The hybrid scheme thus benefits from the advantages
of both approaches. Tessellation is applied if a user can construct a tile within his own cell,
meaning that at least k other users share the same cell. Otherwise, the V-MDAV scheme is
used, as it performs better in case of sparse distribution of users across multiple cells.
Nevertheless, these approaches rely on a trusted third-party managing the generalization
or perturbation of the locations for all users. To generate the cloaked values, the users need
to report their exact locations to the third-party entity. In contrast, [APN+12a, APN+12b]
propose an approach, in which the mobile phones locally and dynamically evaluate the degree
of spatial cloaking to apply. Based on the past and current mobility patterns of the users, the
clients iteratively reduce the degree of granularity of the released locations until reaching a
privacy threshold set by the users.
3.3.3 Data Perturbation
Data perturbation intentionally perturbs the sensor samples by adding artificial distortions
such as Gaussian noise to the data on the client side. The overall intention of data perturbation
is to determine community trends and distributions without revealing individual data. The
characteristics of the applied noise must thus be chosen carefully, as it needs to perturb
individual sensor readings sufficiently while still ensuring that the statistical trend remains
unaffected. For example, independent random noise has been demonstrated to be insufficient
to prevent adversaries from reconstructing the original data in [Kru07].
A data perturbation scheme particularly tailored to the requirements of participatory sensing
applications was proposed in [GPTA08]. Its principle is as follows. First, a noise model with
characteristics similar to a realistic data set is generated using an approximate model of
the phenomenon monitored by the application. Note that preliminary knowledge about
the data distribution is required, which may not be available in all participatory sensing
applications. The designed model, which is composed of a structural description as well as the
probability distribution of the parameters, is then distributed to the community. The users use
the distributed model to locally generate noise and superimpose it on their sensor readings.
In order to complicate the reconstruction of each individual data, the proposed approach
allows the users to change the values of the noise generation parameters regularly. The data
perturbed by the users are then reported to the application. As the statistical characteristics
of the noise model are known, the sum, average, and distribution of the added noise over
the data of all users can be approximated. The community results (including trends and
distribution) can be estimated by subtracting the average noise time series from the sum of all
3.3 anonymous and privacy-preserving data reporting 27
individual perturbed data, the precision of the estimation increasing with the community size.
Other examples that make use of data perturbation, though not in the context of participatory
sensing, can be found in [AS00, AA01, EGS03].
3.3.4 Hiding Sensitive Locations
Sensitive locations can be selected by the users and protected using location selective hid-
ing [MRS+09], which was introduced in the PEIR campaign presented in Section 2.1.1 and
represents an alternative to data perturbation. When the user approaches a location which
has been priorly defined as sensitive, the application generates fictitious location traces which
intentionally avoid the selected location. However, the generated traces remain realistic,
i.e., following exiting roads and streets. The algorithm selects the closest routes first, then
refines the selection by taking the history of the users’ results into account (e.g., their physical
capacities based on their preceding experiences). Furthermore, the algorithm even shifts the
activities timely and modifies their duration to maintain the consistency of the application re-
sults. In comparison with data perturbation (Section 3.3.3) and spatial cloaking (Section 3.3.2),
the location selective hiding scheme improves the location privacy without impacting the
application results. In fact, data perturbation and spatial cloaking only modify the location
information without considering the consistency of the results and visits to the sensitive
locations may still be identifiable after the application of these schemes depending on the
granularity and noise model selected.
3.3.5 Data Aggregation
In comparison to the previous schemes, the privacy-preserving data aggregation approach
proposed in [SZLZ10] does not rely on a central entity to protect data privacy, but on a mutual
protection between users. Before transmitting data to the server, the mobile phones partially
distribute their data among their neighbors. The mobile phones then upload the sensed
data coming from their neighbors and the remaining of their own data. This distribution
diminishes the probability to successfully attribute each sensor reading to the mobile phone
which actually captured it. For example, if two mobile phones A and B exchange half of their
data, the probability that the data reported by A was actually captured by itself is 50% (in
absence of any additional and prior knowledge), and the same holds for B.
Moreover, this approach does not require any preliminary knowledge about the data
distribution which is necessary in data perturbation schemes (cf. Section 3.3.3). Depending
on the nature of the aggregation functions, two distinct schemes can be applied. For additive
functions, each mobile phone/node partitions its data into n+ 1 slices and sends one slice to
each of n selected nodes. There are three ways in which nodes can be selected. In the first
model, the nodes are selected randomly regardless of their location leading to an additional
energy consumption overhead if multi-hop communication is supported. In the second model,
the one-hop neighbors are selected via a single broadcast. The efficiency of the privacy
protection directly depends on the density of neighbors located in the broadcast regions, as
n is lower in sparsely populated regions than in dense ones. An h-hop version is proposed
in the third model, where h is a system parameter. Once each node has distributed its slices
to its neighbors, the exchanged slices and the node’s own slice are combined and sent to the
aggregation server which is then able to compute the aggregation result. For non-additive
aggregation functions, such as percentiles and histograms, a method combining slicing, count
query, and binary search can be applied. Nevertheless, this approach only ensures data privacy
protection if the nodes and the server do not conspire to breach the privacy of potential targets.
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3.4 privacy-aware data processing
In typical participatory sensing applications, data processing is shared between the mobile
phones and the application server. However, due to the resource constraints on mobile plat-
forms, the distribution of the processing tasks between both parties is typically biased towards
the server. While preprocessing is generally carried out on the phones to reduce the amount
of data to transfer in order to save bandwidth and transmission energy, complex processing
tasks may exceed the computational power of mobile phones, making their execution on the
server necessary. Moreover, complex processing might also require information from other
participants, which complicates its execution on mobile phones.
In the applications discussed in Section 2.1, the data processing on the mobile phone mainly
constitutes extracting features from the raw data to remove sensitive information endangering
the privacy of the users (e.g., human voices recorded or people photographed) and for resource
saving purposes. For example, an audio classifier can analyze the sound samples to determine
whether human voices were recorded [MLF+08]. Further, the loudness level of the audio
samples can be determined locally by running signal processing algorithms to minimize the
data to be transferred to the server [MSNS09]. After processing, the raw data may be deleted
from the local storage and the processed summaries are reported to the central server.
On the server side, the reported data may then be processed to eliminate privacy-sensitive
information, such as the identity or data characteristics threatening the anonymity/privacy of
the users. For example, the captured data can be aggregated among several users to render
them indistinguishable or published in the form of statistics [GPA+10] and maps [DKCB08].
By doing so, sensitive data are not directly revealed to the end users, which avoids direct
identification of the users. However, the users must rely on the application to efficiently
anonymize the data, sufficiently protect their privacy, and not disclose the privacy-sensitive
information contained in their reported data to third parties.
3.5 review, deletion, storage, and retention of data
After the collecting sensor data, the users can review them to verify that they do not contain
sensitive information (e.g., faces in pictures or sensible locations) and judge of the appropri-
ateness of the released information. If privacy-sensitive or inappropriate items are identified,
the users can discard and delete them before the data are being reported to the application
server [AAB+07]. Alternatively, the application can automatically discard the buffered sensor
data unless the users review them and indicate their willingness to share the same [SBE+08].
Most of the applications discussed earlier rely on a centralized system storage managed
by the application itself. The pool of sensor data is easily accessible for processing, which
is advantageous for the application. However, this solution reduces the users’ control over
their data. Once they have uploaded their data, the users must trust the central entity not
to disclose them to unauthorized third parties. Even if applications may authorize the users
to delete the uploaded data or adopt retention policies favorable for the users (e.g., deleting
the location information every six months by default [MRS+09]), the users do not typically
receive any confirmation that data have been definitely removed from the server.
To address this issue of access control, a short-term solution may be to locally store the
sensitive data on the mobile phones to prevent third parties from accessing and potentially
misusing them. However, the mobile phones often suffer from resource and energy constraints,
which effectively limit storage and processing capability. Moreover, this storage modality
may not be appropriate to community-oriented applications, where global processing may be
necessary to highlight interesting features of the data.
A solution for the secure data storage are so called Personal Data Vaults (PDVs) [MHM+10],
which uncouple the acquisition of sensor data and their secure storage. PDVs are individually
controlled secure data repositories, which may only be fully accessed by their owner. The
owner may however choose to share information based on its time or location annotations,
or provide post-processed data to external services. SensorSafe [CCCS11, CCS12] is another
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framework that helps users in managing their data in a privacy-aware fashion. Instead of
providing a unique data store accessible only by its owner as in [MHM+10], SensorSafe allows
users to access multiple remote data stores by leveraging a broker. Besides, it offers similar
services as the PDVs in terms of sharing. For example, users can define context-aware and
behavioral-based sharing rules. Based on these rules, SensorSafe applies the corresponding
obfuscation mechanisms on the stored data before their release. It further detects and notifies
the users in case of rule conflicts.
Personal virtual machines also represent an alternative to local storage, designated as
virtual individual servers [CCL+09], where the users can upload their raw data. The data are
only uploaded once and may then be released to all applications the users are involved in.
Different applications can be authorized to access different sets of data according to their
demands. Consequently, the users maintain the control over their data and can dynamically
determine potential recipients of selected sets of data. In comparison with a centralized
scheme, this approach may generate additional management overhead for the users, but they
retain ownership of their data and can directly control their privacy.
3.6 access control and audit
Depending on the application scenario, the sensing results may not only be of interest for the
users, but also different stakeholders, e.g., researchers, medical staff, friends, family members,
city councils, or larger public. However, the users may not be willing to share their data with
all types of people within the stakeholder group and with the same granularity. Users can
define the intended audience who are authorized to access their data from the user interface
of many applications. They can define groups [GKN+07, GLC+08, Shi09], select persons
individually [RPH+07, MLF+08, GLC+08, Shi09] or authorize everyone [GLC+08]. The users
can refine their selection by specifying the nature of the data they share and may additionally
define particular subsets of accessible data [RPH+07, MLF+08, Shi09]. Furthermore, they
can define precise conditions (e.g., time, location, and data type) under which the data are
made accessible [SBE+08]. Similarly to the selection of the sensing modalities presented in
Section 3.1, these actions support the expression of the concept of appropriateness and its
personalization by the users.
In order to highlight the privacy implications of sharing their data, graphic tools including
maps, charts, or pictures are used to visualize the data being released and increase the
users’ awareness [SBE+08]. After data have been published, the users can also monitor
access to the data by consulting application log files. These logs record the nature of the
accessed data, the frequency of these accesses, and the identity of the people accessing
them [SBE+08, Shi09, MHM+10]. Based on the results of these audits, the users control the
distribution of their information and can judge of their appropriateness. If needed, they may
update their access control policies to restrict or enlarge the authorization conditions in order
to match their privacy preferences.
3.7 privacy-aware data query
End users may be interested in accessing data collected by other users of the participatory
sensing applications. To this end, they can send a data query to the application server that
contains, e.g., a location of interest. In this case, malicious application administrators may
infer the location of the end users based on (1) the location from which the query is sent, and
(2) the location included in the query. In the former case, the same mechanisms as applied in
the reporting of sensor readings to the application server can be utilized to protect the location
privacy of the end users (see Section 3.3). Despite the utilization of such a mechanisms, the
location privacy of the end users may still be endangered by the location included in the query.
Indeed, users likely request information about the region, in which they are currently located.
Additionally, if queries can be dynamically forwarded to users located in the region of interest,
the location privacy of such users need also to be protected.
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In order to address these threats, three main solutions have been specially proposed for
participatory sensing applications. In [DCS11], the privacy of the queries is ensured by
cryptographic primitives, specially using identity-based encryption. In a first step, clients
report encrypted sensor readings to the application server. Another client then sends a query
to the application server. The query is also encrypted in order to protect the confidentiality of
its content. At the application server, this query is blindly matched with previously received
encrypted reports. As a result, the application administrators have neither access to the content
of the reports nor the queries. In case the query matched existing reports, the corresponding
reports are transmitted to the requester who is the only one able to decrypt them and access
the original sensor readings.
Instead of relying on cryptographic solutions, the following approaches aim at limiting the
location information provided to the application server while still supporting the answers to
potential queries. In [BFV12], the authors show that the transmission of the k last positions
visited by the users to the application server is sufficient to provide a satisfying coverage
of a region of interest in order to respond to the corresponding queries. Another approach
proposed in [KS11a, KS11b] is based on the dynamic and decentralized distribution of the
regions of interest between users. The clients first share the locations of interest among them
by computing their Voronoi cell without the intervention of any central entity. Next, they
define a cloaked area containing their location and at least k- 1 other users in order to protect
their privacy. They further cloak the smallest radius of their Voronoi cell by replacing it by
the maximum (smallest) radius among the k- 1 users. This prevents malicious application
administrators from identifying users based on this radius. The clients report both cloaked
location and radius to the application server that finally assigns the locations of interests to
each user accordingly.
3.8 summary
In this chapter, we have surveyed the current state-of-the-art in privacy protection mechanisms
specially tailored to participatory sensing applications. Our survey has first shown that users
are not involved in all privacy-preserving mechanisms. As summarized in Figure 3, users
can mainly indicate their preferences in terms of sensing and released location granularity.
They can review the collected data, manage their storage, and define the related access control
before their release to potential end users. With the exception of these approaches, users
are not always involved in privacy decisions for mechanisms protecting their privacy while
interacting with the participatory system. As a result, most of the proposed mechanisms are
controlled and pre-configured by the applications and not by the users.
Secondly, most proposed schemes rely on a centralized entity, either the application server
or a trusted party. Hence, users must trust this entity to (1) protect their privacy according
to their preferences and (2) not to disclose their data to unauthorized parties. Indeed, users
loose the control over their data once they either upload the sensor readings to the application
server or transmit their location information to a trusted party. While users can configure
settings for data release, they have no guarantees that the application server will adhere to
them.
4PROBLEM STATEMENT
There are no problems, only solutions.
J. Lennon
Based on the survey of existing countermeasures to privacy threats presented in Chapter 3,
we have identified two main shortcomings in Section 3.8, namely the prevalence of both
application-controlled and centralized privacy-preserving schemes. In this section, we discuss
both identified shortcomings and specially highlight the arising research questions that are
addressed throughout this thesis.
4.1 application-controlled to user-controlled privacy-preserving schemes
As a first issue, our survey of existing privacy-preserving schemes has shown that numerous
schemes are fully configured by the participatory sensing applications and users are hence
not involved in privacy decisions at all. Thus, users are unable to (1) express their privacy
preferences and (2) exert any control over how their data are released to and accessed by
applications. Privacy research has shown that the notion and perception of privacy are strongly
individual [Wes67] and furthermore based on the user’s context [FHHK+11] and cultural
background [LS93, GHW+11]. The combination of these factors thus has a strong impact
on the individual perception of data sensitivity, and we believe that no universally valid
configuration exists for large and heterogeneous user bases.
By selecting general settings valid for all users, application administrators express and
impose their own vision of privacy on the users. If this vision does not match the privacy
conception of the users, users may (1) opt out if they judge the provided protection to be
insufficient, or (2) provide less information to the application than if they would have set the
preferences themselves (if their conception of privacy is less restrictive than the one applied).
Participatory sensing applications depend on user-provided data. The users’ reluctance
to contribute would diminish the impact and relevance of sensing campaigns as well as
the benefits to the users. In order to foster the contribution of users, we therefore believe
that privacy-preserving mechanisms should cover more than one conception of privacy.
In particular, users should be able to configure these mechanisms according to their own
conception.
By not involving users in privacy decisions, existing mechanisms not only prevent cus-
tomization of privacy settings, but also prevent users from exerting control over their data.
In the few studied solutions that permit individual privacy settings, users can mainly con-
trol the type of sensor readings provided to the application, the degree of granularity, the
spatiotemporal context, and the data recipients (cf. Chapter 3). In most cases, users have
no control over the mechanisms applied on their data by the application server or trusted
parties; these mechanisms remain hidden from them. Control and transparency are, how-
ever, pivotal components in the acceptance of privacy-enhancing technologies by potential
users [CsS+05, ACC+05, HFHPB07, GHW+11]. In orthogonal domains to participatory sens-
ing, experiments have further demonstrated that providing control to users over their data
and privacy protection increase their trust in the system [FHP04, PFHD+05, GHW+11]. As a
result, we believe that increasing user control on applied privacy-preserving mechanisms in
participatory sensing would similarly increase the trust of the users in the system and thus,
foster their contribution to the application. As a result of this discussion, we identify the
following open issues in current participatory sensing systems:
. How can users of participatory sensing applications control their privacy?
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. Which parameters can be controlled by users?
. What is the impact of this control on the function of the application and its parameters,
such as overhead and latency?
Investigating these questions paves the way to the inclusion of users in the loop. Beyond em-
powering users to exert control over their privacy, such investigation is important to determine
the consequences of this control on the application and its applicability in real-world partici-
patory sensing deployments. The contributions of this thesis, as detailed in Chapters 5 to 7,
answer the identified research questions by proposing and evaluating novel user-controlled
privacy-preserving schemes that can be tailored to the users’ privacy preferences.
4.2 centralized to decentralized privacy-preserving solutions
Secondly, as highlighted in our preceding survey (cf. Section 3.8), most of existing solutions
are organized around a central entity, either the application server or a trusted party, that
ensures the privacy protection of the users. In this scenario, all sensor readings collected by
the users are first transmitted to the central entity that applies privacy-preserving schemes in
order to remove sensitive information from the uploaded data. As a result, application and/or
trusted party administrators have direct access to the reported sensor readings. They are
also responsible for the selection of the applied privacy-preserving scheme(s) and ensure the
distribution of the processed sensor readings to potential end users. As users lose the control
over their data once they have been uploaded, they must trust the central entity to protect
their privacy according to their preferences and not to disclose their data to unauthorized
parties. In most solutions, the administrators of these central entities are assumed to be honest
and respect as well as protect the privacy of the users. However, users have no guarantees
about the honesty of the administrators, which may be interested in their data for various
purposes, such as simple curiosity or willingness to commercially exploit the contributed data.
Depending on their interest(s), administrators can violate the privacy of the users to different
degrees and finally break the trust of the users. Additionally, such centralized architectures
present a single point of failure, making them vulnerable to malfunctions and malicious
external attacks that can reveal or damage the entire data storage. Their vulnerability has
been demonstrated multiple times in recent years through the leakage of user names and
passwords stored in central repositories, such as in Sony’s PlayStation Network [AS11] and
Yahoo Voices [Gro12].
Based on this discussion, we identify the following open issues:
. How can the dependency of the users on trusted entities be reduced?
. How to support the functions of participatory sensing applications, such as reputation
systems, while reducing the dependency to trusted entities?
. Which privacy processing functions can be shifted to the users’ mobile phones? Which
one(s) cannot?
The investigation of these research questions is important to empower users with additional
control over their data, while simultaneously taking into account the existing underlying
architecture of participatory sensing applications. By answering these questions and adopting
a threat model, in which application administrators and trusted parties can show malicious
behavior, we believe that the resulting solutions are better adapted to the conditions of real-
world participatory sensing deployments and offer a better privacy protection to the users of
such applications.
4.3 summary
In this chapter, we have defined our problem statement based on our literature review
conducted in Chapter 3. Our problem statement follows two primary research directions.
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Firstly, we aim at providing solutions in which users are in control of their privacy protection
and can adapt the underlying mechanisms to their individual privacy preferences. Secondly,
our objective is to increase user control by moving from existing centralized solutions towards
decentralized architectures in order to reduce the dependency of users on application and
trusted party administrators. As a result, the contributions of this thesis are in line with both
identified research directions and answer the questions raised in this chapter.

5PATH JUMBL ING : A PR IVACY-PRESERVING COLLABORATIVE
SCHEME FOR PATH HIDING
Alone we can do so little;
together we can do so much.
H. Keller
We have shown that most existing schemes to protect privacy in participatory sensing
rely on either the application or a third party. For example, spatial cloaking requires users
to report their exact locations to a third party that generates the cloaked values [HKH09].
Users therefore need to entrust the protection of their privacy to these entities. Besides, we
have shown that users are not involved in most privacy decisions taken in these schemes,
despite the individual and personal nature of privacy. In order to address both of these
issues, we propose the concept of path jumbling [CGR+11], in which users mutually preserve
their privacy in a decentralized fashion and can parametrize the proposed scheme according
to their individual preferences. In our scheme, users physically exchange collected sensor
readings with other users at opportunistic encounters. As the sensor readings are annotated
with spatiotemporal information, the exchanges aim at breaking the association between the
users’ identities and the locations visited during the collection of the sensor readings and thus,
preserve the location privacy of the users.
We first define our system and adversary models in Section 5.1, before detailing our concept
in Section 5.2. In the description of our concept, we specially analyze the design space, define
design criteria, and present our design decisions. Next, we evaluate our design decisions
using real-world GPS traces of human mobility. Our evaluation is two-fold. In Section 5.3, we
conduct a quantitative analysis of our design decisions in comparison to our design criteria,
while we measure the resilience of our concept against potential adversaries in Section 5.4.
Finally, we survey direct related work in Section 5.5, before summarizing our results in
Section 5.6.
5.1 system and threat models
5.1.1 System Model
For our system, we assume participatory sensing applications without real-time constraints
for data delivery. Examples include monitoring noise pollution [RCK+10] and road condi-
tions [MPR08] as well as documenting personal diets [RPH+07]. In these applications, the
users carry mobile phones equipped with embedded sensors, wireless interfaces, and position-
ing systems (e.g., GPS, Wi-Fi, or cellular network based triangulation [LCC+05]). The mobile
phones autonomously collect sensor readings (e.g., sound samples, pictures, and accelerometer
data). However, the users can control the activation/deactivation of the sensing function and
its sampling period. Each sensor reading is stamped with the collection time and location
information to form the following triplet T =< t, l, s > with t: time, l: location, s: sensor
reading, which may be present in the form of vectors (like 3-axis accelerometer readings) or
scalar value (such as noise level in decibels). Additional processing can be locally applied to
the sensor readings to extract features and/or avoid the disclosure of sensitive information.
For example, possibilities include extracting the noise level from the collected sound samples,
or obfuscating recorded conversations in applications monitoring noise pollution.
The triplets are then autonomously reported to the application server. We assume that the
users can configure reporting settings by, e.g., selecting the desired reporting frequency and
particular reporting locations or choosing to only report when they have access to a free Wi-Fi
35
36 path jumbling: a privacy-preserving collaborative scheme for path hiding
connection. The application server is able to establish a link between the reported triplets
and the users who reported them. The establishment of this link can be based on either
explicit identifiers, such as user ID and pseudonyms, or the analysis of reporting meta-data to,
e.g., infer the location from the used IP addresses. The application can utilize the established
links to assign reputation to the users [HKH10b], as from the application perspective the
triplets are assumed to be reported by the users who collect them.
5.1.2 Threat Model
We assume two kinds of adversaries to our system: (1) malicious application administrators and
(2) malicious users. The motivations of the adversaries include simple curiosity and willingness
to harm or commercially exploit the disclosed information. Both types of adversaries are
discussed in more detail in the following.
Malicious administrators are a common threat to the privacy of the users in participatory
sensing applications, since they have direct access to the triplets reported by the users and
stored on the application server. In absence of privacy-preserving mechanisms locally applied
on the mobile phones, the triplets contain information about the locations visited by the users
and disclose the paths they followed. This may provide insights about the users’ whereabouts
and lifestyle. For example, the sensor readings collected while users are walking from their
offices to their homes might reveal their exact paths as well as their start and end locations.
Since the collected sensor readings are reported and stored on a central application server,
they can be exposed to the following threats to their privacy:
. Curious administrators who attempt to gain further information about the participants
by analyzing their sensor readings.
. Intentional disclosure to untrusted parties and/or misuse of the sensor readings and
derived information by malicious application administrators.
. Application of inefficient privacy-preserving mechanisms by the administrators, poten-
tially leading to privacy breach when sharing the sensor readings with third parties.
. External attacks directed at the server to fraudulently access the data stored.
In the following, we assume a honest-but-curious adversary model, in which the application
administrators attempt to passively breach the privacy of the participants, but runs the system
normally and faithfully. This means that the application administrators focus on the data
reported by the participants to the application server in order to breach their privacy. They,
however, do not launch active attacks (such as collusions with malicious users) to obtain
further information.
As an artifact of the collaborative nature of the path hiding mechanism, users can also
become adversaries. Malicious users can launch the following attacks:
. They can attempt to breach the privacy of other users by directly accessing the informa-
tion included in the triplets exchanged during encounters.
. They can stay in crowded areas to collect as many triplets as possible.
. They can either drop exchanged triplets or create false triplets to be exchanged in
order to alter the results consolidated at the server side and perturb the function of the
collaborative path hiding mechanism. Note that we address this particular adversary
scenario in Chapter 6.
We further assume that adversaries follow the Dolev-Yao threat model [DY83], i.e., they are
able to listen to all communication, fabricate, replay, and destroy messages. They are, however,
not able to compromise cryptographic mechanisms.
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5.2 the path jumbling concept
In this section, we first provide an overview of the path jumbling concept. Next, we analyze
the design space for both exchange and reporting strategies, before presenting our design
decisions.
5.2.1 Overview
The objective of our concept is to remove the association between the spatiotemporal context
(i.e., time and location) at which the sensor readings were taken and the identity of the users
in order to protect their privacy. The spatiotemporal context reveals the visited locations and
paths followed by the users during the sensing process, thus providing insights about the
users’ lifestyles and whereabouts. In our approach, users mutually preserve their privacy
in a decentralized fashion. Inspired from mix networks [Cha81], users exchange previously
collected sensor readings when they physically encounter each other. Before their exchange,
the triplets are individually encrypted using the public key of the server to prevent other users
from accessing their content.
In order to illustrate our concept, we consider the example in Figure 4. We assume that
users A, B, and C follow the paths illustrated in Figure 4a while they collect triplets and
meet according to the timeline represented in Figure 4b. In this example, A first meets C and
exchanges his previously collected triplets with him. The selection of the triplets is determined
by the exchange strategy. Here, we assume that A and C exchange all triplets they collected up
to the moment of their encounter. Note that different exchange strategies can be envisaged, as
discussed in Section 5.2.2. After their meeting, A and C continue to collect triplets while they
are continuing along their routes. When A meets B, both exchange their triplets (including
those already exchanged by A) according to the exchange strategy. After their meeting, they
collect triplets until reaching their final destination where they terminate the sensing process.
We further assume in the presented example that the users configure their reporting strategy
to a daily upload of triplets. Note that the users can select other reporting strategies as detailed
in Section 5.2.3, which have an impact on the achievable privacy protection. By applying our
mechanism, the users report triplets partially collected by themselves and partially exchanged
with other users to the application server. Based on these triplets, the application assumes
that user A walked from B’s home to the bank. The user B traveled from the cinema to the
hospital, and the user traveled C from A’s office to his home, as depicted in Figure 4c.
As a result, swapping a subset of the data samples removes the association between the
sensor readings and the identity of the users who collected them. Consequently, the sensor
readings do not reveal the actual paths followed by each user, but instead jumbled paths,
which cannot be easily reconstructed by a server as shown in Section 5.4.
5.2.2 Exchange Strategies
As mentioned in Section 5.2, different exchange strategies can be applied to jumble triplets
between users. In this section, we analyze the design space and select different strategies to
investigate their impact on the performance of our concept in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
Design Space Analysis
Our analysis primarily concentrates on the selection modality of triplets to exchange, both
locally collected and received from other users. This includes a discussion about the number
and the selection of triplets that will be exchanged. We consider the following design
alternatives:
. partial vs. complete exchanges The triplets can be exchanged either partially
or completely upon physical encounters at participants. A partial exchange is defined
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Figure 4: Meetings and exchanges of the users A, B, and C
as the transmission of a random subset of all collected and already exchanged triplets.
Opposed to the traces resulting from the partial exchange of triplets, paths generated
by the latter alternative are realistic (see example in Section 5.2), as if captured by a
single real person. When such paths are reported to the application after the jumbling
process, the users’ actual traces are obfuscated by realistic and coherent substitutes. The
application server can however identify potential exchanges between users based on
the spatiotemporal distribution of the triplets, as the users’ paths overlap at encounters.
Since users exchange all triplets at each encounter, the application sever would be able to
reconstruct all jumbled paths by simply switching the subpaths. Instead of exchanging
all triplets at each encounter, we propose that users exchange all of them with a certain
probability in order to prevent the application from reconstructing the jumbled paths
straightforwardly. By choosing a probability of 0.5, the application server has therefore a
0.5n chance of correctly identifying the original paths of the users after n encounters.
In comparison, partial exchanges may lead to incoherent traces, since the exchanged
triplets may not necessarily have been collected in the same area. Malicious application
administrators may hence be able to recognize the exchanged triplets because of their
outlying location. Besides, users will often report a higher percentage of own triplets
to the server, as they only partially exchange them. As a result, users may reveal
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more information to the server about themselves than when complete exchanges are
performed.
. individual vs. consecutive triplets If the aforementioned partial strategy is
applied, the triplets to exchange can be chosen either randomly, such that they represent
a collection of sparse locations, or by selecting coherent path segments based on consec-
utive triplets. The exchange of partial triplets may, however, form unrealistic paths as
the collected and exchanged triplets may have been collected in unconnected areas and
at different times of the day. This can result in improbable covered distances between
triplets assumed to be consecutive, which can be detected by the application server.
. symmetric vs. asymmetric exchanges Another design dimension to explore is
the reciprocity in the amount of triplets exchanged during an encounter. A symmetric
exchange supports the collaborative nature of our concept, as the users benefit from
similar exchange conditions and potential reporting overhead can be distributed between
them in a fair manner. Instead of choosing a predetermined value of triplets to be users
by all users, a negotiation phase is used before the actual data transmission to agree on
the amount of exchanged triplets. However, this negotiation must take into consideration
that malicious users may be willing to exchange a large amount of data with other users
to gather as much information as possible. In comparison, an asymmetric exchange
allows each user to individually determine how many triplets she exchanges, implying
that users can receive more triplets than they exchange. These users will thus report
more triplets to the server introducing additional overhead for them.
The above discussions highlight that each alternative presents advantages as well as draw-
backs with regard to potential information disclosed to the server and introduced overhead.
Tradeoffs between advantages and drawbacks must thus be found.
Design Decisions
Based on the results of the design space analysis, we select the following exchange strategies
for our further analysis, which cover different combinations of the above design alternatives:
. realistic exchange strategy The users exchange their entire set of collected/ex-
changed triplets at each meeting with a certain probability. Let us go back to our example
shown in Figure 4 and assume that users A and C collected six and three triplets before
their meeting, respectively. A hence receives the three triplets from C, and C receives
the six triplets from A, as illustrated in Figure 5a. This strategy exchanges consecutive
triplets, which form realistic path segments (see Section 5.2). The exchange can be
asymmetric, if the amounts of collected/exchanged triplets differ between both users.
. random-unfair exchange strategy Each user independently and randomly
determines the amount of triplets she wants to exchange. In Figure 5b, A exchanges five
of six triplets, while C exchanges two of three triplets. Moreover, each triplet to exchange
is selected randomly. In our example, A selects the triplets A1, A2, A3, A4, and A6,
whereas C selects the triplets C1 and C3. In comparison to the realistic strategy, the
exchanges are mostly partial and involve triplets selected individually. The exchanges
can be asymmetric, depending on the amount of exchanged triplets.
. random-fair exchange strategy The users agree on a common amount of n
triplets to exchange at each meeting. Each user advertises the amount of triplets
available for exchange. In Figure 5c, A and C advertise six triplets and three triplets,
respectively. The amount of exchanged triplets is determined randomly between one
and the minimum of both advertised values. In our example, a value of one triplet is
chosen. Then, A and C randomly select the triplet to exchange. In comparison with the
random-unfair strategy, the fair variant ensures the symmetry of each exchange that
fairly jumbles the triplets and equally distributes the reporting overhead between the
users.
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Figure 5: Comparison of the exchange strategies
Furthermore, we complete these strategies by introducing additional features to prevent
consecutive exchanges with the same users and unidirectional exchanges of triplets. The first
feature only allows users to exchange triplets with the same user when they have exchanged
data with at least x other users between two encounters. A malicious user can thus not
easily recover a full collection of triplets by simply following targeted users and constantly
exchanging triplets with them. Without this feature, already exchanged triplets may be
exchanged again and return to the users who collected them. This would lower the jumbling
degree of the triplets, and hence the privacy benefits of our approach. Moreover, we introduce a
tit-for-tat mechanism where triplets are exchanged alternatively to ensure that malicious users
cannot receive an entire set of triplets without providing any triplet in exchange. Additionally,
both users have an equivalent opportunity to exchange triplets even in case of early abortion
of the exchange due to technical reasons or divergent user mobility.
5.2.3 Reporting Strategies
In addition to the exchange strategy, different variants can be envisaged to report the triplets
to the application server. In this section, we analyze and discuss design alternatives before
presenting our design decisions.
Design Space Analysis
The privacy protection provided by our approach depends on the meeting pattern of the users.
In extreme cases, users may not be able to exchange triplets with other users during long
time periods. The non-jumbled triplets can be either reported to the application server or
stored until the next meeting. Reporting these triplets to the server would reveal the original
paths followed by the users, and hence breach their privacy. In contrast, waiting until the next
meeting to report the triplets would introduce additional delays for the application. Within
the scope of this analysis, we thus investigate the tradeoff between privacy and latency by
considering the following reporting strategies:
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. time-based strategy The triplets are periodically reported to the server. The
application is thus ensured to timely receive triplets. However, the triplets can be
reported without having been jumbled in absence of encounters during the considered
period.
. exchange-based strategy The triplets are reported to the server after a certain
number of meetings. The reporting latency is thus determined by the frequency of the
meetings. Although this strategy ensures that the triplets have been jumbled before their
report, no guarantee is provided on the achieved degree of jumbling. For example, only
one of the reported triplets may have been jumbled with another user.
. metric-based strategy The triplets are only reported to the server after reaching
metric-based thresholds, such as a given number of triplet exchanges. This strategy thus
guarantees the users that their privacy is respected to a degree defined by the threshold.
However, these thresholds may increase the latency between two reports, as multiple
meetings may be necessary to reach them.
The discussed reporting alternatives highlight that high privacy protection and low latency
for the application are difficult to combine. A tradeoff must thus be found between both
parameters, especially as users may refuse to contribute to the application if their privacy is
not protected. To the interests of the application, these contributions must be encouraged,
meaning that strategies with guaranteed privacy should be preferred, despite the introduction
of additional latency for the application.
Design Decisions
Based on the previous discussion, we select different reporting alternatives in order to investi-
gate their actual impact on the performance of our concept. Note that the parameterization
of the strategies has been influenced by the real-world dataset used for the evaluation (see
Section 5.3).
. hourly and daily strategies The triplets are reported hourly and daily, respec-
tively. Both time-based strategies may report non-jumbled triplets in absence of meetings.
In comparison with the hourly strategy, the daily strategy offers a longer period during
which meetings may occur.
. 1-exchange strategy The triplets are reported after each exchange. We introduce
a random waiting period before the upload to prevent the server from identifying the
users who exchanged their triplets by analyzing simultaneous reports.
. jumbling-based strategy The triplets are reported if the percentage of jumbled
triplets (i.e., collected by others) reaches a given threshold. We choose the following
thresholds: 25%, 50%, and 75%. This metric-based strategy allows controlling that
the triplets have been sufficiently jumbled. A high percentage indicates that only few
triplets were collected by the users themselves and their reporting discloses thus little
information about the paths actually followed by them.
. distance-based strategy The triplets are reported if the average distance between
each location of the actual and jumbled paths is above a given threshold. We select three
thresholds: 1 km, 2 km, and 5 km. Similarly to the former strategy, the distance-based
strategy provides an estimation of the path. If the distance is small, the jumbled path
remains in proximity of the actual path and may still contain sensitive locations. If the
distance is large, fewer insights about the users can be inferred.
In summary, we have chosen different exchange and reporting strategies that can be selected
based on users’ preferences in terms of privacy protection. Both the performance of the chosen
strategies and the resulting degree of privacy protection are examined in the next sections.
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5.3 performance in exchanging and reporting triplets
In this section, we describe the performance evaluation of the selected exchange and reporting
strategies detailed in Section 5.2.2 and Section 5.2.3, respectively. We first discuss the charac-
teristic properties of the utilized dataset and detail our simulation settings. Subsequently, we
present the results of our evaluation and highlight particular findings.
5.3.1 Simulation Setup and Method
Our evaluation is based on the GPS traces from the GeoLife project ([ZLC+08], [Mic13]). In
this real-world deployment, the users carried GPS-enabled devices to monitor their location.
We extend the initial scenario to a participatory sensing application by assuming that a triplet
was collected at each monitored location. In total, 178 users contributed to this project between
April 2007 and October 2011. This resulted in the collection of more than 17,500 trajectories
mainly located in Beijing, China with a sampling frequency between one and ten seconds
depending on the user. From this dataset, we have selected 97 users, which had at least
met one other user, i.e., having been in a range of 20 m for at least 8 s, and we observed
their mobility and meeting pattern during a period of 24 hours. The meeting distribution
of the selected users is depicted in Figure 6a, while their respective number of collected
triplets is presented in Figure 6b. Note that the difference between the numbers of collected
triplets is due to the possibility for the users to select the collection frequency as well as
activate/deactivate the sensing function. Among the 97 users, we selected the following users
who represent the extreme and average cases in terms of meetings: User 19 (one meeting),
user 55 (three meetings), and user 97 (17 meetings).
We simulated the exchange and reporting of triplets based on the GPS traces in order to
evaluate our approach. When the users were in physical proximity, they exchanged their
triplets according to one of the exchange strategies (see Section 5.2.2). For the realistic strategy,
we choose a probability of exchange equal to one in order to compare all exchange strategies
on the same basis, i.e., the same number of exchanges. The following results show therefore
the upper bound for the realistic strategy. Each user was only able to exchange with the same
user again, if she met three other users in between in order to prevent constant exchanges
between the same users as discussed in Section 5.2.2. Although this value has been selected
based on the characteristics of the dataset, it could also be easily determined dynamically in
a real-world deployment. Besides, the users reported the triplets to the application server
with one of the selected reporting strategies (see Section 5.2.3). We therefore conducted a
cross-evaluation of both exchange and reporting strategies, where each possible combination
of strategies is evaluated using the following metrics:
. jumbling degree It measures the average percentage of reported triplets having
been jumbled with other users. A high percentage thus indicates that only few triplets
collected by the users themselves are reported, meaning that little information about
the users’ paths is disclosed. This metric hence provides insights about the level of
obfuscation achieved at the time of the reporting to the server.
. distance It estimates the average distance between the actual path followed by the
users and the path resulting from the exchange. A small distance indicates that the
reported path remains in proximity of the actual path. Even when the distance is large,
the reported path may however still reveal sensitive locations visited by the users.
. overhead It compares the average number of triplets having been reported after
jumbling with the number of triplets having been collected. It thus measures the
reporting overhead caused by our approach. A positive factor/percentage means that
the users need to report more triplets to the server than they collected themselves after
applying our mechanism.
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Figure 6: Distribution of meetings and triplets for the 97 users over 24 hours
5.3.2 Results
In this section, we compare and evaluate the impact of the selected exchange and reporting
strategies on the aforementioned metrics. Although the results of our evaluation are only
representative for the given dataset, our evaluation shows the feasibility of our approach
under realistic conditions.
Jumbling Degree
We consider the realistic, random-fair, and random-unfair exchange strategies and assume
first that the triplets are reported at the end of the sensing process. In particular, we examine
the results for three representative users 19 (one meeting), 55 (three meetings), and 97 (17
meetings) introduced in Section 5.3.1 in order to investigate the impact of the number of
meetings on the performance of our approach. Figure 7 illustrates the temporal evolution of
the jumbling degree for each user. Note that the users have different sensing periods, as they
were able to activate/deactivate the sensing function individually. The figure highlights that
the realistic strategy ensures the highest jumbling degree, as all triplets are exchanged at each
meeting. For the realistic strategy, the jumbling degree hence reaches 100% at the time of each
meeting and then progressively decreases when users collect triplets until the next meeting.
In comparison, both random-unfair and random-fair strategies reach lower jumbling degrees
due to partial exchanges of randomly selected triplets. For example, the jumbling degree of
user 55 is equal to 94% for the random-unfair strategy and 42% for the random-fair strategy at
t=45,678 s (time of his/her first meeting), respectively. Moreover, the random-unfair strategy
globally shows a higher jumbling degree than the random-fair strategy since more triplets are
exchanged at each meeting with the random-unfair strategy.
We next analyze the combination of exchange and reporting strategies for the entire dataset,
i.e., all 97 users. For each combination, we calculate the minimal, mean, and maximal jumbling
degree of the triplets reported to the application server. Table 3 shows the obtained results,
which can be summarized as follows. The realistic strategy combined with all reporting
strategies shows a higher jumbling degree than the random-unfair and random-fair strategies.
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Figure 7: Jumbling degree over time for selected users with different numbers of meetings
Except for the time-based reporting strategies, the jumbling degree reaches 100%, meaning
that all triplets were jumbled before their reporting to the application server, even for users
with a single meeting only. This implies that the paths are protected independently of the
selected reporting strategy and even if the users meet once only. In addition to the high
jumbling degree, this exchange strategy allows the application to timely receive the triplets,
as the thresholds triggering the report can already be reached after a unique meeting, while
multiple meetings may be needed in the case of the random-unfair and random-fair strategies.
In general, the random-fair strategy obtains lower jumbling degrees than the random-unfair
strategy due to its fairness constraint, as illustrated in Figure 8. For both random-unfair and
random-fair strategies, the jumbling-based reporting strategies show higher jumbling degrees
than with other reporting strategies. Note that the minimum values of the jumbling degree
are at least equal to the threshold of the applied jumbling-based strategy. For example, the
minimal jumbling degree obtained by applying the random-unfair exchange strategy and the
25%-variant jumbling-based reporting strategy is equal to at least 25%. The jumbling-based
reporting strategies therefore guarantee minimal jumbling degrees, which is not the case for
the other reporting strategies. This is also clearly seen, as the time-based reporting strategies
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Table 3: Strategy comparison: Jumbling degree, distance, and overhead
metrics
jumbling degree (%) distance (km) overhead (%)
Exchange Reporting Threshold Mini- Mean Maxi- Median Median
strategy strategy mum mum
R
ea
lis
tic
Time-based hourly 0 17 49 2 8
daily 59
100
5 7
Exchange-based 1
100 100
4 -8
Jumbling-based
25%
50%
75%
Distance-based
1 km 5 0
2 km -6
5 km 8 -16
R
an
do
m
-u
nf
ai
r
Time-based hourly
0
8 32 2 5
daily 28 88 5 7
Exchange-based 1 36 97 4 -4
Jumbling-based
25% 26 61 96
5
-26
50% 53 76 97 -46
75% 75 89 99 -78
Distance-based
1 km 0 36 97 -3
2 km 30 96 -9
5 km 1 49 98 9 -27
R
an
do
m
-f
ai
r
Time-based hourly
0
2 11 2
0
daily 10 39 5
Exchange-based 1 22 65 4
Jumbling-based
25% 26 42 76 6
50% 51 62 79 5
75% 76 79 80 9
Distance-based
1 km 0 21 65 7
2 km 19 63 4
5 km 1 21 80 7
show particularly low jumbling degree and do not provide any guarantee, as the triplets are
reported even in absence of meetings.
As compared to the jumbling-based reporting strategies that guarantee a predetermined
maximal jumbling degree, the remaining reporting strategies achieve variable maximal jum-
bling degrees, which range from 65% to 100%.
Distance
Similarly to the evaluation of the jumbling degree, we consider each combination of exchange
and reporting strategies and calculate the distance between the collected and the reported
triplets for all users. The second column to the right of Table 3 presents the obtained median
distances. Note that the obtained values depend on the mobility pattern of the users. In
isolation, these values only provide limited insights, while their comparison allows to evaluate
the performance of the combined exchange and reporting strategies for preserving the path
privacy. In average over all reporting strategies, the median distance between positions on
the real and jumbled path obtained by the realistic strategy is 4 km, while it is 5 km for both
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Figure 8: Jumbling degree of the jumbling-based reporting strategies
random-unfair and random-fair strategies. The impact of the different exchange strategies is
thus only slightly distinguishable. The analysis of the different reporting strategies shows that
there is no major difference in terms of distance between them. However, the distance-based
reporting strategies ensure that the reported triplets at least reach their respective distance
threshold. The users are therefore guaranteed that the reported triplets present a distance to
the actual path greater than the predetermined threshold and that their privacy is respected to
a greater extent. The hourly strategy performs poorly, as the triplets are often reported even
in absence of meetings.
Overhead
Except for the random-fair strategy, the exchange strategies can influence the amount of
triplets to report, as the users can receive a lower, equal, or higher amount of triplets than they
provide. The difference can thus increase, leave unchanged, or reduce the reporting overhead.
In a first step, we evaluate the potential reporting overhead introduced by the exchange
strategies combined with the daily reporting strategy. Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of
the reporting overhead factor. The realistic strategy introduces a larger overhead factor than
the random-unfair strategy. The overhead remains negative for 44 users with realistic strategy
and 40 users with the random-unfair strategy. This implies that these users report fewer
triplets than collected by themselves with our approach. On the other hand, the remaining
users report more triplets than they collected with a factor reaching up to 55 for the realistic
strategy and 40 for random-fair strategy. On a network scale, the number of reported triplets
however remains identical.
Secondly, we examine the median reporting overhead introduced by the exchange strategies
in combination with different reporting strategies. The results are summarized in the third
column to the right of Table 3. By design, the random-fair exchange strategy does not
introduce/shift any overhead. The comparison of both realistic and random-unfair strategies
shows that the overhead median is -4% on average for the realistic strategy and -20% on average
for the random-unfair strategies. This result confirms and extends the prior finding: The
overhead introduced by the realistic strategy is generally higher than with the random-unfair
strategy. The overhead difference, however, depends on the random value that determines
the number of triplets to exchange in the random-fair strategy. Moreover, the reporting
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Figure 9: Distribution of the additionally introduced reporting overhead factor for the daily reporting
strategy
performance is also influenced by the random selection of the triplets, as the thresholds can be
either exceeded or not, depending on the selected triplets. Note that the median reporting
overhead is negative in most cases. Intuitively, one would expect its value to globally be zero,
as the triplets given by one user are received by another. However, one needs to remember that
we only consider the triplets that are actually reported (and not only exchanged) in Table 3.
If the reporting conditions are not fulfilled, the triplets are not reported and not taken into
account in the calculation of the reporting overhead.
In summary, the above evaluation shows that the realistic exchange strategy provides the
best results in terms of their jumbling degree. Except for the time-based reporting strategy, the
jumbling degree reaches 100% even after a single meeting, while additional meetings increase
the mixing of the triplets among the users even further. As a single meeting is sufficient to
reach the reporting threshold, the latency between two reports exclusively depends on the
meeting pattern. Moreover, the users are ensured that their triplets are sufficiently jumbled
before reporting. However, this strategy requires a high degree of trust in other users and
introduces substantial overhead, which is not fairly distributed among the users. We observe
extreme cases where users with thousands of triplets meet users with few triplets, causing
a high overhead for the latter users. In comparison, the random-unfair exchange strategy
requires a lower degree of trust and introduces less overhead. However, the partial exchanges
of triplets diminishes the jumbling degree and can delay the reporting, as multiple meetings
can be necessary to reach the report thresholds. The latency between two reports not only
depends on the meeting pattern, but also on the random selection of the triplets. The overhead
is also not equally distributed among the users. Finally, the random-fair strategy presents
the most restrictive exchange condition, as the number of triplets to exchange is randomly
determined and limited by the user with fewer triplets. The required degree of trust in other
users is the lowest and there is no reporting overhead for any user. However, the restrictive
exchange condition limits the amount of exchanged triplets that reduces the jumbling degree
and can increase the latency between two reports, as the thresholds can be more difficult to
reach.
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Figure 10: Examples of jumbled paths showing potential spatial outliers
5.4 privacy protection
We next quantify the privacy protection provided by our approach by means of extensive
simulations. In our analysis, we model malicious application administrators who aim at
distinguishing jumbled triplets from original ones based on their spatiotemporal information.
In fact, jumbled triplets may have been collected in different geographical areas than the ones
collected by the users themselves (see Figure 10a). The simultaneous transmission of both
collected and exchanged triplets to the application server may hence generate paths showing
spatial outliers as depicted in Figure 10b. We have implemented four different outlier detection
algorithms and apply each of them on a realistic dataset in order to evaluate the performance
of potential attackers in identifying jumbled triplets. We first present our simulation setup
and method. In particular, we describe the main principles of the selected outlier detection
algorithms and highlight their key parameters. Next, we describe our results and specially
discuss the performance of these algorithms depending on the evaluated parameters.
5.4.1 Simulation Setup and Method
Our evaluation is based on the GeoLife dataset introduced in Section 5.3.1. For our simulations,
we selected a period of 14 days (from the 01/10/2008 to the 14/10/2008). In this period, we
selected 20 users having at least met one other user and observed their mobility and meeting
pattern. Figure 11 depicts the daily number of meetings during this period, while Table 4
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Figure 11: Distribution of daily number of meetings between the 01/10/2008 and the 14/10/2008
Table 4: User statistics ordered by number of meetings for the period of the 01/10/2008 to the 14/10/2008
user id number of meetings user id number of meetings
117 4 86 78
126 5 42 78
12 8 11 103
151 9 83 108
142 15 13 111
122 18 52 112
102 21 82 112
123 31 68 204
62 46 94 222
124 59 10 235
details the number of meetings, trajectories, and collected triplets for each of the 20 selected
users. Among these users, we further selected the following users who represent the extreme
and average cases in terms of meetings: User 117 (four meetings), user 86 (78 meetings), and
user 10 (235 meetings).
Next, we apply one of the following exchange strategies on the triplets collected by the
users during the chosen period: (1) realistic with an exchange probability of 0.5, (2) random-
unfair, and (3) random-fair (see Section 5.2.2). By doing so, we artificially generate jumbled
paths. These paths are similar to those users would have obtained if they would have
actually exchanged these triplets at physical encounters. After the jumbling, the triplets are
chronologically ordered based on their timestamp, as if they would have been collected by the
same user. We further assume that users report these triplets every hour in average.
Detection of Jumbled Triplets
In order to analyze the efficacy of the path hiding approach, we assume that malicious
application administrators apply one of the following outlier detection algorithms tailored to
identify spatial outliers at the end of the considered time period.
velocity-based outlier detection algorithm With this algorithm, we aim at iden-
tifying consecutive triplets that are inconsistent with a realistic movement model. In other
words, our objective is to determine if the distance between two triplets can be covered within
the period of time defined by their timestamps, i.e., if the user’s velocity is realistic. To this
end, we define different models based on a maximum velocity vmax that cover most users’
transportation modalities.
The algorithm computes the velocity vi between consecutive triplets Ti and Ti+1. If the
computed velocity is higher than vmax, the triplet is considered as an outlier since its velocity
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mismatches with the model. In our evaluation, we vary vmax between one and 30 m/s in
order to model pedestrians, cyclists, and vehicle passengers and drivers.
grubb-based outlier detection algorithm Inspired from the Grubb’s test [SLZ03],
this algorithm is based on the spatial distance between neighboring triplets and shown in
Algorithm 1. In particular, it compares the Euclidian distance of each triplet T to the mean
distance of its neighbors (see steps 3 to 12 in Algorithm 1). It hence differs from the above
algorithm by the used metric and the number of considered triplets. In fact, it uses the distance
(instead of the velocity) and considers both direct neighbors of each triplet as well as the
neighbors of its direct neighbors (instead of a unique neighbor in the above algorithm). Note
that additional neighbors can be taken into account in this algorithm. The computed spatial
distance is then compared to the mean and the standard deviation obtained for all triplets
by computing Zs (see step 17). If Zs is greater than the given confidence level c, the triplet is
considered as outlier (see steps 18 and 19). The algorithm identifies an outlier per iteration
and is hence iteratively applied when multiple outliers are assumed. As a result, the algorithm
can be parametrized using the following parameters.
. Confidence level (c)
. Number of algorithm iterations (n)
In our evaluation, we investigate the impact of the selected confidence level and number of
iterations on the performance of the algorithm in identifying jumbled triplets. Consequently,
we have varied the number of interactions between one and 100. Recall that using 100 iterations
allows the algorithm to identify 100 outliers. This approximately corresponds to assuming
a jumbling degree of 50%, since the mean length of the considered paths is around 200
triplets. We have chosen values of 0.70, 0.95, and 0.99 for the desired confidence level. We
have especially selected high values for the confidence level in order to only consider triplets
identified as being exchanged with a high probability in order to reduce the number of false
positives. Again, our analysis is by no means exhaustive, but aims at exploring the main
characteristics of the algorithm.
distance-based outlier detection algorithm This algorithm is based on the ap-
proach proposed in [KNT00]. In this approach, a triplet is considered to be a DB(p, dmin)-
outlier if at least a fraction p of the triplets show a distance greater than the distance dmin
from the considered triplet [KNT00]. Let Ti be the triplet of interest. The algorithm, shown in
Algorithm 2, first computes the Euclidian distance between Ti and each triplet of the same
path (see step 3 in Algorithm 2). If the computed distance is lower than dmin, the triplet
is added in the neighborhood of Ti (see step 5). This means that the neighborhood of Ti
contains the set of triplets that are within distance dmin of Ti. According to [KNT00], p
determines the minimum fraction of triplets that must be outside the neighborhood of an
outlier. Consequently, the maximum number of triplets in the neighborhood of an outlier is
equal to M = N(1- p), N being the total number of triplets of the path. This implies that
if there are at least M+ 1 triplets included in the neighborhood of Ti, Ti is identified as a
non-outlier and another triplet is examined (see steps 6 to 8). As compared to the previous
algorithms, the distance-based outlier detection algorithm hence does not only compare the
distance of each triplet to its direct neighbors (i.e., its successor and its predecessor), but the
distance to any triplet until the newly defined neighborhood contains more thanM+ 1 triplets.
As a result, the algorithm can be parametrized according to the following values.
. Fraction of triplets (p)
. Distance (dmin)
In our evaluation, we vary both parameters in order to explore the performance of the
algorithm under various settings. We select the following values for p: 0.01, 0.05, 0.50, 0.75, and
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Algorithm 1 Grubb-based outlier detection algorithm
Input: n: number of iterations, c: confidence level, N: total number of triplets
1: for each iteration i with i 2 [1,n] do
2: for all triplets Tj with j 2 [2,N] do
3: compute mean distance between Tj-1 and its direct neighbors
4: dTj-1 =
|Tj-2Tj-1|+|Tj-1Tj|
2
5: compute mean distance between Tj and its direct neighbors
6: dTj =
|Tj-1Tj|+|TjTj+1|
2
7: compute mean distance between Tj+1 and its direct neighbors
8: dTj+1 =
|TjTj+1|+|Tj+1Tj+2|
2
9: compute mean distance of the direct neighbors of Tj
10: dTj-1Tj+1 =
dTj-1+dTj+1
2
11: compute distance difference between Tj and its direct neighbors
12: sTj = |dTj-1Tj+1 - dTj |
13: end for
14: compute sT as the mean value of all sTj with j 2 [2,N]
15: compute  T as the standard deviation of all sTj with j 2 [2,N]
16: for all triplets Tj with j 2 [2,N] do
17: compute Zs(Tj) = |
s(Tj)-sT
 T
|
18: if Zs(Tj) > c then
19: Tj is categorized as outlier
20: break
21: end if
22: end for
23: end for
1.00. Note that the lower p, the more outliers are assumed. Following the recommendations
of [KNT00], we have chosen the following values for dmin based on the distribution of the
triplets: 1 m, 25 m, 50 m, 75 m, and 100 m.
density-based outlier detection algorithm The last algorithm is adapted from
[BKNS00]. It is based on the computation of a Local Outlier Factor (LOF) that quantifies
the likeliness of a triplet to have been jumbled. Again, this method relies on the distance
between triplets and determines the density of triplets around the triplet of interest. The
density is defined as the number of nearest neighbors within a certain distance around a
triplet. It hence measures how isolated a triplet is from potential neighbors. The rationale
behind this algorithm is that outliers show lower density that non-outlier triplets. Algorithm 3
summarizes the different steps necessary to identify potential outliers. In particular, it requires
the computation of the following variables introduced in [BKNS00] and adopted herein.
. The k-distance of a triplet Ti (k 2 N) is defined in Algorithm 3 as the distance dTiTj
between Ti and a triplet Tj of the same path such that:
1. for at least k triplets Tk (with Tk 6= Ti),
dTiTk 6 dTiTj (1)
2. for at most k- 1 triplets Tk,
dTiTk < dTiTj with Tk 6= Ti (2)
. The k-distance neighborhood of a triplet Ti denoted Nk(Ti) contains every triplet whose
distance from Ti is not greater than the k-distance of Ti. The triplets contained in the
k-distance neighborhood of Ti are referred to as the k-nearest neighbors of Ti.
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Algorithm 2 Distance-based outlier detection algorithm
Input: p: fraction of triplets, dmin: distance
1: for all triplet Ti do
2: for all triplet Tj with Tj 6= Ti do
3: compute dTiTj = |TiTj|
4: if dTiTj 6 dmin then
5: add Tj in the neighborhood of Ti
6: if neighborhood size of Ti > M then
7: Ti is categorized as non-outlier
8: break
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
. The reachability distance of triplet Ti with respect to triplet Tj is defined as:
rdk(Ti, Tj) = max{k-distance(Tj),dTiTj } (3)
. The local reachability density of triplet Ti is defined as:
lrdk(Ti) =
|Nk(Ti)|P
Tj2Nk(Ti) rdk(Ti, Tj)
(4)
. The local outlier factor of triplet Ti is defined as:
LOFk(Ti) =
P
Tj2Nk(Ti)
lrdk(Tj)
lrdk(Ti)
|Nk(Ti)|
(5)
As a result, the clustering of the triplets is based on both the minimum number of triplets k
and the reachability distance rdk [BKNS00]. Both metrics define a density threshold denoted
td. Triplets are considered as outliers when their LOF is below td, while they are considered
as non-outliers for higher LOF values (see step 10 in Algorithm 3). In our evaluation, we
therefore investigate the impact on the following parameters on the performance of malicious
administrators in identifying jumbled triplets.
. minimum number of neighborhood triplets k
. density threshold td
We specially consider the following values for k based on the distribution of the triplets: 1,
25, 50, 75, and 100. For td, we examine the following values: 1, 5, 10, 15, and 20.
5.4.2 Evaluation Metric
In the next step, we apply each of the presented outlier detection algorithms on the generated
jumbled paths and vary their respective parameters. As a measure of the performance of the
algorithm in identifying exchanged triplets, we use the Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC)
computed as follows. True Positives (TP) are the number of exchanged triplets identified as
exchanged ones. True Negatives (TN) are the number of original triplets identified as such.
False Positives (FP) refer to the number of original triplets identified as exchanged, and False
Negatives (FN) are the number of exchanged triplets identified as original.
MCC =
TP · TN- FP · FNp
(TP+ FP) · (TP+ FN) · (TN+ FP) · (TN+ FN) (6)
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Algorithm 3 Density-based outlier detection algorithm
Input: k: minimum number of triplets, td: density threshold
1: for all triplets Ti do
2: compute k-distance for Ti based on Eq. 1 and 2
3: end for
4: for all triplets Ti do
5: determine the k-distance neighborhood of Ti
6: compute the reachability distance rd of Ti to all other triplets according to Eq. 3
7: compute the local reachability density lrd of Ti according to Eq. 4
8: compute the local outlier factor LOF according to Eq. 5
9: if LOF 6 td then
10: Ti is categorized as outlier
11: end if
12: end for
Table 5: Examples of MCC values for different TP and TN values (with TP = 1- FP and TN = 1- FN)
tp
0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95
tn
0.05 -0.90 -0.71 -0.50 -0.28 0.00
0.25 -0.71 -0.50 -0.25 0.00 0.28
0.50 -0.50 -0.25 0.00 0.26 0.50
0.75 -0.28 0.00 0.26 0.50 0.71
0.95 0.00 0.28 0.50 0.71 0.90
Table 6: Chosen classification of the performance of the algorithms based on their MCC values
mcc value performance
MCC 6 0.00 Poor
0.00 < MCC < 0.30 Fair
0.30 6 MCC < 0.60 Good
0.60 6 MCC < 0.90 Very good
0.90 6 MCC < 1.00 Excellent
MCC = 1.00 Perfect
Table 5 illustrates examples of MCC values obtained for different values of TP and TN.
The MCC values range between -1 and +1. A value of +1 indicates a perfect identification of
both exchanged and original triplets, i.e., no false negatives or positives, while a value of -1
indicates a total failure in identifying both categories. In the following, the performance of the
algorithms are evaluated based on the computed MCC values and categorized according to
the classification presented in Table 6. For example, an algorithm is considered to perform
poorly if its MCC value is negative or equal to zero. This corresponds to, e.g., TP = 0.50 and
TN = 0.25 (i.e., 50% of the exchanged triplets and 25% of the non-exchanged triplets have been
correctly identified). We have repeated each simulation ten times and present the averaged
results herein.
54 path jumbling: a privacy-preserving collaborative scheme for path hiding
5.4.3 Results
In this section, we present and discuss the results obtained for each of the aforementioned
outlier detection algorithms. We first analyze the MCC values obtained for 20 users of the
dataset (see Section 5.4.1). Next, we examine the results of our three selected users (i.e., user
117, user 86, and user 10) in order to study the impact of the number of meetings on the
performance of the algorithms in identifying jumbled triplets. For both scenarios, we specially
analyze the influence of the applied exchange strategies on the performance of the chosen
algorithms. Note that again, the obtained results depend on the characteristics of the utilized
dataset. Our evaluation can therefore not be generalized to all possible scenarios, but again
shows the feasibility of our approach under realistic assumptions.
Velocity-based Outlier Detection
Figure 12 illustrates the MCC values for different maximum velocity values (vmax). The figures
in the left column depicts minimum, maximum, and quartiles of the MCC values computed
for the 20 users of the dataset. The figures in the right column show the individual results for
each of the three selected users. The first row of figures corresponds to the application of the
realistic exchange strategy, while the second and third rows correspond to the random-unfair
and random-fair strategies, respectively.
Figure 12a shows that the performance of the velocity-based outlier detection algorithm in
identifying exchanged triplets when users apply the realistic exchange strategy is globally
considered as fair to good according to our classification introduced in Table 6 (with the
exception of extreme poor and excellent results). For vmax equal to 20 and 30 m/s, the
performance of the algorithm slightly degrades when considering the first quartile. In
comparison, the results of the random-unfair exchange strategy illustrated in Figure 12c are
globally better than those of the realistic strategy. Indeed, no first quartile is below zero, most
medians are higher, and the third quartiles for vmax = 20 m/s and vmax = 30 m/s are greater
than 0.60. Overall, the performance of the algorithm can hence be considered as good when
users apply the random-unfair strategy. For the random-fair strategy, the performance of the
algorithm further improves as shown in Figure 12e. Since all medians are greater than 0.30,
the performance is categorized as good according to our classification. With the exception
of vmax = 5 m/s, all first quartiles with the random-fair strategy are higher than those of
the random-unfair strategy. Additionally, all third quartiles are included in the interval that
corresponds to a very good performance. As a result, the realistic exchange strategy provides a
better privacy protection since the algorithm performs worse in identifying jumbled triplets as
compared to the other strategies. Note that the algorithm is, however, capable of identifying
almost all jumbled triplets for a particular user having collected triplets in a remote location as
compared to other users. This almost perfect identification is possible for a vmax value of 10,
20, and 30 m/s independently of the applied exchange strategy due to the particular spatial
distribution of the triplets.
With the exception of user 10, the results depicted in Figures 12b, 12d, and 12f shows that
the performance of the algorithm improves with the value of vmax. Concerning user 10, the
performance globally drops with vmax until reaching vmax = 20 m/s. This difference can
be explained by the distribution of the velocity in his/her set of triplets. In fact, this user
shows particularly low velocity between his/her own triplets and thus, a high vmax allows the
algorithm to better filter exchanged triplets. Again, applying the realistic exchange strategy
provides globally a slightly better protection against curious administrators followed by the
random-unfair and random-fair exchange strategies. For example, for vmax = 30 m/s and
user 117, MCC = 0.51 with the realistic strategy (see Figure 12b), whereas MCC = 0.80
and MCC = 0.84 for the random-unfair (see Figure 12d) and random-fair strategies (see
Figure 12f), respectively. Moreover, these results show that globally the more meetings, the
worse the performance of the algorithm to identify outliers and hence, the better protection
against curious administrators. For example, for the random-unfair strategy, the performance
of the algorithm in identifying the jumbled triplets of user 117 (four meetings) is considered
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Figure 12: MCC for the velocity-based outlier detection algorithm with vmin = 0 and a uniform
probability distribution
as good to very good, while it is considered as good for user 83 (108 meetings) and poor to fair
for user 10 (235 meetings). However, the difference in the degree of protection depending on
the number of meetings is less significant when the users apply the realistic exchange strategy
and vmax is greater than 20 m/s (see Figure 12b).
In summary, the velocity-based algorithm overall performs best in identifying exchanged
triplets when clients apply the random-fair exchange strategy. In contrast, it performs worse
when the realistic exchange strategy is applied. This means that the privacy of the users is
better protected, when they apply the realistic strategy. Moreover, the results show that the
fewer exchanges, the better identification of the exchanged triplets and vice versa.
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Figure 13: MCC for the Grubb-based outlier detection algorithm and different confidence levels c with
n = 50
Grubb-based Outlier Detection
When the Grubb-based outlier detection is applied, Figure 13 depicts the MCC values for dif-
ferent confidence levels (c), while Figure 14 depicts them for different number of iterations (n).
Recall that the confidence level determines the threshold above which a triplet is considered
as outlier based on the computed value of Zs. The number of iterations determines how many
times the algorithm is run and how many outliers are identified, as one outlier is identified
per algorithm iteration.
According to the results illustrated in Figure 13, the performance of the Grubb-based
algorithm in identifying jumbled triplets is considered as fair to good in most cases. For the
random-unfair and random-fair strategies, the third quartiles are equal or greater than 0.60.
The performance of the Grubb-based detection algorithm hence reaches the very good level.
Moreover, the medians are higher for the random-fair strategy (cf. Figure 13e) followed by the
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random-unfair strategy (cf. Figure 13c) as compared to the realistic strategy (cf. Figure 13a).
Overall, this means that the algorithms performs the best when the random-fair exchange
strategy is applied as compared to the random-unfair and realistic strategies.
For the selected users, the performance of the algorithm is best for user 117 independently
of the applied exchange strategy, reaching even excellent results for the random-unfair and
random-fair strategies as shown in Figure 13d and Figure 13f, respectively. This means that
users with few meetings allow the algorithm to better identify jumbled triplets. However, in
contrast to the previous algorithm, the performance does not significantly degrade with the
number of meetings. In fact, the MCC values of user 10 (235 meetings) are greater than those
of user 83 (108 meetings). Therefore, additional studies are necessary to determine the meeting
threshold from which the performance degrades and also the dependency of the results with
the distribution of the triplets. Similar trends as for the previous algorithm can be observed
about the range of the algorithm’s performance based on the applied exchange strategy and
the number of meetings. When users apply the realistic strategy, the algorithm performs
similarly for all users, while the difference in performance increases for the random-unfair
and random-fair strategies based on the number of meetings. For example, for c = 0.95, the
MCC values range between 0.16 and 0.33 for the realistic strategy (see Figure 13a), while they
range between 0.10 and 0.90 for the random-fair strategy (see Figure 13e).
In Figure 14, we assume c = 0.95 and vary the number of iterations n. Overall, the
performance of the algorithm globally improves with the number of iterations for all exchange
strategies until stabilization as shown in the figures in the left column. For the realistic strategy,
the performance of the algorithm is considered as poor to fair for n = 1, while it is fair to
good from n = 25 (see Figure 14a). For the random-unfair and random-fair strategies, the
performance is slightly better and is categorized as fair to very good based on the values of
the quartiles as illustrated in Figure 14c and Figure 14e, respectively. However, the minimum
MCC value is lower for n = 100 than for n = 75 for both the random-unfair and random-fair
strategies. This means that the algorithm is about to reach the threshold above which the
number of false positives increases. If all outliers have been already been identified, additional
runs of the algorithm lead to the identification of original triplets as outliers and cause the
decline in performance of the algorithm. The comparison of the medians shows that the
algorithm performs globally better when users apply the random-fair exchange strategy
compared to the random-unfair strategy. This means that the algorithm is able to better
distinguish original triplets from jumbled ones. As a result, the random-fair strategy provides
a lower privacy protection to the users as compared to the other strategies. In contrast, the
realistic exchange strategy provides the best privacy protection as MCC values are lower.
For the selected users, the results confirm that the algorithm performs best when users had
only few meetings. For example, user 117 (four meetings) shows a MCC value of up to 0.97
for the random-unfair strategy (see Figure 14d) and 0.90 for the random-fair strategy (see
Figure 14f). This corresponds to excellent performance in our classification. Again, the influence
of larger numbers of meetings on the performance need to be confirmed by additional studies,
since the algorithm, e.g., performs worse for user 83 (108 meetings) than for user 117 (235
meetings).
In summary, the best privacy protection is again offered when users apply the realistic
strategy and exchange their triplets multiple times. In contrast, the worst protection is
provided with the combination of the random-fair strategy and rare exchanges with this
detection algorithm.
Distance-based Outlier Detection
In this algorithm, a triplet is considered to be an outlier if at least a fraction p of the triplets
show a distance greater than the distance dmin from the considered triplet as previously
introduced. We therefore study the impact of (1) the fraction of triplets p and (2) the distance
dmin on the performance of the algorithm in identifying jumbled triplets.
Let us first assume dmin = 50 and vary the fraction of triplets p. Figure 15 illustrates the
corresponding results. For all exchange strategies, the variation of p does not influence the
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Figure 14: MCC for the Grubb-based outlier detection algorithm and different number of iterations n
with c = 0.95
performance of the algorithm. In fact, the MCC values remain almost the same for the 20
users of the dataset, including our three selected users as shown in Figures 15b, 15d, and 15f.
As for both previous algorithms, the performance of the algorithm is slightly better for the
random-fair strategy compared to the realistic and random-unfair strategies when comparing
the quartiles. However, this algorithm globally performs worse than both the aforementioned
velocity-based and Grubb-based outlier detection algorithms since all quartiles remain below
0.30, which corresponds to a fair performance only. In contrast to these algorithms, the number
of meetings, however, does not impact the performance of the distance-based algorithm as
depicted in Figures 15b, 15d, and 15f.
In the second step, we assume p = 50 and vary dmin. The results in Figure 16 highlight
that the algorithm performs best for dmin = 1 for all exchange strategies. In this case, the
performance of the algorithm is considered as fair to very good for all exchange strategies. For
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Figure 15: MCC for the distance-based outlier detection algorithm and different fractions of triplets p
with dmin = 50
the remaining dmin values, the performance is mainly fair with the exception of dmin = 25
for both the random-unfair and random-fair strategies. For these strategies, the third quartiles
are greater than 0.30 and the performance is hence classified as fair to good. These results,
however, highly depend on the spatial distribution of the dataset. Indeed, the best performance
is reached for short distances, which represent the majority of triplets collected in nearby
areas. The larger the distance, the worse the performance, as only few triplets have been
collected in more remote locations. Therefore, these results cannot be easily generalized
to other datasets. Again, the realistic strategy provides overall the best protection against
malicious administrators, seconded by the random-unfair and random-fair strategies when
comparing the quartiles. The observations about the performance of the algorithm for both
dmin and the applied exchange strategies are confirmed for the selected users as shown in
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Figure 16: MCC for the distance-based outlier detection algorithm and different distances dmin with
p = 50
Figures 16b, 16d, and 16f. Also, the number of meetings does not significantly influence the
performance of the algorithm for different values of dmin.
In summary, the results show that the distance-based outlier detection algorithm performs
worse in identifying jumbled triplets when users apply the realistic exchange strategy and
encounter many other users during their journeys.
Density-based Outlier Detection
We finally analyze the impact of the main parameters, i.e., the minimum number of triplets k
and the density threshold td, of this algorithm on its performance in distinguishing jumbled
triplets from original ones. Recall that k is the minimum number of triplets that are required
to be in the neighborhood of the triplet of interest and td serves as threshold to determine
whether a triplet is identified as outlier based on the computed Local Outlier Factor (LOF).
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Figure 17: MCC for the density-based outlier detection algorithm and different minimum numbers of
triplets k with td = 10
Figure 17 presents the results for different values of k with td = 10, while Figure 18 presents
those for different values of td with k = 50.
For the realistic strategy, the performance of the density-based outlier detection algorithm is
considered as poor to fair for k = 1. It then improves to good from k = 25 (see Figure 17a). In
comparison, the performance is fair to good from k = 1 to k = 50 and fair to very good from
k = 75 for the random-unfair strategy (see Figure 17c). For the random-fair strategy, the
algorithm shows poor to fair performance for k = 1, fair to good performance for k = 25 and
k = 50, and fair to very good performance from k = 75 (see Figure 17e). Again, the algorithm
shows the same behavior as the previous studied algorithms concerning the impact of the
applied exchange strategies: The application of the random-fair strategy enables the algorithm
to correctly identify more jumbled triplets than with the other strategies.
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Figure 18: MCC for the density-based outlier detection algorithm and different density thresholds td
with k = 50
For the selected users, the same conclusions can be drawn. Moreover, few encounters lead to
a better (correct) identification of jumbled triplets, while the difference between large numbers
of encounters is insignificant. For user 117 (four meetings), the performance of the algorithm
is good to very good when the user applies the realistic strategy (cf. Figure 17b), while its
performance is poor to fair for the other users. For the random-unfair strategy (cf. Figure 17d),
the performance for user 117 is up to excellent, whereas it is considered as perfect for the
random-fair strategy (cf. Figure 17f). For the other users, the performance does not exceed
good at any time.
Finally, we vary the density threshold td with k = 50. The performance of the algorithm in
identifying exchanged triplets is considered as fair to good for all exchange strategies, with
the exception of td = 10 for the realistic strategy where first quartile is below zero (see
Figure 18a). As previously determined, the random-fair strategy allows a better identification
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of the jumbled triplets compared to the other strategies. Again, only few meetings lead to
higher MCC values and potentially endanger the privacy of this particular user. For example,
the algorithm shows very good to perfect performance for user 117 (four meetings) and all
exchange strategies. For the other users, it remains poor to fair using the realistic strategy (see
Figure 18b), fair using the random-unfair strategy (see Figure 18d), and fair to good using the
random-fair strategy (see Figure 18f).
In summary, as for all studied outlier detection algorithms, the density-based algorithm
performs worst when users apply the realistic exchange strategy in numerous exchanges.
Therefore, the combination of the realistic strategy and a large number of meetings provides
the better privacy protection for the users.
5.4.4 Evaluation Summary
We have shown that the performance of the selected outlier detection algorithms in distinguish-
ing jumbled triplets from original ones is globally not excellent, but remains fair to good with
some very good exceptions. Indeed, the algorithms do not succeed in identifying all jumbled
triplets with the exception of one particular user as shown by the low MCC values. They,
however, perform better when users apply the random-fair strategy and have few meetings.
In this case, only few triplets are exchanged at each encounter. They are hence more easily
identifiable by the algorithm due to their potential difference in both time and space dimen-
sions. By exchanging more triplets, the triplets may form groups that are coherent in terms
of spatiotemporal distribution and prevent the algorithms from detecting them. We have,
however, observed that some algorithms perform better for user 83 (108 meetings) than for
user 10 (235 meetings) and vice versa. Therefore, additional studies are necessary to provide a
more fine-granular analysis of the impact of large numbers of meetings on the performance
of the algorithms. Based on the above results, the realistic exchange strategy has shown to
provide the best privacy protection for the users, as all selected algorithms perform worst in
identifying the jumbled triplets.
5.5 related work
We have presented an approach to protect the privacy of the users by breaking the link between
the spatiotemporal context of the sensor readings and the users who collect them. A simple
alternative to our mechanism could be that the users use pseudonyms to report the triplets to
the server (see Section 3.3.1). However, it was demonstrated in [Kru07], that the application
can infer the real identity of the users by tracking their location traces over multiple reports,
as it may expose the location of their workplaces and homes. In the current state-of-the-art
detailed in Chapter 3, additional measures tailored to participatory sensing applications and
preserving location privacy include spatial cloaking (cf. Section 3.3.2) and data perturbation
(cf. Section 3.3.3). Spatial cloaking builds groups of users that share a common attribute
(e.g., k users located in the same district) to render them indistinguishable from each other.
For example, the real location of the users can be replaced using the averaged location of the k
nearest users [HKH10b]. However, spatial cloaking relies on a third-party entity managing
the perturbation of the locations for all users. To generate the cloaked values, the users need
to report their exact locations to the third-party entity, endangering their privacy. On the other
hand, data perturbation intentionally perturbs the location traces by adding artificial noise
(e.g., Gaussian noise) in order to conceal the individual traces. However, the noise model is
selected by the application and influences the efficiency of the privacy protection. Indeed,
independent random noise has been demonstrated insufficient to prevent adversaries from
reconstructing the original data [Kru07]. The users must therefore trust the application to
protect efficiently their privacy, while they ensure their privacy themselves in our approach.
Our approach shares features with the concept of mix zones [BS03], where the users change
their pseudonyms when they encounter other users. However, our mechanism does not
involve pseudonyms, but is solely based on the triplets collected by the users, which are
64 path jumbling: a privacy-preserving collaborative scheme for path hiding
actually exchanged. Our concept shares also similarities with [HG05], [MC09] and [MC10]. In
these schemes, the paths followed by users are replaced by newly generated paths intersecting
with those of other users. However, these schemes are centrally organized and require users
to transmit their current and actual position to a trusted entity for the generation of the new
paths. Finally, our scheme shares similarities with the data aggregation scheme proposed
in [SZLZ10]. This decentralized scheme is based on data slices equally distributed between
neighbors before being reported to an aggregation server. Instead of only considering an
equal distribution between neighbors, we examine multiple exchange strategies as well as
reporting strategies that are not addressed in this prior work. Moreover, we investigate
different dimensions in our evaluation and we do not assume the existence of an aggregation
server. Our mechanism is tailored for common participatory sensing applications, where each
user individually and directly reports triplets to the application server.
5.6 summary
In this chapter, we have presented a collaborative and decentralized approach to preserve the
location privacy of users contributing to participatory sensing applications. Our approach
is solely based on the exchange of the collected sensor readings between users in physical
proximity in order to conceal the paths they have followed. We have first examined multiple
exchange strategies in combination with different reporting strategies to determine their
impact on the jumbling degree, the distance, and the incurred reporting overhead. Based on
the utilized real-world dataset, we have shown that the realistic exchange strategy guarantees
privacy independently of the applied reporting strategy. However, its application requires a
high degree of trust in other users and generates a potentially large reporting overhead for
some of the users. In comparison, the random-unfair and random-fair strategies require a
larger amount of meetings to ensure similar guarantees, but require a lower degree of trust
and generate less overhead. In the second step, we have used state-of-the-art outlier detection
techniques that we have tailored to the application domain in order to investigate if exchanged
triplets can be distinguished. The results show that the performance of the mechanisms in
distinguishing exchanged triples from original ones is mostly between fair and very good on
a scale ranging from poor to perfect. This means that only partial identification of jumbled
triplets is possible in most cases. In particular, the realistic exchange strategy globally provides
the best privacy protection followed by the random-unfair and random-fair strategies. As a
result of our evaluation, we have provided insights for the strategy selection depending on the
desired privacy guarantees, the degree of trust in other users, and the willingness to equally
share the reporting overhead. Using our approach, the users can therefore customize their
exchange and reporting settings depending on their preferences and, protect their location
privacy themselves.
6TRUSTMETER : A TRUST ASSESSMENT SCHEME FOR
COLLABORATIVE PATH HIDING
The best way to find out if you can
trust somebody is to trust them.
E. Hemingway
In our collaborative path hiding mechanism detailed in Chapter 5, users mutually preserve
their privacy in a decentralized fashion by exchanging sensor readings at physical encounters.
Swapping a subset of the data samples removes the association between the sensor readings
and the identity of the users who collected them. The sensor readings hence do not reveal the
actual paths followed by each user, but instead result in jumbled paths which cannot be easily
reconstructed. This scheme, however, relies on the collaboration of the participating users.
Malicious users may attempt to disturb the operation of the mechanism by, e.g., dropping
exchanged data samples as outlined in Section 5.1.2. This can lead to a total failure of the
mechanism and thus of the underlying application. To overcome these threats, we propose
an application-agnostic scheme called TrustMeter that assesses the behavior of the users
contributing to the collaborative path hiding process [CRPSKH12a].
In Section 6.1, we first recall our assumptions and models already adopted in Chapter 5,
before describing our novel scheme in Section 6.2. We discuss the robustness of TrustMeter
against threats to reputation in Section 6.3 and assess its performance in identifying malicious
users in Section 6.4. We further quantify the traffic overhead incurred by TrustMeter in
Section 6.5. Finally, we survey related work in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 concludes this chapter.
6.1 system and threat models
In this section, we provide an overview of our system and threat models. As we adopt the
same models as in the previous chapter, further details are also provided in Sections 5.1.1 and
5.1.2, respectively. In particular, we refine the adversary model adopted in this chapter.
6.1.1 System Model
We assume that mobile devices automatically collect sensor readings. Each sensor reading s
is stamped with the collection time t and location information l forming a triplet < t, l, s >.
Instead of directly reporting the triplets to the application server, the mobile devices leverage
the collaborative path hiding concept introduced in Section 5.2. This means that mobile devices
physically exchange triplets at opportunistic encounters according to one of the following
exchange strategies detailed in Section 5.2.2.
. realistic strategy Users exchange the entire set of collected and/or exchanged
triplets with a certain probability at encounters.
. random-unfair strategy Each user independently and randomly determines the
number of triplets to exchange.
. random-fair strategy Users agree on a common number of triplets to exchange at
each meeting.
Each user uploads a combination of the samples received from encountered users and the
remainder of their own collected samples to the application server every hour as assumed in
Chapter 5.
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Figure 19: Overview of the TrustMeter architecture
6.1.2 Threat Model
In our threat model detailed in Section 5.1.1, we assume two kinds of adversaries: (1) honest-
but-curious application administrators and (2) malicious users. In this chapter, we specially
consider malicious users, who either drop exchanged triplets or create false triplets to exchange.
By conducting such attack, malicious users aim at altering the results consolidated at the
server side, and perturbing the function of the collaborative path hiding mechanism. In the
following, we refer to malicious users who neither exchange nor report triplets from other
users as droppers and to users who create falsified triplets as spammers.
As users apply the collaborative path hiding mechanism, application administrators do
not obtain complete information about the paths followed by the users during the sensing
process as shown in Chapter 5. In order to breach the privacy of the users, administrators may,
however, be interested in any information about exchanges reported to the server hat can help
them in linking the jumbled triplets to the users who gathered them.
6.2 trustmeter architecture
TrustMeter is built upon our system model presented in Section 6.1.1. It comprises clients
(i.e., mobile devices) and an application server as illustrated in Figure 19. The objective of
TrustMeter is two-fold: (1) identify malicious clients that launch dropping and spamming
attacks as defined in Section 6.1.2, and (2) quarantine malicious clients in order to mitigate
their attacks. We first provide an overview of the system architecture, before detailing the
underlying mechanisms.
6.2.1 Overview
We assume that clients have a unique identifier IDclient and the application server has a
public/private key pair. Each client periodically transmits the triplets to the application server.
At each transmission, the application server disseminates a table containing the level of trust
of all users. The level of trust is computed by the server based on the triplets reported by all
users and their feedback about past exchanges. The feedback is reported to the server with
the transmitted triplets in form of statistics.
When a client encounters another client, the two entities first examine the trust level of the
opposite party provided by the application server. Only if both clients are rated as trusted, they
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initiate the exchange of triplets using one of the three strategies (cf. Section 6.1.1). They first
generate an unique identifier for each triplet and encrypt it using the public key of the server
in order to prevent other clients from accessing its content, before physically exchanging them.
6.2.2 Underlying Mechanisms
Next, we present the building blocks of TrustMeter and detail their integration into a common
participatory sensing application.
Preparation and Exchange of Triplets
When two clients meet, they first examine the trust level of the opposite party and only initiate
the exchange of triplets if none of them is rated as untrusted. The triplets to be exchanged are
individually encrypted using the public key of the server to prevent other users from accessing
their content. For each triplet i, clients generate an unique identifier (IDi) by concatenating
their own identifier (IDclient), the time of creation of the triplet (ti), and a random number
(r), and computing a one-way hash function of the result.
IDi = H(IDclient k ti k r) (7)
The use of concatenation and hashing results in the creation of unique triplet Identifiers (IDs)
that cannot be easily guessed by potential attackers. Note that other mechanisms for the
generation of unique triplet identifiers can be used without loss of generality.
Before sending triplets to another client, each client stores the IDs of the triplets to be
exchanged and the identifier of its exchange partner IDpartner. Both clients exchange their
triplets. Additionally, they set a delivery timeout Tdelivery specific to the exchanged triplets.
If these triplets do not reach the server before the timeout expiration, the clients consider them
as lost and exchange them again.
Reporting of Triplets
When reporting new triplets to the server, clients can (1) verify if triplets they have exchanged
with other clients have been delivered to the server and (2) report their experience with other
clients, as detailed in the following.
tracking of triplets The clients request the list of the triplet IDs delivered to the server
since their last connection. Based on this list, the clients determine how many exchanged
triplets have been successfully delivered to the application server. Note that clients cannot
directly request the IDs of the triplets of interest to the server, since doing so would allow the
server to establish a link between the triplet ID and previously uploaded reports and thus,
defeat the primary purpose of the collaborative path jumbling mechanism. If the transmitted
triplets have reached the server, the clients delete them. If not, they wait until the expiration of
the timeout to retransmit them.
experience reporting The clients report their experience with all exchange partners
by compiling statistics for each pair-wise exchange. These statistics include the identifiers
of the two entities involved, the number of triplet exchanges in both directions, and the
number of triplets delivered to the server. By reporting these statistics, the clients provide
insights about the exchange pattern to the server in order to improve the reliability of the
feedback provided by the clients and prevent malicious users from fraudulently increasing
their reputation. However, the server cannot link the identity of the clients and the triplets
they generated based on these statistics, as neither the IDs of the exchanged triplets nor the
fraction of own collected triplets are disclosed.
68 trustmeter: a trust assessment scheme for collaborative path hiding
Reputation Computation and Trust Assessment
We describe herein how the server computes the reputation scores and derives the associated
trust level for each client. We introduce two reputation scores, R and R 0. R measures the
participation of the clients in the collaborative path hiding process based on the numbers
of exchanged triplets and delivered triplets. As a result, the value of R provides insights
about potential dropping behavior. In contrast, R 0 focuses on identifying potential spamming
behavior based on the reported triplets. For each new client, the server initializes R with R0
and R 0 with R 00 in order to allow new clients to participate in exchanges with already active
clients.
R is recursively computed according to Equation 8 each time clients report statistics. Equa-
tion 8 corresponds to an exponential moving average with a coefficient of 0.25. R 2 [0,100]
and   is the ratio of the number of delivered triplets to the total number of exchanged triplets.
The lower the value of  , the higher the probability that the client has dropped packets. R
increases for   > Rn100 , while it decreases for lower values.
Rn+1 = Rn +
100 ·  - Rn
4
(8)
For the computation of R 0, we assume that the server can detect falsified triplets referred
to as spam, using a function such as applied in [HKH10a]. When the server identifies spam,
it flags the client having reported these triplets as well as its exchange partners. The server
computes two metrics as indicator of spamming behavior,  1 and  2.  1 is the ratio of the
number of flagged exchanges over the total number of exchanges of the client.  2 is the ratio
of the number of reported triplets identified as spam over the total number of reported triplets.
The higher  1 and  2, the higher the probability that the clients have injected spam. Based on
these metrics, the server computes R(1),R(2),R(3) 2 [0,100] as follows, with   =  1+ 22 .
R
(1)
n+1 = R
(1)
n +
100 · (1-  1)- R(1)n
4
(9)
R
(2)
n+1 = R
(2)
n +
100 · (1-  2)- R(2)n
4
(10)
R
(3)
n+1 = R
(3)
n +
100 · (1-  )- R(3)n
4
(11)
Next, the server computes R 0 according to Algorithm 4, with  U and  T being the reputation
thresholds used by the server to classify the clients into the categories introduced in Table 7.
The rationale behind this algorithm is to first identify clients that are clearly malicious (i.e., R(3)
<  U) or honest (i.e., R(3) >  T ). Then, the classification is refined for clients that are still
considered as indefinite. Step 1 in Algorithm 4 focuses on identifying additional honest clients
based on the value of R(2), while potential malicious clients remain classified as indefinite.
Similarly, step 3 focuses on identifying malicious clients based on the value of R(1). Finally,
the server selects the minimum of Rn+1 and R 0n+1 as reputation value and associates the
corresponding trust level to the client according to the mapping presented in Table 7. Choosing
the minimum prevents malicious clients from masking spamming behavior by well behaving
in terms of dropping and vice versa. Note that we chose R0 and R 00 as the average of  U and
 T to allow new clients to take part in exchanges without introducing unjustified promotion
or penalty.
Dissemination of Trust Levels
When a client reports triplets to the server, it obtains an update of the trust levels of all other
clients. These levels are piggybacked with the acknowledgements from the server in order to
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Algorithm 4 Computation of R 0
Input: R(1),R(2),R(3)
1: if  U 6 R(3) 6  T and R(2) >  T ) then
2: R 0  R(2)
3: else if ( U 6 R(3) 6  T and R(1) <  U) then
4: R 0  R(1)
5: else
6: R 0  R(3)
7: end if
8: return R 0
Table 7: Mapping of trust levels with reputation values
trust level reputation range
Untrusted 0 6min(R,R 0) <  U
Indefinite  U 6min(R,R 0) 6  T
Trusted  T < min(R,R 0) 6 100
reduce the incurred traffic and avoid that the server obtains temporal information about the
exchanges. Clients leverage these levels to decide to exchange triplets with newly encountered
clients as introduced in Section 6.2.2.
6.3 robustness against threats to reputation and privacy
We assume the threat model of Section 6.1.2 and discuss the resilience of TrustMeter against
the following attacks.
6.3.1 Manipulation of Reputation
Malicious clients can attempt to alter the reputation computed and stored at the server side.
The application server is, however, protected against unauthorized access using standard
cryptographic primitives. As such, this particular attack cannot be launched. Furthermore,
malicious clients can try to report falsified information on behalf of others. Our scheme protects
honest clients against this attack by requesting clients to authenticate with the application
server. Such an attack would hence only be successful if malicious clients can access the private
keys of the targeted clients, which is beyond the scope of our attacker model. Malicious clients
can send falsified information to the server about their exchanges in order to: (1) reduce the
reputation of other clients by indicating that they have got fewer triplets from other clients
and/or fewer triplets were delivered, or (2) fraudulently increase their own reputation by
reporting larger numbers of handed and delivered triplets. However, recall that both exchange
partners provide the numbers of handed, received, and delivered triplets to the server. This
means that the server can verify that the provided information is the same for both exchange
partners. If the figures do not match, the server assumes that one of the exchange partners
is providing false information. It then observes the behavior of both exchange partners by
maintaining a counter of non-matching reports in order to distinguish lying from honest
clients. The larger the counter value, the higher the probability that a client is malicious.
Another more sophisticated attack is the collusion of malicious clients that may agree on
corroborating falsified information to mutually increase their reputation. Nevertheless, the
efficacy of this attack increases with the frequency at which it is conducted. Simultaneously,
exchanges between the same clients at a abnormal high frequency increases the risk to be
detected by the server, which maintains a list of exchange partners for each client. As a
result, the impact of such attacks remains limited. In order to still diminish the effect of this
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attack, the server can take into account the number of exchange partners in the reputation
computation. The more exchange partners, the higher the increase in reputation. At the same
time, honest clients showing a small number of partners due to their physical distribution
should not be penalized.
6.3.2 Replay and Sybil Attacks
Under normal operating conditions, triplet retransmissions are permitted after expiration of
the delivery timeout. However, malicious clients can abuse this feature in order to increase
their reputation by replaying triplets to exchange and/or to report. The efficacy of this attack
depends on the frequency at which it is launched. The server receiving the same triplets at
abnormal rates considers them as spam and utilizes the mechanisms described in Section 6.2.2
to identify malicious clients. Moreover, TrustMeter does not prevent malicious clients from
adopting multiple identities. However, malicious clients need first to gain reputation before
effectively launching attacks, since the trust level of new clients is initialized as indefinite. This
thus increases the cost of such attack for malicious clients.
In summary, we have shown that TrustMeter can identify a variety of threats against the
reputation system by malicious clients.
6.4 identification of malicious users
We analyze the performance of TrustMeter in identifying malicious behaviors (i.e., spamming
and dropping) by means of extensive simulations. In particular, we examine the impact of the
proposed exchange strategies as well as different framework parameters.
6.4.1 Simulation Setup and Method
We implemented both our system model (see Section 6.1.1) and the TrustMeter scheme
(see Section 6.2) in the ONE simulator [KOK09]. In the following, we consider a constant
population of 100 clients over 24 hours for each simulation. The clients follow a pedestrian
movement model based on a section of Helsinki City. All clients contribute to a participatory
sensing application by generating a new triplet every 150 s and reporting triplets to the
server every hour. The collected sensor modalities are, however, irrelevant since TrustMeter is
application-agnostic. We assume that the client devices use Bluetooth to communicate with
neighboring devices. We also assume lossless communication within a radius of 10 m, which
is consistent with typical Bluetooth communication range. In order to study the impact of
the exchange strategies introduced in Section 6.1.1, we assume that clients exchange triplets
with clients rated as indefinite or trusted using one of the following strategies: (1) realistic, (2)
random-unfair, and (3) random-fair. Moreover, they do not exchange triplets with untrusted
clients. Depending on the simulation scenario, each client can act as an honest client, a dropper,
or a spammer.
As a measure of the TrustMeter performance in identifying malicious clients, we use the
Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) introduced in Equation 6 (cf. Section 5.4.1). In this
case, True Positives (TP) are the number of malicious clients identified as malicious. True
Negatives (TN) describe the number of honest clients identified as such. False Positives (FP)
are the number of honest clients identified as malicious, and False Negatives (FN) are the
number of malicious clients identified as clients. Moreover, we consider malicious clients
and honest clients that are both classified as indefinite as false negatives and false positives,
respectively.
Recall that a MCC value of +1 indicates a perfect identification of both malicious and
honest clients, i.e., no false negatives or positives, while a value of -1 indicates a total failure
in identifying both categories. In the following, we use the classification introduced in
Table 6 in order to analyze the performance of TrustMeter based on the obtained MCC values.
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(b) Realistic strategy with an exchange probability of 1.0
Figure 20: Impact of the exchange probability in the realistic strategy on the MCC for different values of
the initial reputation scores R0 and R 00 (with R0 = R 00)
Additionally, we measure the impact of the identification of malicious clients on the latency
until the triplets reach the server. We repeated each simulation 50 times using different random
seeds to model different movement patterns. We present herein the averaged results.
6.4.2 Framework Parameterization
We first examine the performance of TrustMeter in identifying malicious clients depending
on the following parameters: (1) initial reputation scores, (2) reputation thresholds, and (3)
delivery timeout. For these simulations, we consider a constant population of 90 honest clients,
five droppers (dropping all packets), and five spammers (spamming all packets).
Initial Reputation Scores (R0 and R 00)
We first investigate the impact of R0 and R 00 on the performance of TrustMeter. Recall that R0
and R 00 are the initial reputation scores attributed by the server to new clients in order to allow
them to exchange triplets with already active clients. As detailed in Section 6.2.2, we select
R0 = R
0
0, with R0 and R
0
0 2 [0,100]. Moreover, we assume | U -  T | = 20 for these simulations.
Moreover, the exchange probability for the realistic strategy is chosen to be 1 in order to
compare the exchange strategies on the same basis, i.e., the number of exchanges. If the
exchange probability is set to 0.5 in order to prevent the application server from reconstructing
the original paths of the users, the obtained MCC values are similar to those obtained when
the users exchange triplets at each encounter, but it takes around twice as much time to reach
the same MCC values as shown in Figure 20.
Figure 21 illustrates the evolution of the MCC for different initial reputation scores over
time. Figure 21a presents the results obtained when all clients apply the realistic strategy,
while Figure 21b and Figure 21c present the same for the random-unfair and random-fair
strategies, respectively. The results show an initial bootstrapping phase in which the MCC
values fluctuate due to a low number of exchanged and reported triplets. During this phase,
each triplet significantly impacts the reputation of the clients and the associated trust levels.
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After this phase, the system stabilizes and attributes a definitive trust level to the client. If
the behavior of the clients changes, TrustMeter adapts the attributed trust level to the current
behavior of the clients as shown in Sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4. This process, however, takes some
time as the trust levels are derived from observations of the past behavior of the clients.
Figure 21 shows that high initial reputation scores globally lead to a better performance of
TrustMeter in identifying malicious clients. For example, TrustMeter reaches perfect identifica-
tion at t=65,000 s for initial reputation scores of 70 and 80 when clients apply the random-fair
exchange strategy (see Figure 21c). In comparison, TrustMeter performs worse for lower
reputation scores. For initial reputation scores chosen between 20 and 50, the identifica-
tion is however considered as very good, whereas it is excellent for R0=R 00 at t=65,000 s, for
example. Since the reputation thresholds  U and  T are centered by design on R0 and R 00
(cf. Section 6.2.2), the lower the initial reputation scores, the lower  T . Consequently, clients
require lower reputation to be classified as trusted, resulting in false negatives (i.e., malicious
clients rated as trusted). At the same time, high initial reputation scores require that honest
clients show high reputation to be classified as trusted. Setting the initial reputation scores too
high may thus result in false positives, i.e., honest clients classified as either indefinite or even
untrusted. In order to balance this tradeoff, we therefore choose R0=R 00=50 in the remainder of
this chapter.
Furthermore, TrustMeter shows better performance when the clients apply the random-fair
exchange strategy as compared to the other exchange strategies. This difference is due to
the number of triplets exchanged in each strategy. Clients applying the realistic strategy
exchange more triplets than using the other strategies, since all triplets are exchanged. In
the random-unfair strategy, only a subset of triplets is exchanged, while clients agree on the
number of triplets to exchange in the random-fair strategy. As shown in Section 5.3.2, fewer
triplets are exchanged when clients apply the random-fair strategy. By exchanging fewer
packets, honest clients are less impacted by the reduction in reputation caused by not yet
identified malicious clients they have met. Consequently, their reputation scores reflect better
their actual behavior that allows a better assessment of their trust level.
Reputation Thresholds ( U and  T )
The reputation thresholds determine the reputation ranges associated to each trust level as
illustrated in Table 7. By design, these thresholds are centered on the initial reputation scores,
i.e., 50 (cf. Section 6.4.2). Figure 22 presents the temporal evolution of the MCC for the different
pairs of reputation thresholds.
For all exchange strategies, TrustMeter shows poor results for the threshold pair (0,100), as
the MCC values remain equal to -1 for the entire time of the simulation. Using this threshold
pair, clients can only be classified as indefinite that exclusively results in false positives and
false negatives. For the pair (10,90), the performance of TrustMeter improves, as TrustMeter
can also classify clients as trusted and untrusted. To reach these categories, clients however
need to show either a very high reputation score (i.e., greater than 90) or a very low reputation
score (i.e., lower than 10). As a result, only few clients reach such thresholds and thus, the
remaining clients are classified as indefinite, leading to high percentages of false positives
and negatives. By narrowing the threshold pair around values of 50, TrustMeter identifies
malicious clients faster. The best results are reached for the pair (50,50) with which there
are only two possible trust levels, trusted and untrusted. As there is no indefinite trust level
in this case, new clients starting with an initial reputation of 50 may rapidly be classified as
untrusted as soon as they meet a spammer not yet identified. This would definitely prevent
them from contributing to the path jumbling. As a result, initial reputation scores greater
than 50 should be chosen in order to support the future contribution of newly active clients, if
the pair (50,50) is selected. Under these conditions, the detailed results show that TrustMeter
correctly distinguishes honest from malicious clients in most cases, increasing the percentages
of true positives and true negatives.
Overall, the random-fair exchange strategy shows better results for the same threshold
pair than the other strategies. For example, at the end of the simulation, the MCC values
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(c) Random-fair strategy
Figure 21: MCC for different values of the initial reputation scores R0 and R 00 (with R0 = R 00) and
exchange strategies over time
for the pairs (30,70), (40,60), and (45,55) are around 0.60 for the realistic strategy, 0.63 for the
random-unfair strategy, and 0.68 for the random-fair strategy. In particular, TrustMeter reaches
a MCC of 0.63 at then end of the simulation for the pair (10,90) with the random-fair strategy
as compared to only 0.04 and -0.35 for the random-unfair and realistic strategies, respectively.
As detailed in Section 6.4.2, this difference is due to the number of triplets exchanged in each
strategy. The lower the number of triplets exchanged, the lower the reduction of reputation
caused by encountered malicious clients who are not yet identified as such. Consequently,
honest clients can reach  T faster when applying the random-fair strategy and be hence
correctly classified.
In summary, the interval size from the center should not be too large, so that honest clients
can still reach  T and malicious clients drop below  U in a realistic time. Simultaneously, the
interval should be large enough to allow honest clients to prove their genuine behavior before
being classified as untrusted and not be allowed to exchange triplets with others. Based on
the above results, we therefore choose  U=30 and  T=70 as reputation thresholds in order to
balance this tradeoff.
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Figure 22: MCC for different pairs of reputation thresholds  U and  T and exchange strategies over time
Delivery Timeout (Tdelivery)
As detailed in Section 6.2.2, clients set a timeout Tdelivery that triggers the retransmission
of triplets, which have not reached the server yet. In this section, we study the influence
of the duration of this timeout on the performance of TrustMeter in identifying attackers.
Additionally, we investigate the corresponding latency until triplets reach the application
server. Figure 23 illustrates the temporal evolution of the MCC for different timeout durations,
while Figure 24 illustrates the corresponding average latency. For the smallest timeout values,
TrustMeter shows the worst performance for all exchange strategies, as shown, e.g., by a MCC
value of -0.08 for the realistic strategy, 0.03 for the random-unfair strategy, and 0.30 for the
random-fair strategy at the end of the simulation for a timeout of 1,500 s. With a short timeout
duration, clients tends to prematurely consider the exchanged triplets as dropped, even if they
may have been further exchanged or not yet reported to the server. This causes a reduction
in reputation of the clients with which they exchanged these triplets. As a result, these may
be incorrectly classified as untrusted despite their honest behavior. In order to reduce the
percentage of false positives, the timeout should hence be chosen long enough to at least
allow clients to report the triplets after the exchange before considering them as dropped. At
the same time, selecting a long timeout delays the identification of actual droppers. Thus, it
negatively impacts on the function of the collaborative path hiding mechanism.
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Figure 23: MCC for different durations of the delivery timeout Tdelivery and exchange strategies over
time
Furthermore, the latency increases with the timeout duration when the clients apply the
realistic and random-unfair exchange strategies, as shown in Figure 24a and Figure 24b,
respectively. Additionally, the averaged latency is shorter for the random-fair strategy as
compared to the random-unfair and realistic strategies. For example, for a timeout duration
of 1,500 s, the latency is equal to around 1,900 s for the random-fair strategy, 2,350 s for the
random-unfair strategy, and 2,400 s for the realistic strategy. This difference is again due to
the number of exchanged triplets for each strategy. Using the random-fair strategy, clients
exchange fewer packets with others. This means that they report a higher fraction of their
own collected triplets directly to the server. Consequently, the latency is mainly determined
by the period of reporting, i.e., one hour on average in our scenario, and the duration of
timeout has thus only a limited impact on the latency as confirmed in Figure 24c. In contrast, a
larger number of packets are exchanged using the random-unfair and realistic strategies. This
hence increases the probability that triplets are exchanged over several hops, thus resulting
in an increased latency. In summary, the shorter the timeout, the shorter the latency for the
realistic and random-unfair strategies. Simultaneously, a short timeout increases the amount
of retransmitted triplets, and hence introduces additional overhead. Note that we quantify
this overhead in Section 6.5. In order to balance both aforementioned tradeoffs, we therefore
select a timeout of 7,500 s.
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Figure 24: Average latency until packets reach the server for different durations of the delivery timeout
Tdelivery and exchange strategies over time
6.4.3 Identification of Droppers
We first investigate the performance of TrustMeter in identifying droppers with different
percentages of droppers, dropping rates, and attack scenarios. Note that the same analysis for
spammers is conducted in Section 6.4.4. In the following, we assume the following values for
the system parameters: (1) R0=R 00=50, (2)  U=30 and  T=70, and (3) 7,500 s as timeout.
Percentage of Droppers
In this scenario, we assume that the droppers launch their attacks at the start of the simulation
and continue to drop all triplets. Figure 25 represents the temporal evolution of the MCC
for different percentages of droppers. It shows that the latency until TrustMeter succeeds in
identifying most droppers depends on both the percentage of droppers as well as the exchange
strategy applied by the users. Overall, the lower the percentage of droppers, the faster their
identification, as the reputation of all clients from the triplets generators to the droppers
are affected by the dropping action. The fewer droppers, the higher increase in reputation,
allowing honest clients to reach the trusted level faster. The identification of droppers is faster
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Figure 25: MCC for different percentages of droppers and exchange strategies over time
for the random-fair strategy with 21,000 s (i.e., around six hours and ten minutes) for 5%
of droppers, as compared to the random-unfair and realistic strategies with 34,800 s (nine
hours and 20 minutes) and 59,500 s (16 hours and 28 minutes), respectively. This means that
only around six reports are necessary for the droppers’ identification with the random-fair
strategy, as reporting occurs every hour in average. Since clients exchange fewer triplets with
the random-fair strategy, the impact of triplets dropped by others on the reputation of honest
clients is lower than with the other strategies.
Furthermore, Figure 26 confirms that the latency increases with the percentage of droppers.
For example, Figure 26b shows a difference in latency of up to 2,400 s between 5% and 95% of
droppers at t=22,800 s. However, the latency decreases again when the droppers have been
identified by the server, as honest clients do not exchange triplets with them anymore. For
95% of droppers, the latency decreases from around 1,980 s using the realistic strategy (see
Figure 26a), to 1,620 s and 1,140 s using the random-unfair (see Figure 26b) and random-fair
strategy (see Figure 26c), respectively. The impact of droppers on the latency is lower for the
random-fair strategy, since the droppers are identified and excluded faster than with the other
strategies as shown in Figure 25. Simultaneously, the decrease in latency takes longer with the
random-fair exchange strategy, as the clients exchange fewer triplets. If the triplets are not
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(c) Random-fair strategy
Figure 26: Average latency until triplets reach the server for different percentages of droppers and
exchange strategies over time
directly reported by clients, the probability that they are exchanged is lower and the path to
the server takes longer.
Dropping Rate
Next, we assume a population of 90 honest clients and ten droppers and investigate the impact
of the dropping rate on the performance of our scheme. Figure 27 shows that TrustMeter
performs poorly in distinguishing honest clients from droppers for dropping rates below and
equal to 30%. For these dropping rates, droppers drop fewer packets that results in a slower
reduction in reputation, and hence a longer time span until they are considered as untrusted.
However, the performance improves for 50% dropping rate with MCC values around 0.60
for the realistic strategy (see Figure 27a), 0.40 for the random-unfair strategy (see Figure 27b)
and 0.20 for the random-fair strategy at t=86,400 s (see Figure 27c). For dropping rates over
70%, TrustMeter reaches perfect identification at the end of the simulation. As previously, the
identification of droppers is globally faster when the clients apply the random-fair strategy as
compared to the other exchange strategies.
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Figure 27: MCC for different dropping rates and exchange strategies over time
Figure 28 shows the dependency of the latency on the correct identification of the droppers.
Again, the latency decreases when droppers are identified (i.e., for dropping rates higher than
70%). This is particularly visible for the realistic strategy, where the latency diminishes from
3,200 s to 2,800 s for 95% dropping (see Figure 28a). Moreover, droppers have less impact on
the latency when the clients apply the random-fair and random-unfair strategies, since clients
exchange fewer triplets with them and report more triplets to the server directly. This also
explains the overall difference in latency between the different exchange strategies.
Distribution of Dropping Attacks
In the following, we assume a constant population of 30 droppers that drop all packets
according to different temporal patterns and 70 honest clients. By considering the following
scenarios, we aim at analyzing the impact of the time at which the droppers start their
attacks on the performance of TrustMeter in identifying droppers. This provides insights
about the influence of potential reputation gained by the droppers before the attack on their
identification as untrusted clients. Additionally, we examine the impact of the number of
droppers simultaneously launching dropping attacks.
. scenario 1 : All 30 droppers start at t=0 s (reference scenario).
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Figure 28: Average latency until triplets reach the server for different dropping rates and exchange
strategies over time
. scenario 2 : All 30 droppers start at t=10,800 s.
. scenario 3 : All 30 droppers start at t= 21,600 s.
. scenario 4 : 15 droppers start at t=10,800 s and the 15 others start at t=21,600 s (i.e., two
waves of 15 droppers each).
. scenario 5 : Ten droppers start at t=10,800 s, ten others at t=21,600 s, and the remaining
at t=32,400 s (i.e., three waves of ten droppers each).
. scenario 6: Six droppers start at t=10,800 s, six others at t=16,200 s, six others at
t=21,600 s, six others at t=27,000 s, and the last six at t=32,400 s (i.e., five waves of six
droppers each).
Figure 29 represents the temporal evolution of the MCC for the different dropping scenarios
and exchange strategies. The results show that the later the attack is launched, the longer
TrustMeter needs to correctly identify the droppers. For the random-fair strategy, all droppers
are correctly identified 24,600 s after the attack was launched in scenario 1, while detection took
46,000 s in the scenario 2, and over 64,800 s in the scenario 3 (see Figure 29c). In other words,
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Figure 29: MCC for different dropping attack scenarios and exchange strategies over time
the longer droppers act as honest users, the longer it takes to TrustMeter to unmask them
after their attack. Since droppers are able to first build reputation, this is the time necessary
for their reputation to drop below  U. The more reputation gained, the longer the delay.
Furthermore, the identification is faster when clients apply the random-fair and random-unfair
strategies. By applying these exchange strategies, clients statistically exchange fewer triplets
than with the realistic strategy. This means that their reputation is less impacted by exchanges
with malicious clients as discussed previously. Simultaneously, the increase in reputation
depends on the number of exchanged triplets. The fewer triplets exchanged, the lower the
reputation increases. Consequently, droppers are able to build less reputation when applying
these exchange strategies and thus, lower reduction in reputation is necessary to drop below
 U. At the same time, the number of exchanged triplets may not be sufficient to significantly
reduce the reputation of droppers that have launched their attacks, potentially increasing the
identification delay. However, the results show that the reduction in reputation is sufficient
to mitigate the small number of exchanged triplets and caters for the identification of the
droppers in a reasonable time. Concerning scenarios 4 to 6, TrustMeter performs better for
scenario 4, since the attacks are launched earlier as compared to the other scenarios discussed
above. For scenarios 5 and 6, there are only few differences between the performance of
TrustMeter in identifying droppers even if an additional attack is launched in scenario 6. In
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both scenarios, TrustMeter is still in the initial phase in which it progressively starts to identify
spammers, leading to only few differences in its performance.
6.4.4 Spammers
We analyze the performance of TrustMeter in identifying spammers under the same attack
scenarios as above.
Percentage of Spammers
We assume that the spammers launch their attacks at the start of the simulation and continue
to spam all triplets. Figure 30 illustrates the temporal evolution of the MCC for different
percentages of spammers. For all exchange strategies, the performance of TrustMeter improves
with the number of spammers until reaching the best performance for 50% of spammers at
the end of the simulation. The lower the number of spammers, the higher the probability that
they exchange spam with honest clients. As a result, the reputation of honest clients decreases,
leading to their incorrect classification as indefinite. Moreover, the reduction in reputation
increases with the number of exchanged spam triplets. Hence, TrustMeter performs better
when the clients apply the random-fair strategy for up to 50% of spammers as shown by,
e.g., a MCC value of 0.63 at the end of the simulation for 5% spammers (cf. Figure 30c), as
compared to 0.26 for the random-unfair strategy (cf. Figure 30b) and 0.00 for the realistic
strategy (cf. Figure 30a). The probability that spammers exchange spam with other spammers
increases with the number of spammers. Their reputation hence diminishes, leading to
their correct identification. However, the performance of TrustMeter decreases from 50% of
spammers. Since the amount of injected spam increases, the probability that honest clients
relay this spam increases. Simultaneously, the impact of the exchange strategy diminishes
when the number of spammers increases, as the probability to exchange spam increases.
Spamming Rate
Next, we assume a population of ten spammers and consider different spamming rates.
Figure 31a shows that TrustMeter only fairly performs in identifying spammers when clients
apply the realistic strategy, as clients exchange more triplets than with the other strategies.
Therefore, the reputation of honest clients getting spam decreases more rapidly, leading to
their incorrect categorization. However, when honest users are identified as untrusted, they are
temporarily quarantined and can only upload previously exchanged or their own triplets. If the
uploaded triplets are correct, clients rapidly regain reputation that causes the change of their
trust level and allow them to exchange triplets again. Otherwise, the clients are maintained in
quarantine. Depending on the duration of the quarantine, the privacy of the clients may be
endangered if clients only report their own collected triplets. In this case, the clients can apply
an additional privacy-protection mechanism, such as replacing the exact location included
in the triplet by a coarser one. In comparison, the performance of TrustMeter improves for
the random-unfair strategy due to a lower amount of exchanged triplets, and hence a lower
impact on their reputation if the triplets are spam. TrustMeter shows the best results for the
random-fair strategy with up to a MCC value of 0.85 at the end of the simulation for 100%
spamming (cf. Figure 31c). Moreover, the improvement of the performance of TrustMeter
with the spamming rate for both the random-unfair and random-fair strategies is due to the
values of  U and  T that determine the reputation range for the different categories in which
clients are classified. With our settings, the reduction in reputation caused by a low spamming
rate may not be sufficient to reach  U. The spammer may hence be incorrectly classified as
indefinite or trusted. The higher the spamming rate, the lower the increase in reputation, and
hence the higher probability that the spammers are correctly classified.
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Figure 30: MCC for different percentages of spammers and exchange strategies over time
Distribution of Spamming Attacks
We finally assume a constant population of 30 spammers launching their attacks according
to the same scenarios as presented in Section 6.4.3. Scenarios 1 to 3 correspond to the same
number of spammers launching their attacks at t=0 s, t=10,800 s, and t=21,600 s, respectively.
Similarly to droppers, Figure 32 shows that the longer malicious clients can build reputation,
the longer it takes for TrustMeter to unmask them after they launched their attacks. However,
TrustMeter requires more time to correctly identify all spammers as compared to droppers,
since all spammers are still not identified at the end of the simulation for the random-fair
strategy (cf. Figure 32c), whereas it is reached at t=57,600 s for the droppers (see Figure 29c).
Additionally, the impact of the applied exchange strategy on the performance of TrustMeter
is the same as for droppers. Indeed, TrustMeter performs better when clients apply the
random-fair strategy as compared to the random-unfair and realistic strategies. Since fewer
packets are exchanged in the random-fair strategy, the reputation built by the spammers before
launching their attack is lower. Consequently, a lower reduction in reputation is necessary to
drop below  U and thus, be identified as untrusted.
Furthermore, scenarios 4 to 6 correspond to smaller groups of spammers that simultaneously
launch their attack at different times. Scenario 4 consists of two groups of 15 spammers, while
scenarios 5 and 6 consist of three groups of ten spammers and five groups of six spammers,
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Figure 31: MCC for different spamming rates and exchange strategies over time
respectively. Figure 32 illustrates that TrustMeter identifies spammers faster in scenario 4, as
the attacks are launched earlier when compared to the other scenarios. Moreover, there are
almost no differences between the results for scenarios 5 and 6. In these scenarios, additional
attacks (with smaller number of spammers) are launched after those in scenario 4. However,
we have previously observed that the later the attacks, the longer TrustMeter requires to
correctly identify both droppers and spammers. Overall, TrustMeter also requires more time
to identify spammers as compared to droppers. This means that the presented results still
correspond to the initial phase in which TrustMeter progressively identifies the spammers.
6.4.5 Evaluation Summary
The performance of TrustMeter in identifying malicious users can be considered good to
excellent in most cases. In some of the cases, perfect identification has even been reached
around the end of the simulation. Due to the multi-hop nature of the scheme, its performance
improves with time and TrustMeter succeeds in identifying a majority of malicious clients
after only few reports sent by the clients to the server on a hourly basis.
Overall, TrustMeter performs better in identifying malicious clients when users apply the
random-fair strategy. By applying this strategy, the users statistically exchange fewer triplets
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Figure 32: MCC for different spamming attacks scenarios and exchange strategies over time
with other users. In case of exchanges with malicious users not yet identified as such, the
consequences for honest users are less severe, since fewer triplets are dropped and fewer
spam triplets are exchanged. Especially the identification of spammers when users apply the
realistic strategy is difficult, since honest users can exchange all their genuine triplets with a
not yet recognized spammer in the worst case. If these users directly upload the exchanged
triplets to the server, they will be consequently identified as spammers. Honest users have
thus less chance of being falsely identified when applying the random-fair strategy compared
to the random-unfair and realistic strategies.
We have however seen in the preceding chapter that applying the random-fair strategy
leads to a better identification of the jumbled triplets by curious application administrators.
A tradeoff therefore exists between the performance in identifying the exchanged triplets
as well as malicious users. The more difficult the identification of exchanged triplets for
the application server, and hence the better privacy protection, the worse the detection of
malicious users.
There is an additional tradeoff between the responsiveness of TrustMeter in identifying
malicious users and the frequency of exchanges between users, feedback transmitted to the
application server as well as reported triplets. The less frequent the exchanges and reports, the
longer it takes to TrustMeter to distinguish malicious users from honest ones. Simultaneously,
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Figure 33: Temporal evolution of the overheads for different number of droppers and small triplet size
reporting triplets more frequently, i.e., after fewer meetings, allows the application server to
potentially identify more exchanged triplets, and hence reduce the privacy protection again as
shown in the preceding chapter.
6.5 traffic overhead
Next, we quantify the traffic overheads incurred by both TrustMeter and potential attacks.
To this end, we assume that TrustMeter is integrated into two distinct participatory sensing
applications. These applications differ in the size of the collected triplets in order to compare
the introduced overheads to the traffic generated by the application. In particular, the first
application collects primitive sensor readings (e.g., accelerometer data or sound levels) with
sizes between 100 bytes to 1 kilobytes, whereas the second application collects rich sensor
readings (e.g., short sound samples) with sizes around 16 kilobytes [CRKH11]. We further
assume that 100 clients apply the realistic exchange strategy and that the percentage of active
droppers that drop all triplets is 0% and 50%, respectively.
Figure 33 and Figure 34 represent the temporal distribution of the following traffic classes
over 24 hours for small triplet size and large triplet size, respectively. Payload corresponds
to triplets exchanged between clients. Exchange and Report consist of the lists of client IDs
and the corresponding number of triplets exchanged and reported, respectively. Retransmis-
sion corresponds to triplets that are resent by the client after the delivery timeout expired.
Confirmation are the lists of triplet IDs reported to the server, while Reputation consists of the
reputation values for each client computed by the server.
After an initial bootstrapping phase, 80% of the total traffic is caused by the confirmation
class for triplets of small sizes as shown in Figure 33. In comparison, the payload and
reputation classes only represent 15% and 2% of the traffic, respectively. This difference is
due to the length of the triplet IDs that are currently 32 bytes long using a SHA-256 hash
function. Moreover, for each triplet reported, the server transmits its ID to all clients. The
overhead generated by the triplet retransmissions increases with the number of droppers, but
remains under 4% of the total traffic. Similarly to the latency (see Section 6.4.3), the overhead
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Figure 34: Temporal evolution of the overheads for different number of droppers and large triplet size
diminishes, once droppers have been identified after 13,600 s. The overheads for the remaining
classes are negligible. For triplets of large sizes, the overhead caused by the confirmations
represents only 15% of the traffic, whereas the exchange of triplets generates 80% of the traffic
as shown in Figure 34a. Since the triplets are larger, their retransmission also generates more
overhead. This overhead reaches over 15% of the traffic in the case of 50% droppers. Note that
the distributions of the traffic classes in presence of spammers are the same as illustrated in
Figure 33a and 34a, as their attacks do not trigger retransmissions.
In summary, confirmation lists generate a large overhead for applications gathering primitive
sensor readings. In order to reduce this overhead, a trivial solution could be to reduce the size
of the triplet IDs. However, this would imply using a hash function producing shorter digests.
This increases the risk that the server can infer the identifiers of the clients having generated
the triplets. As a result, a tradeoff should be found between a sufficient length for the triplet
IDs to ensure the confidentiality of the client identifier and short enough to keep the overhead
small.
6.6 related work
Assessing the trust of clients exchanging and reporting sensor readings have not been ad-
dressed in such settings in the context of participatory sensing applications. For example,
reputation systems have been presented in [HKH10a], [YZR11], and [CRH+12a]. However,
they mainly concentrate on evaluating the correctness and quality of the reported sensor
readings. While we integrate such mechanisms to identify spammers, additional mechanisms
are necessary to assess the contribution of clients in the collaborative path hiding mechanism.
Therefore, we specially focus on solutions tailored to delay tolerant and opportunistic net-
works [LKBG06], since they share the more similarities with our system model detailed in
Section 6.1.1.
Existing solutions for opportunistic networks can be classified into two categories, depending
on the nature of the information used to compute the levels of trust. For example, [BCP08],
[TLA10], and [CBCC10] leverage social relationships, while [MSC09] and [KTH10] rely on the
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numbers of encounters between users. In particular, users explicitly indicate their degree of
trust for other users based on their social relationships and build a web of trust in [TLA10].
However, leveraging social relationships limits the number of exchange partners to a subset of
users sharing strong social links. This hence restrains the efficacy of the collaborative path
hiding scheme. Another model proposed in [CBCC10] combines information about social
relationships and quality of service metrics. However, this model is designed to ensure the
delivery of packets between clients using the shortest path. In contrast, in our approach, the
destination of the triplets is the application server and clients are encouraged to exchange
triplets with other users before reporting them to the server in order to increase the jumbling
of the triplets and improve the mutual privacy protection of the clients.
Models presented in [MSC09, KTH10] solely determine the trust relationships between
users based on the number of their encounters. In [MSC09], users generate a shared secret at
each encounter. The shared secret is then used at the next encounter to prove that a previous
encounter between the same users already happened. As a result, the trust relationship
between users strengthens at each exchange of shared secret. In comparison to our approach,
this scheme does not take into account the behavior of the users, but focuses on the frequency
of their meetings. Similarly, the model proposed in [KTH10] is not based on the generation
and exchange of shared secrets, but analyzes the location of the users over long period in
order to determine similar behaviors. Users exhibiting similar behavior are assumed to share
stronger trust relationships than those showing different behavior. Relying only on encounters
to assess the degree of trust in other users is insufficient in our scenario, since malicious
clients can visit densely populated locations in order to rapidly build strong trust relationships,
before launching dropping attacks.
In summary, existing mechanisms in opportunistic networks are not designed to assess
the contribution of clients in the exchange and reporting of triplets as defined in our system
model. Novel mechanisms, such as presented in TrustMeter, therefore need to be introduced.
6.7 summary
In this chapter, we have presented TrustMeter, an application-agnostic scheme that assesses
the behavior of the users contributing to the collaborative path hiding process. It computes
and attributes a trust level to each user based on statistics provided by the users about past
exchanges of sensor readings annotated with spatiotemporal information. Malicious users
can be clearly identified based on their low trust ratings and subsequently excluded from
the data jumbling process. At the same time, the ratings provide as little information as
possible about the exchanges in order to preserve the provided privacy protection. We have
implemented the TrustMeter scheme and investigated its performance in identifying malicious
users in a realistic application scenario. By means of extensive simulations, we have analyzed
various attack scenarios and shown that the performance of TrustMeter is good to excellent
in most scenarios. Overall, TrustMeter shows better performance in identifying droppers
as compared to spammers after only few reports sent by the clients to the server. We have
further discussed the robustness of TrustMeter against threats to reputation and quantified
the overheads introduced by the proposed scheme under diverse scenarios. In particular,
we have shown its practicability in participatory sensing applications that gather rich sensor
readings with around 30% additional traffic incurred. Using our approach, users hence obtain
the assessed trust level of encountered users and can subsequently determine the exchange
strategy to apply based both on the provided trust levels and their personal preferences in
terms of, e.g., privacy protection as studied in Chapter 5.
7INCOGNISENSE : AN ANONYMITY-PRESERVING REPUTATION
FRAMEWORK
It takes many good deeds to build a good
reputation, and only one bad one to lose it.
B. Franklin
As illustrated in Chapter 3 and especially in Chapter 5, existing privacy-preserving solutions
often rely on breaking the associations between consecutive user contributions. However, these
associations are required by reputation systems applied in participatory sensing applications
to weed out incorrect user contributions as detailed in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we present
our framework called IncogniSense [CRH+12a, CRH+13] that addresses the aforementioned
inherent conflict between privacy and reputation. Our system utilizes periodic pseudonyms
generated using blind signatures and relies on reputation transfer between these pseudonyms.
In particular, our approach does not rely on a trusted third party to ensure the privacy
protection of the users. Users can parametrize our system according to their individual privacy
preferences.
We first introduce our assumptions and threat model in Section 7.1, before presenting the
IncogniSense framework in Section 7.2. We analyze the robustness of IncogniSense against
threats to reputation in Section 7.3 and conduct a multi-dimensional evaluation of IncogniSense
in Section 7.4. We further study the feasibility of our approach in Section 7.5. We finally
compared IncogniSense to existing related work in Section 7.6, before making concluding
remarks in Section 7.7.
7.1 assumptions and threat model
In this section, we present our threat model and detail our assumptions. We consider that
our adversary set includes malicious clients, application servers, and the Reputation and
Pseudonym Manager (RPM) (described in Section 7.2). Again, the adversaries follow the
Dolev-Yao threat model [DY83], i.e., they are able to listen to all communication, fabricate,
replay, and destroy messages. They are, however, not able to break cryptographic mechanisms.
7.1.1 Threats to Reputation
The goal of the adversaries, primarily malicious clients, is to corrupt the reputation system in
order to artificially increase their own reputation. Self-promotion can be achieved by means
of Sybil attacks, in which the malicious client creates an arbitrary number of identities that
vouch for each other [Dou02]. Alternatively, malicious clients may replay old messages to gain
reputation without contributing new sensor readings.
We assume that the application server and the RPM are protected against fraudulent access
by well-established security mechanisms. Hence, adversaries are not able to access stored data,
or change the behavior of applications. Denial of service attacks are considered beyond the
scope of this work.
7.1.2 Threats to Anonymity
Another goal of the adversaries is to breach the anonymity of the clients. Adversaries track
the interactions of the clients with the reputation system and attempt to establish relationships
between successive pseudonyms and link them to a unique real identity. We assume that the
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Figure 35: Overview of the IncogniSense framework
reported sensor readings do not contain any direct indication of the identity of the clients
and that the interactions of the clients with the application server are anonymized using,
e.g., disposable IP and MAC addresses and anonymous communication networks [SCP+10].
7.2 the incognisense framework
We first provide an overview of the IncogniSense framework and detail the underlying
mechanisms. Note that further details on the utilized blind signatures are available in
Appendixe A.1 to A.3. We then present our reputation cloaking mechanisms and highlight the
differences between IncogniSense and the framework proposed in [MR07], which forms the
basis for parts of our work.
7.2.1 Overview and Underlying Mechanisms
The IncogniSense framework illustrated in Figure 35 includes clients, an application server,
and a RPM (introduced in Section 7.1). We assume a participatory sensing application in
which several active clients collect sensor readings and report them to the application server.
In this scenario, our framework relies on two main mechanisms: (1) the utilization of periodic
pseudonyms by the clients to report the collected sensor readings, and (2) the transfer of
reputation scores between consecutive pseudonyms in order to conserve the reputation gained
by the clients across multiple time periods. In particular, the proposed solution is comprised
of the following four steps, which are repeated sequentially for each time period T .
Pseudonym Generation
We assume that each client has a permanent identifier ID, a private key PR, a public key PU,
and is registered with the RPM. Clients generate pseudonyms in association with the RPM and
based on blind signatures [Cha83]. By employing blind signatures, the objective is two-fold:
(1) to ensure that each client has a unique pseudonym for each T in order to prevent Sybil
attacks (cf. Section 7.1.1), and (2) to hide the generated pseudonym from the RPM in order to
prevent it from linking the pseudonym to the client’s real identity. In fact, blind signatures
ensure the authenticity of signed messages without revealing their content to the signing entity
and prevent the signing entity from linking the message content with the identity of its creator.
For each pseudonym, each client generates a new key pair (PRP,PUP), with PRP the private
key and PUP the public key. Note that the public key is available to all, while the private key
is only known by the client who generated it. Next, the client hands over the public key to the
RPM for blind signature as detailed in Appendix A.2. For each time interval T , the RPM uses a
different private key PRsignature in the blind signature that determines the period of validity
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of the pseudonym. Moreover, the RPM only signs one pseudonym per client per time period
in order to prevent Sybil attacks. As a result, the client uses the blindly signed pseudonym
and the newly generated private key to report sensor readings to the application server and
thus, to transfer reputation to its subsequent pseudonym. If the RPM signs more than one new
pseudonym in each T , the application server and the RPM cannot link the reported sensor
readings to the real identity of the client.
Reporting of Sensor Readings
Within T , the client periodically reports sensor readings to the application server using
its current pseudonym Pcurrent (i.e., the pseudonym valid in T ). The application server
verifies the validity of the pseudonym with the RPM, evaluates the sensor reading using a
reputation model, and attributes a reputation score Rscore to Pcurrent, with Rscore 2 Z.
The application server eventually makes use of the reputation scores to identify inaccurate
contributions. Depending on the selected reputation model, the application server can discard
the contributions with low reputation scores or reduce the weighting for such contributions
in the computation of summaries. Note that the design of both reputation algorithm and
model is considered beyond the scope of this thesis. Existing solutions such as [HKH10a]
can, however, be easily integrated into our generic framework. Next, the application server
transmits Rscore to the RPM, which maintains a reputation account for each pseudonym and
adds Rscore to Pcurrent’s reputation account.
Generation of Reputation Tokens
Before the expiration of Pcurrent (i.e., at the end of T ), the client generates its next pseudonym
Pnext for the next time period as described in Section 7.2.1. It then transfers the gained
reputation with Pcurrent to Pnext in order to conserve it after the expiration of Pcurrent.
The reputation transfer is realized using Reputation Tokens (RTs) generated by the clients in
collaboration with the RPM to prevent reputation corruption. The transfer process also makes
use of blind signatures with Pnext being the blinded content in order to prevent the RPM from
linking the client’s consecutive pseudonyms. In fact, each client withdraws reputation scores
from Pcurrent’s account and then, deposits them using RTs in Pnext’s account, both accounts
being maintained by the RPM. For each generated RT, the client using Pcurrent indicates the
reputation score to be transferred in the RT to the RPM as detailed in Appendix A.3. The RPM
verifies the balance of the reputation account of Pcurrent and decrements it accordingly. The
RPM has different key pairs referred to as transfer keys, each of them being associated to a
different reputation value. It thus uses the key pair corresponding to the reputation score to
be transferred on the RT to blindly sign it. Consequently, the signing key (and not the content
of the RT) determines the reputation value of each RT that prevent clients from manipulating
RTs’ value. However, the linking between Pcurrent and Pnext is only prevented if more than
one RT is generated per T . Otherwise, the linking is straightforward as there is only a single
reputation transfer between two pseudonyms.
Reputation Transfer
The client registers with the RPM using Pnext within the current T and hands over RT(s). The
RPM verifies that each RT has not been used before and credits the reputation account of
Pnext from RT’s value.
7.2.2 Cloaking Mechanisms
In theory, the utilization of blind signatures prevents the linking of consecutive pseudonyms.
However, in practice, the reputation transfer between two consecutive pseudonyms may reveal
insights about their succession. For example, consider the case where Pcurrent has the highest
reputation among all pseudonyms. Now assume that after reputation transfer, this same
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reputation score is associated with the pseudonym, Pnext. It is fairly straightforward for an
adversary to establish a link between Pcurrent and Pnext. An adversary able to track the
reputation scores over several time intervals can link pseudonyms used in different periods.
To prevent such attacks, we propose that the clients cloak (i.e., alter) their reputation scores
before their transfer. Since the RPM prevents unjustified reputation promotion by controlling
the generation of the RTs, the clients only transfer reputation scores lower or equal to their
actual reputation. While cloaking the reputation scores prevents a reputation analysis attack,
it may cause degradation in reputation score since it entails adding a perturbation to the same.
In this section, we present three different reputation cloaking schemes, which address this
tradeoff in different ways.
Floor Function Reputation Transfer (Floor)
This scheme divides the entire spectrum of reputation scores into fixed intervals and classifies
the clients into these intervals based on their reputation scores. For the actual transfer, the
clients use the floor value of the reputation interval as reputation score and transfer it using
a single RT. Note that we use the floor value to prevent unjustified reputation promotion.
Similar to the concepts of k-anonymity [Swe02], the scheme forms groups of pseudonyms
sharing the same reputation score. The larger the groups, the more indistinguishable the
pseudonyms, and the harder it is for the adversary to link consecutive pseudonyms. The
anonymity protection is thus determined by the size of the groups, which depends on the
selection of the intervals. Selecting large intervals may increase the number of pseudonyms
within a group, but may negatively affect the reputation scores due to the coarse granularity
of the chosen intervals. The size of the reputation intervals is therefore an important design
parameter for addressing the tradeoff between anonymity and reputation.
Transfer of Random Sets from Reputation Partition Sets (RandSet)
RandSet divides the reputation score to be transferred into multiple RTs based on a predefined
set partitioning (e.g., {10, 50, 250}) used by all users. For each reputation transfer, the division
of the reputation score into the set partitioning is determined by each client individually. For
example, a client can partition a reputation score of 70 into one RT of value 50 and two RTs of
value 10, or alternatively use seven RTs of value 10. The client then randomly selects one or
more RTs handed over to the RPM. We refer to p as the probability that an individual RT is
used to transfer reputation. In other words, each RT is discarded and not transferred with a
probability 1- p. Both the division and discarding mechanisms increase the entropy of the
actually transferred reputation and prevent the linkage between consecutive pseudonyms.
However, discarding RTs can reduce the reputation scores. The reduction in reputation is
linearly correlated with the size of the RTs, i.e., discarding a large RT leads to greater loss in
reputation. In summary, both set partitioning and discarding probability influence the tradeoff
between anonymity and reputation.
Transfer of Random Scores from Reputation Partition Sets (RandScore)
The initial reputation score is split into different RTs of predefined size as in RandSet. During
the transfer, all the RTs are transferred. However, the transferred score of the individual RTs
is lowered according to a random function. The set partitioning impacts the entropy of the
transferred scores and the loss in reputation. The range of the possible scores linearly increases
with the size of the RTs. Simultaneously, the transferred reputation statistically diminishes,
as the probability of transferring the initial RT values decreases, while the size of the RTs
increases.
Note that the spectrum of possible cloaking mechanisms is not limited to the aforementioned
schemes. We have specially selected these schemes based on the diversity of their key
parameters to address the tradeoff between anonymity protection and reputation degradation.
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7.2.3 Comparison with the “Reputation using Pseudonyms” Framework
We contrast IncogniSense with the Reputation using Pseudonyms (RuP) framework proposed
in [MR07], since our work improves the presented ideas. In particular, we highlight shortcom-
ings of the RuP algorithm in terms of cryptographic overhead and vulnerability to reputation
manipulation and argue how IncogniSense addresses these issues differently.
Algorithmic Differences
In the RuP algorithm, the client includes the interval of validity of the pseudonym in the
blind signature. Each client creates n pseudonyms to generate a sole valid pseudonym. The
n pseudonyms are transmitted to the RPM, which randomly selects n- 1 pseudonyms and
requests the client to send the corresponding random values 1r . The RPM then encrypts the
n- 1 pseudonyms and verifies that they are valid for the same interval. If the verification is
successful, it signs the nth pseudonym, which becomes the valid pseudonym. The generation
of RTs also necessitates that the client prepares n messages and the RPM verifies n - 1
messages before signing the nth message. In IncogniSense, we decouple the interval of validity
of the pseudonym and the value of the reputation to transfer from the blind signatures by
introducing periodic signature keys and different transfer keys for each value of RT, reciprocally.
Cryptographic Overhead
Table 8 summarizes the cryptographic overhead for generating pseudonyms associated with
both schemes. In [MR07], the client generates n key pairs, selects n values r and 1r , and
executes n encryptions to generate one valid pseudonym. The generated key pairs of non-
selected pseudonyms should not be reused to prevent the RPM from linking the pseudonyms to
the client’s identity. In IncogniSense, the client prepares one blind signature per pseudonym,
i.e., it generates only one key pair and encrypts one message, and the RPM verifies only
one signature per interval and per client (instead of n- 1), which significantly reduces the
computational overhead if we assume a large base of clients. Similar conclusions can be drawn
for the RT generation, except that no key pair is generated by the client.
Reputation Manipulation
In the RuP algorithm, the RPM cannot verify the interval of validity of the pseudonym included
in the blinded message. It randomly verifies n-1 of the n generated pseudonyms and signs the
nth, hoping that it contains the same validity interval as the verified pseudonyms. This implies
that malicious clients can generate multiple pseudonyms for a given time interval with a
probability of 1n . If such an attack is successful, then the adversaries can seriously compromise
the reputation system (see Section 7.1.1). Likewise, malicious clients can generate fraudulent
RTs and increase their reputation. IncogniSense completely eliminates the possibility of Sybil
attacks and also prevents adversaries from compromising the reputation transfer process. The
utilization of periodic signature keys and the verification of already existing pseudonyms by
the RPM guarantees that each client has a unique pseudonym per interval. Similarly, the
utilization of different transfer keys allows the RPM to easily verify and guarantee the value of
the transferred reputation, preventing malicious clients from generating falsified RTs.
In summary, IncogniSense achieves better protection against reputation manipulation, while
significantly reducing the cryptographic overhead for the client.
7.3 robustness against threats to reputation
Next, we revisit the assumptions and threat model presented in Section 7.1 and show that
IncogniSense is resilient against the following attacks.
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Table 8: Comparison of the cryptographic overhead of the RuP framework and IncogniSense
client rpm
RuP [MR07] IncogniSense RuP [MR07] IncogniSense
Generated key pairs n per interval 1 per interval 1 1 per interval
Prepared messages n per interval 1 per interval - -
Signature verifications - - n-1 per interval and client 0
Number of signatures - - 1 per interval and client 1 per interval and client
7.3.1 Sybil Attacks
Malicious clients can attempt to generate multiple pseudonyms for a given interval to increase
their reputation through cross-recommendations. However, IncogniSense is protected against
these attacks since the RPM maintains a list of the clients that have presented pseudonyms for
blind signature along with their validity interval. Once a pseudonym has been signed for a
given interval, the RPM discards all other pseudonyms submitted by the same client.
7.3.2 Replay Attacks
Malicious clients may attempt to replay old messages for the following two reasons: (1)
artificially increase their reputation by replaying RTs, (2) debit the reputation account of
honest clients without the victims receiving the associated credit by replaying the message to
be signed. The RPM, however, maintains a list of IDs associated with each RT. The RPM can
thus detect malicious clients trying to corrupt the reputation system and prevent both attacks.
Malicious clients are prevented from forging RTs and manipulating the reputation of other
clients, as the creation of the RTs requires the signature of the corresponding pseudonym,
which is only possible using the pseudonym’s private key.
7.3.3 Manipulation of Reputation Accounts
Malicious clients can attempt to alter the reputation stored in the RPM. The clients, however,
do not have direct access to their reputation accounts and the RPM is protected against
unauthorized access using standard cryptographic primitives. As such, this attack cannot be
mounted.
7.3.4 Reporting of Falsified Sensor Readings
Malicious clients can try to report falsified sensor readings on behalf of others to degrade their
reputation. IncogniSense protects honest clients against this attack by requesting clients to
authenticate with both the application server and the RPM. These entities verify the validity of
the pseudonyms before considering their contributions and/or delivering them information.
Such an attack would only be successful if malicious clients can access the private keys of the
targeted clients and those of their respective pseudonyms, which is beyond the scope of our
attacker model.
In summary, we have shown that IncogniSense is robust by design against all threats directed
against the reputation system by malicious clients.
7.4 anonymity protection
We analyze the resilience of IncogniSense against the threats to anonymity identified in
Section 7.1.2. In particular, we measure the level of anonymity, i.e., unlinkability, that can
be achieved by the different reputation cloaking schemes introduced in Section 7.2.2. In a
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Table 9: Probability distribution of transient reputation scores
Score attribution probability 0.25 0.35 0.25 0.10 0.05
Attributed reputation scores 10 5 0 -5 -10
first step, we assume that the reputation scores are lost if they are not transferred to the next
pseudonym at the end of the period. We hence quantify the reduction in reputation score
caused by the different cloaking approaches and investigate the trade-off between anonymity
protection and loss in reputation. Next, we assume that the clients can store reputation for
future use and analyze the impact of stored reputation scores on anonymity protection for
both a constant and variable population of clients.
7.4.1 Transient Reputation Scores
In the following, we assume that the reputation scores are transient, i.e., their validity duration
is limited to the duration of the period in which they have been gained, and we adopt the
following simulation setup and method.
Simulation Setup and Method
We implemented a simulator in Java to model the behavior of clients, RPM and application
server. Each simulation run is for 100 time intervals T . We repeat each simulation 100 times
and present the averaged results. All clients remain active for the duration of the simulation.
During each time interval, the clients generate five random sensor readings and report them
to the application server. The application server runs a simulated reputation algorithm,
which randomly attributes reputation scores to the pseudonyms according to the distribution
presented in Table 9. Note that the actual values of both sensor readings and reputation scores
do not impact the performances of the cloaking schemes in terms of linkability and can thus
be selected randomly. Moreover, we consider the study of additional reputation models and
distributions as future work.
We adopt the assumptions of our threat model (see Section 7.1) and assume that the RPM
and the application server are malicious internal observers. We further assume that adversaries
collude and aim at linking consecutive pseudonyms. For each simulated interval, the RPM
and the application server have access to the following information. The RPM observes
the generated RTs, the utilized RTs, and the updates of the reputation accounts, while the
application server observes the current pseudonyms, the initial and final reputation scores,
and the updates of reputation scores.
Based on the observed information, the adversaries identify the set of pseudonyms active
in each time interval. We refer to SPcurrent as the set of pseudonyms active in a given time
interval and SPnext as the set of pseudonyms active in the subsequent time interval. As all
clients remain active for the duration of the simulation, |SPcurrent | = |SPnext | and there exists
a bijection between the sets SPcurrent and SPnext . For each Pcurrent, the adversaries first
identify all potential successors and create links between Pcurrent and the identified Pnexts
based on their reputation scores and the created and used RTs as detailed in Algorithm 5.
Note that the second condition in step 3 (SRTused ✓ SRTcreated ) is verified if the values of the
RTuseds are lower than those of the RTcreateds if the RandScore scheme is applied. For the
other schemes, the same condition is verified if the values are equal. Next, they iteratively
eliminate the created links based on the bijection between SPcurrent and SPnext according to
Algorithm 6. Algorithm 6 first searches for single links between SPcurrent and SPnext . Due to
the bijection between both sets, all other existing links of Pcurrent and Pnext are removed
(step 6). Pcurrent and Pnext are then flagged (step 7) and the link between both pseudonyms
is confirmed (step 8). This indicates that Pnext has been identified as the successor of Pcurrent.
Flagged pseudonyms and confirmed links are then excluded from further searches. When
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Algorithm 5 Identification of potential successors for transient reputation scores
Input: RPcurrent : Pcurrent’s reputation, RPnext : Pnext’s reputation, SRTcreated : set of RTs created by
Pcurrent, SRTused : set of RTs used by Pnext
1: for all Pcurrent 2 SPcurrent do
2: for all Pnext 2 SPnext do
3: if RPnext 6 RPcurrent and SRTused ✓ SRTcreated then
4: create a link between Pcurrent and Pnext
5: end if
6: end for
7: end for
Algorithm 6 Elimination of potential successors for transient reputation scores
Input: SLinks: set of links created in Algorithm 5
1: linkConfirmed true
2: while 9 non-flagged pseudonym 2 (SPcurrent [ SPnext) and linkConfirmed = true do
3: linkConfirmed false
4: for all non-flagged pseudonym 2 (SPcurrent [ SPnext) do
5: if 9 a single link between Pcurrent and Pnext then
6: remove all other links of Pcurrent and Pnext
7: flag Pcurrent and Pnext
8: linkConfirmed true
9: end if
10: end for
11: if linkConfirmed = false then
12: search for other non-flagged Pcurrents having the same potential successors
13: if number of found Pcurrents = number of common Pnexts then
14: remove all other links of the found Pcurrents and Pnexts
15: flag the found Pcurrents and Pnexts
16: linkConfirmed true
17: break search
18: end if
19: end if
20: end while
all existing single links have been successively removed, Algorithm 6 analyzes the remaining
pseudonyms and searches for Pcurrents having the same potential successors (step 12). This
search returns one or several subsets of SPcurrent sharing the same successors. The algorithm
then selects the smallest subset whose size is equal to the number of common successors (step
13). It removes all other links of these pseudonyms (step 14), flags the pseudonyms (step
15), and confirms the links (step 16). The analysis of sets of pseudonyms having the same
successors is interrupted and the algorithm restarts at step 2 with the search for single links,
which potentially appear while removing the previous links.
Finally, as a measure of the level of anonymity provided by the reputation transfer, we
calculate how many potential successors xk (i.e., links) a pseudonym k has on average. We
express the amount of potential successors as the fraction of the total number of clients
N = |SPcurrent |. For each interval, we calculate this metric as shown in Equation 12.
Metric =
1
N
·
NX
k=1
xk (12)
A value of 1 implies perfect anonymity achieved during the transfer, since all pseudonyms
within SPnext are potential successors to each individual pseudonym of SPcurrent . The lower
the value, the smaller the set of pseudonyms that are the potential successors, which in turn
implies that it may be easier to establish a link between consecutive pseudonyms. We can
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therefore directly assess the quality of the anonymization achieved by the cloaking schemes
using this metric.
Evaluation Results
By applying the above setup and method, we first individually evaluate the reputation
cloaking schemes (see Section 7.2.2). In particular, we analyze the effect of the most important
configuration parameter relevant to each scheme and the resulting impact on the anonymity
of the clients. Secondly, we compare how these schemes fare against each other. In this
comparison, we use the transfer scheme used in [MR07] as a baseline. This scheme, also
referred to as the Full Reputation Transfer (Full) scheme, always transfers the entire reputation
in a single RT. It hence represents the worst case in terms of anonymity protection, since
the reputation score remains the same for consecutive pseudonyms, which allows for easy
linkability by the adversaries. Note that we compare the cloaking schemes based on selected
variants that show a good tradeoff between anonymity protection and loss in reputation.
In the Floor scheme, the clients use the floor value of given reputation intervals as reputation
score and transfer it using a single RT. Figure 36a illustrates the influence of different interval
sizes (10, 15, 20, 25, 30) on the quality of the anonymity protection. The results show that
the choice of large reputation intervals results in a higher level of protection, as more clients
are grouped within the same interval and therefore become indistinguishable during the
RT transfer. This protection comes at the expense of greater perturbation in reputation for
some of the clients, since the difference between the actual reputation value and the floor of
the interval also increases on average. Over time, the protection level decreases, since the
reputation values of the individual clients spread over wider intervals as shown in Figure 38b
for an interval size of 20. Figure 38 shows the development of reputations scores over time and
is annotated with the 0.25- and 0.75-quantile of reputation scores of the clients for time interval
50. As a result, individual clients are more easily distinguishable in our attacker model, since
potential successors can be identified more easily. The Full scheme shows a similar behavior
(cf. Figure 38a), but is able to preserve higher reputation scores. This is illustrated in Figure 37,
which shows the observed diminution in reputation scores per interval caused by the cloaking
for selected variants of the proposed cloaking schemes that show a good tradeoff between
anonymity protection and loss in reputation. With both schemes, clients are therefore easy to
identify after a number of rounds since only a small number of peers have similar reputation
scores.
In the RandSet scheme, the reputation score is partitioned into different RTs of predefined
size and a reputation transfer is performed with probability p for each RT. The partition in RTs
is implemented as follows. The clients first generate as many RTs with the highest value of the
set of partition as possible. Next, they use the second highest and so on, until the remaining
reputation becomes lower than the lowest value of the set partition. Figure 36b illustrates the
influence of the choice of p (50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%) using the set partitioning {10, 50, 250}
on the anonymity protection level. The fraction of potential successors stabilizes early, which
means that attackers do not gain further evidence even if monitoring for extensive periods
of time. This can be attributed to the reputation scores, which are not constantly increasing
over time, but fluctuate in a certain interval as shown in Figure 38c for a probability p of 80%.
Indeed, at a certain time instant the average increase in reputation due to the contribution to
the application equals the average loss due to the discarding of reputation during the transfer.
In contrast, the Full and Floor schemes constantly increase the reputation values as shown in
Figures 38a and 38b. The percentage of potential successors using RandSet lies between 7%
and 26% for p equal to 90% and 50%, respectively (see Figure 36b). The degree of anonymity
protection increases with decreasing p, i.e., increasing discarding probability 1- p. Figure 37
shows the preserved reputation score for p equal to 80%. Obviously, for increasing p, the
preserved reputation per round increases likewise. Note that the preserved reputation stays
slightly below p, since the partitioning of the sets might not exactly fit the exact reputation
value.
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Figure 36: Level of unlinkability for reputation transfer schemes Floor, RandSet, and RandScore for a
constant population of 100 clients and transient reputation scores
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Figure 37: Comparison of transferred reputation for a constant population of 100 clients and transient
reputation scores. Floor uses an interval size of 20. RandScore uses a partition set of {10, 50,
250} and p=75%. RandSet uses p=80%. Hybrid uses a partition set of {10, 20, 250} and p=80%
In the RandScore scheme, the reputation score is also partitioned into several RTs, which
are all used in the reputation transfer. The transferred score is, however, lowered according
7.4 anonymity protection 99
0
150
300
450
600
750
900
1050
1200
1350
1500
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
R
ep
ut
at
io
n 
sc
or
e
Time interval ID
10<# of occurrences<1000
1000<# of occurences<10000
# of occurences>10000
Maximum reputation 
value for I=50 is 1220
Reputation value for 
0.75-quantile is 890
Median reputation 
value is 830 Reputation value for 
0.25-quantile is 770
Minimum reputation 
value is 320
(a) Full reputation transfer
0
150
300
450
600
750
900
1050
1200
1350
1500
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
R
ep
ut
at
io
n 
sc
or
e
Time interval ID
Maximum reputation 
value for I=50 is 840
Reputation value for 
0.75-quantile is 520
Median reputation 
value is 440
Reputation value for 
0.25-quantile is 380
Minimum reputation 
value is 80
(b) Floor function reputation transfer with an interval size
of 20
0 
150 
300 
450 
600 
750 
900 
1050 
1200 
1350 
1500 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
R
ep
ut
at
io
n 
sc
or
e 
Time interval ID 
Maximum reputation 
value for I=50 is 230 
Reputation value for 
0.75-quantile is 70 
Median reputation 
value is 40 
Reputation value for 
0.25-quantile is 20 
Minimum reputation 
value is 0 
(c) Random set reputation transfer with p=80%
0 
150 
300 
450 
600 
750 
900 
1050 
1200 
1350 
1500 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
R
ep
ut
at
io
n 
sc
or
e 
Time interval ID 
Maximum reputation 
value for I=50 is 140 
Reputation value for 
0.75-quantile is 60 
Median reputation value is 50 
Reputation value for 
0.25-quantile is 30 
Minimum reputation 
 value is 0 
(d) Random score from set reputation transfer with a par-
tition set of {10, 50, 250} and p=75%
Figure 38: Distribution of reputation score amongst clients over time for a constant population of 100
clients and transient reputation scores
to a random function. We analyze the influence of different set partitions while discarding
between 0% and 50% (following a continuous uniform distribution) of the reputation score
of a RT. Figure 36c shows that the level of anonymity protection increases with the set
partitioning moving towards larger RT values. The smaller the lowest RT size in a set {1, 5,
10, 15}, the worse the protection of anonymity, since individual clients can now be tracked by
the number of RTs exchanged (but not the random reputation score exchanged) as detailed
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Figure 39: Scheme comparison and impact of the number of clients on the percentage of successors for
transient reputation scores. Floor uses an interval size of 20. RandScore uses a partition set of
{10, 50, 250} and p=75%. RandSet uses p=80%. Hybrid uses a partition set of {10, 20, 250} and
p=80%
in Algorithm 6. Similar to RandSet, the performance quickly stabilizes since the reputation
values inherently stay within certain bounds as shown in Figure 38d (for a partition set
of {10, 50, 250} and a discarding probability of 25%), which makes identification very hard
even for sophisticated attackers. Note that RandSet and RandScore perform similarly, if the
same partitioning is applied and p equals the mean of the score discarding probability
used in RandScore. Additionally, RandSet behaves similarly to the Full scheme for very low
discarding probabilities (< 1%). In other words, reputation continuously increases for very
low discarding probabilities. In contrast, reputation stabilizes within reputation bounds for
higher probabilities. The stabilization time, however, depends on the discarding probability:
The higher the probability, the faster the stabilization. For example, the reputation reaches its
upper bound after 80 time intervals for a discarding probability of 5%.
For comparison purposes, we select one variant of each scheme that demonstrated a good
tradeoff between anonymity protection and reputation loss based on the previous analysis.
Hence, the following results are only representative for these variants. The parameterization is
as follows.
. Floor utilizes an interval size of 20.
. RandScore partitions the RT sets into {10, 50, 250} and has a mean value of the discarding
probability of 25%.
. RandSet retains RTs with a probability p of 80% and utilizes a similar partitioning {10,
50, 250}.
To model a realistic participatory sensing scenario, we investigate populations of 100 and
300 clients. We present the results in Figure 39 for all proposed reputation cloaking schemes
for both scenarios under consideration. We include an additional scheme referred to as
Hybrid, which combines the RandSet and RandScore schemes. The Hybrid scheme utilizes
the partitioning {10, 50, 250} and retains RTs with a probability p of 80%. The reputation
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Figure 40: Number of identified pseudonym chains for a constant population of 100 clients and transient
reputation scores. Floor uses an interval size of 20. RandScore uses a partition set of {10, 50,
250} and p=75%. RandSet uses p=80%. Hybrid uses a partition set of {10, 20, 250} and p=80%
score of the retained RTs is then randomly lowered as in the RandScore scheme. The Hybrid
scheme is robust against observers that can track the number of RTs or the reputation scores
obtained/transferred, since it cloaks both values during transfer. As seen from both graphs in
Figure 39, all schemes are robust when increasing the client base from 100 to 300. In summary,
the Hybrid scheme provides the best anonymity protection followed by RandScore, RandSet,
Floor, and the Full scheme. Hybrid, RandScore, and RandSet provide a constant protection faster
than Full and Floor due to the constantly increasing reputation observed for the latter schemes.
Figure 40 shows the number and the length of the pseudonym chains, i.e., the number of
identified consecutive pseudonyms, for all schemes. Note that chains of length two represent
identified links between two consecutive pseudonyms. Schemes that allow for long pseudonym
chains are thus weaker than schemes that only allow the attacker to identify short chains. The
Hybrid scheme is the most resilient scheme against attacks since it only allows adversaries to
build very short chains of unique predecessor-successor relations (always shorter than 10).
The RandScore (no chains longer than 13) and the RandSet (no chains longer than 25) have a
vast majority of unlinkable clients, which is in line with our previous observations of a good
anonymity protection. The Floor and the Full schemes perform worst in terms of identified
chain length and number of identified chains. In a few cases, they allow adversaries to identify
chains of up to 84 and 93 successive pseudonyms, respectively. Since the reputation scores
with Full and Floor constantly increase, it is much easier for an attacker to follow individual
pseudonyms. As a countermeasure, one could limit the maximum reputation score a client
can obtain. The introduction of an upper bound would help to keep well behaving clients
together in terms of reputation scores, thus making it much harder for an attacker to build
pseudonym chains.
The anonymity of the clients is, however, protected at the price of a reduction in reputation
as shown in Figure 37. Clients utilizing the Hybrid scheme suffer the highest loss in reputation,
followed by the RandScore and the RandSet schemes. The Full and the Floor schemes manage
to transfer nearly the complete reputation scores.
In summary, we have demonstrated that some of the presented schemes can provide an
effective anonymity protection, even if adversaries are able to track the reputation transfer
between pseudonyms for long periods of time. We have shown that the cost of a high degree
of anonymity protection is the loss of reputation. If we assume that all clients adopt the same
cloaking scheme, all clients will be similarly affected by the incurred loss in reputation. This is
consistent with the typical use of reputation in participatory sensing applications, where the
application server is mainly interested in comparing the reputation scores of different clients
and correspondingly associate a weight to their sensor readings. In the rare case where the
absolute reputation score is of interest, users may consider using a scheme, which preserves
the reputation value but is more susceptible to attacks such as Full or Floor. However, if
minor perturbations in the scores are acceptable, then schemes such as RandScore, RandSet,
and Hybrid may be considered.
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Table 10: Probability distribution for permanent reputation scores
next score
-10 - 5 0 5 10
cu
rr
en
t
sc
o
re -10 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.08 0.02
-5 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.05
0 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.35 0.25
5 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.25
10 0.02 0.08 0.25 0.30 0.35
7.4.2 Permanent Reputation Scores
Next, we assume permanent reputation scores, i.e., the reputation scores have an infinite period
of validity. As such, in contrast with the previous scenario, the reputation cloaking schemes
do not result in a loss of reputation at the end of each period, since the cloaked reputation can
be stored for future use in subsequent time periods. In consequence, the adversaries need to
consider the evolution of the reputation over several periods of time (instead of one period in
the previous scenario). As the clients determine both the amount of transferred reputation and
the time of the transfer, the number of possibilities for the reputation transfer increase. This in
turn increases the complexity of the reputation analysis, thus making it harder for potential
adversaries to de-anonymize users. In order to investigate the impact of permanent reputation
scores on the anonymity protection, we adopt the following simulation setup and method. In
particular, we highlight the differences with the previous evaluation detailed in Section 7.4.1.
Simulation Setup and Method
We investigate a population of 100 clients. Each simulation run covers 100 time intervals (if
not noted otherwise) and we present the average results of 1000 simulations. During each
time interval, the active clients generate five random sensor readings and report them to the
application server. The application server attributes reputation scores to the pseudonyms
according to the distribution presented in Table 10. Instead of arbitrarily attributing a random
reputation score as in Section 7.4.1, the application server models possible behaviors of
the clients by considering the last attributed reputation score in the computation of the
new reputation score. The chosen distribution reflects our assumption that the participant
behavior is unlikely to change at such short time scales. We thus assume that the probability
that a client contributes a correct/incorrect sensor reading is higher when it has already
contributed correct/incorrect samples, respectively. For example, assuming that a client
obtains a reputation score of 10 for its last sensor reading, the probability that it obtains the
same reputation score for its new sensor reading is equal to 0.35. In contrast, the probability
that it obtains a reputation score of -10 is equal to 0.02. Note that we could apply the same
distribution in the previous scenario, but the evolution of the reputation scores over time has
a lower impact on anonymity protection than in this scenario due to the transient nature of
the reputation scores.
Again, we assume that the RPM and the application server are malicious internal observers
with the aim of identifying consecutive pseudonyms based on the information they have access
to. The adversaries first identify the set of pseudonyms active in each time interval. SPcurrent
is the set of pseudonyms active in a given time interval and SPnext is the set of pseudonyms
active in the subsequent time interval. For each pseudonym Pcurrent, the adversaries attempt
to identify its successor Pnext as follows.
The adversaries first identify the set of possible successors of Pcurrent based on their
reputation value and establish a temporary link between Pcurrent and each candidate of
SPnext according to Algorithm 7. Next, the adversaries identify all pseudonyms in SPcurrent
that have a single link to a pseudonym in SPnext and eliminate all other links, since a
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Algorithm 7 Identification of potential successors for permanent reputation scores
Input: RPcurrent : Pcurrent’s reputation, RPnext : Pnext’s reputation, SRTcreated : set of RTs created by
Pcurrent, SRThidden : set of RTs not used by Pcurrent, SRTused : set of RTs used by Pnext
1: for all Pcurrent 2 SPcurrent do
2: for all Pnext 2 SPnext do
3: if RPcurrent + Value(RPhidden) > RPnext and SRTused ✓ (SRTcreated [ SRThidden) then
4: create a link between Pcurrent and Pnext
5: end if
6: end for
7: end for
pseudonym has at most one successor. Similarly, they identify all pseudonyms in SPnext
having a single link to a pseudonym in SPcurrent and eliminate all other links, as a pseudonym
has at most one predecessor (see steps 4 to 8 in Algorithm 8). Note that we compute the
number of potential successors xk (i.e., links) a pseudonym k has on average after this step.
For the remaining multiple links, the adversaries compute the probability of each link based
on the probability that Pcurrent handed RTs to the RPM and the probability that Pnext
shows a behavior similar to Pcurrent (steps 16 and 23 in Algorithm 8). The probability that
Pnext shows a behavior similar to Pcurrent is determined using the probability distribution
presented in Table 10 (known by the application server which uses it for the computation of the
reputation scores), while the probability that Pcurrent handed RTs to the RPM is computed
based on the probability p of using a RT, the number of transferred RTs k, and the total
number of RTs n, as follows.
p(k) =
✓
n
k
◆
· pk · (1- p)n-k (13)
For each Pcurrent having multiple links, the probability of each link is normalized by the
sum of the probability of all links. The link with the highest probability is then chosen as the
potential successor of Pcurrent. The other links are removed. The adversaries continue the
reputation analysis by analyzing the remaining links according to the above steps (i.e., identifi-
cation of single links and weighting of multiple links) until each pseudonym of SPcurrent has at
most one identified successor in SPnext . At this stage, we calculate the length of the established
pseudonym chains and the fraction of successors correctly identified by the adversaries in
each time interval.
Evaluation Results
We first investigate the impact of permanent reputation scores on the anonymity protection for
a constant population of 100 clients based on the above setup and method. For this analysis,
we consider that a reputation transfer is performed with probability p for each RT as in the
RandSet scheme, except that the cloaked reputation is not lost at the end of the period but
stored for future use by the clients. Figure 41 illustrates the influence of the choice of p (50%,
60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, 100%) on the fraction of potential successors over time. Note that p=100%
corresponds to a full transfer of reputation scores, i.e., no reputation cloaking is applied. The
results show that applying reputation cloaking significantly improves anonymity protection.
In particular, the degree of anonymity protection increases with decreasing p. For p=100%,
the percentage of potential successors is under 2% from t=17, whereas it lies between 49%
and 90% for p equal to 90% and 50%, respectively. In comparison, using transient reputation
scores, the percentage of potential successors is between 7% and 26% for the same values of
p (see Figure 36b). The degree of anonymity protection thus considerably increases when
using permanent reputation scores. This is due to the reputation scores stored by the clients,
which individual value is unknown at both the RPM and the application server. Figure 43
highlights the impact of the stored reputation on the distribution of the reputation scores.
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Algorithm 8 Elimination of improbable successors for permanent reputation scores
Input: SLinks: set of links created in Algorithm 7
1: while 9 non-confirmed links 2 SLinks do
2: linkConfirmed false
3: for all non-flagged pseudonym 2 (SPcurrent [ SPnext) do
4: if 9 a single link between Pcurrent and Pnext then
5: remove all other links of Pcurrent and Pnext
6: flag Pcurrent and Pnext
7: update Pnext’s hidden reputation
8: linkConfirmed true
9: end if
10: end for
11: if linkConfirmed = false then
12: search for other non-flagged Pcurrents having the same potential successors
13: if number of found Pcurrents = number of common Pnexts then
14: remove all other links of the found Pcurrents and Pnexts
15: flag the found Pcurrents and Pnexts
16: select for each Pcurrent one of the found Pnexts based on probability weighting
17: update Pnexts’ hidden reputation
18: linkConfirmed true
19: break search
20: end if
21: end if
22: if linkConfirmed = false then
23: select the most likely link based on probability weighting
24: remove all other links of the corresponding Pcurrent and Pnext
25: flag Pcurrent and Pnext
26: update the hidden reputation of Pnext
27: linkConfirmed true
28: end if
29: end while
Figure 43a presents the distribution of the reputation scores handed to the RPM to credit
the reputation accounts and the reputation scores attributed by the application server. In
comparison, Figure 43b shows the distribution of all reputation scores present in the system,
i.e., the reputation scores stored by the clients for future use and those illustrated in Figure 43a.
While adversaries know the total value of stored reputation scores, they however need to
infer the individual value stored by each client each time a successor is selected according
to the above steps. Figure 42 illustrates the success rate of the adversaries in inferring the
value of the stored reputation, and hence the correctly identified successors. In absence of
reputation cloaking, adversaries are able to correctly identify up to 60% of potential successors
and to establish very long chains of unique predecessor-successor relations (up to a length
of 92 in few cases as shown in Figure 44). In contrast, applying reputation cloaking reduces
the fraction of correctly identified successors to 7% and 14% for p equal to 90% and 50%,
respectively. Additionally, it leads to the construction of fewer and shorter pseudonym chains
(up to a length of 75 for p=90%). We, however, observe that 99.9% of the pseudonyms are
involved in chains of length of at most four pseudonyms. Reputation cloaking therefore
effectively protects the anonymity of the clients, as the adversaries are able to link most of the
pseudonyms for only short periods of time. Note that the chain lengths obtained for p=80%
cannot be directly compared to those obtained for the RandSet scheme (see Figure 40), as they
are computed once the adversaries have weighted and selected one of the multiple links—a step
not included in Section 7.4.1. In summary, the degree of anonymity protection is increased by
both the utilization of permanent reputation scores and the application of reputation cloaking.
Additionally, reputation cloaking does not incur permanent loss in reputation as compared to
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Figure 41: Fraction of potential successors over time for permanent reputation scores and a constant
population of 100 clients using the RandSet scheme with different transfer probabilities p
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Figure 42: Fraction of correctly identified successors over time for permanent reputation scores and a
constant population of 100 clients using the RandSet scheme with different transfer probabili-
ties p
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Figure 43: Distribution of permanent reputation scores over time amongst clients for the RandSetscheme
with p=80% and for a constant population of 100 clients
our transient scheme, since the clients can store the cloaked reputation for future use. However,
the transferred reputation still remains lower.
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Figure 44: Number of identified pseudonym chains for permanent reputation scores and a constant
population of 100 clients using the RandSet scheme
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Figure 45: Fraction of correctly identified successors over time for permanent reputation scores and a
variable population of up to 100 clients showing different activity patterns and using the
RandSet scheme with p=80%
As compared to the transient scheme addressed in Section 7.4.1, we additionally consider a
variable population of clients, i.e., clients become active after the beginning of the simulation.
We use a constant population of 100 active clients as baseline for our analysis (Pattern 0) and
selected four different activity patterns. Each activity pattern is defined by (a) the number
of clients active at the simulation start, (b) start of the first period, (c) duration of the period
between newly activated clients, and (d) number of activated clients after each period. For
comparison purposes, we assume that the total number of clients is the same for all scenarios
and that they become active latest at the 100th time interval.
. pattern 0: All 100 clients start at t=0 s (reference scenario).
. pattern 1: A single client is active at t = 0 and a new client becomes active at each
time interval until reaching 100 active clients.
. pattern 2: Ten clients are active at the simulation start and ten new client become
active every ten time intervals.
. pattern 3: 50 initial active clients and ten new clients every 20 time intervals.
. pattern 4: 50 clients are active at the beginning of the simulation and the next ten
clients become active at t = 50. Subsequently, additional ten clients are introduced every
five time intervals until 100 clients are active at the same time.
We further assume that all clients transfer their reputation scores with a probability p equal to
80%. This implies that the results for Pattern 0 are the same as those previously discussed
for a constant population of clients and p=80%. In order to observe the effects of the latest
activated clients on the degree of anonymity protection, we run each simulation for 200 time
intervals (instead of 100 time intervals).
Figure 45 illustrates the impact of the introduction of new clients on the fraction of correctly
identified successors for each activity pattern. It shows that introducing clients according to
7.4 anonymity protection 107
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
Pattern 0
Pattern 1
Pattern 2
Pattern 3
Pattern 4
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 p
ot
en
tia
l s
uc
ce
ss
or
s 
(%
)
Time interval ID
Pattern 0
Pattern 1
Pattern 2
Pattern 3
Pattern 4
Figure 46: Fraction of potential successors over time for permanent reputation scores and a variable
population of up to 100 clients showing different activity patterns and using the RandSet
scheme with p=80%
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Figure 47: Number of identified pseudonym chains for permanent reputation scores and a variable
population of up to 100 clients showing different activity patterns and using the RandSet
scheme with p=80%
patterns 3 and 4 increases the number of correctly identified successors of up to 7% (t=20)
and 8% (t=50) as compared to a constant population of clients (i.e., pattern 0), respectively. In
comparison, patterns 1 and 2 lead to the correct identification of a higher number of successors.
This difference is due to the number of introduced clients. Since new clients present similar
reputation scores, the larger the group of new clients, the higher the number of potential
successors for these clients and hence, the better the reciprocal protection between clients.
Moreover, the difference between pattern 2 (i.e., ten clients introduced every ten intervals)
and 3 (i.e., 20 clients introduced every ten intervals) shows that the introduction of ten more
clients at each period significantly improves anonymity protection, since a lower number of
successors can be identified by potential adversaries. Note that we consider the determination
of the exact value of clients to introduce in order to guarantee anonymity protection as future
work. Furthermore, pattern 1 reaches 100% of correctly identified successors in the first
interval because there is only one client introduced at this time. Subsequently, the difficulty
to correctly identify successors increases at each introduction of a new client. After the last
introduction of new clients, the values of patterns 1 to 4 progressively stabilize around the
value of pattern 0.
These results are mirrored in Figure 46. In particular, it shows for patterns 3 and 4 the
augmentation of the number of potential successors caused by each introduction of clients.
Note that pattern 4 shows a similar behavior to pattern 0 until the 50th interval as the
population of clients remains constant. However, the degree of anonymity protection of
the clients in pattern 4 is lower than those in pattern 0 during this interval, since the client
population in pattern 4 is half the population of pattern 0. For all patterns, the variations
in number of potential successors caused by new clients are temporary, as new clients
progressively gain reputation scores. They hence become indistinguishable from clients which
have been active for a longer period. This is illustrated in Figure 48, where the number of
occurrences of low reputation scores temporarily augments at each introduction of new clients
and later stabilizes. Since new clients have low reputation scores, they become potential
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Figure 48: Distribution of reputation score amongst clients over time for permanent reputation scores
and a variable population of up to 100 clients showing different activity patterns and using
the RandSet scheme with p=80%
successors of already active clients. While the weight associated to the links between new
and already active clients is low at the beginning, it progressively increases as the new clients
gain reputation as shown in Figure 48. The length of successfully identified pseudonym
chains increases with the introduction of new clients as illustrated in Figure 47. However, no
difference can be clearly identified between patterns 1 to 4. Hence, no concrete conclusion can
be drawn on the effect of different introduction patterns on the chain lengths. In summary,
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Table 11: Measured overhead per RT and key generation for the clients
rt key pair
Average battery lifetime (hours) 5:09 5:18
Average number of executions 5037500 16860
Average execution time (ms) 4 1129
0,4342
0,4485
0,4985
1,0819%
1,1174%
1,2417%
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Figure 49: Estimated daily battery consumption incurred by the generation of pseudonyms and RTs
the results show that the degree of anonymity protection for a variable population of clients is
lower than for a constant population. However, the anonymity protection increases with the
number of simultaneously introduced clients, as they protect each other by becoming potential
successors.
7.5 empirical evaluation
We implemented a proof-of-concept of IncogniSense to demonstrate the feasibility of our
approach for transient reputation scores. In particular, we quantified the overhead in terms of
energy consumption for the clients. The overhead should be maintained as low as possible so
as to not drain the battery of the mobile phones. In our implementation, the client program
was developed on Android Nexus S phones, while the application server and RPM were
implemented as two Apache Tomcat servlets. The activities of the clients are managed by a
background thread. The blind RSA signatures are based on 1024-bit private/public key pairs.
The pseudonyms and RTs are stored in a SQLite database on the clients, the access to which
is strictly restricted to our application. The RPM especially maintains lists of the generated
pseudonyms and utilized RTs in MySQL databases. It also controls the common time intervals
and runs a synchronization function that determines the time drift between the server and the
mobile devices. The clients, the RPM, and the application server communicate via Wi-Fi and
the communications are secured using HTTPS.
We conducted a first experiment to measure the impact of the generation of pseudonyms,
RTs, and keys on the clients’ battery lifetime. We configured a benchmarking client to
repeatedly execute the aforementioned sequence of operations until the exhaustion of the
battery. We disabled all other programs and repeated each experiment 20 times on different
clients. The results presented in Table 11 indicate that the overhead to generate keys for
the new pseudonyms is significantly higher than the overhead to create RTs. Note that the
overhead to create a pseudonym is equal to the overheads caused by both RT and key pair
generation. IncogniSense saves 90% of energy while reducing the probability of reputation
corruption from 0.1 to 0.0 as compared to [MR07] assuming n = 10. In a second experiment,
we configured a client to generate pseudonyms and RTs with a period T . We examined the
impact of both the duration of T and the number of generated RTs on the battery usage. Note
that the impact of the cloaking schemes on the battery usage is negligible as compared to the
cryptographic operations required to generate RTs and pseudonyms. Figure 49 shows the
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overall reduction in battery lifetime per day imputed to our approach. By selecting T greater
than 5 minutes, the daily cost in battery lifetime remains below 2.3%, rendering our approach
especially feasible for energy-constrained devices such as mobile phones.
For permanent reputation scores, the blind RSA signature scheme prevents clients from
lowering the value of the RTs without the knowledge of the RPM when applying the RandScore
scheme. Another blind signature scheme needs hence to be applied. For example, the scheme
proposed in [Oka95] is based on the principles of divisible electronic cash and enables to
split the value of a RT into different coins. Each coin can then be handed over to the RPM
independently of the others. The coins cannot be linked to the identity of the user, but to
the originating RT. Therefore, the RPM obtains additional insights about the RTs that may
improve its capabilities in linking consecutive pseudonyms.
7.6 related work
We first compare IncogniSense with existing anonymity-preserving reputation systems de-
signed for application domains orthogonal to participatory sensing. In fact, several reputation
architectures based on pseudonyms have been proposed for peer-to-peer networks. For
example, in [KP03], pseudonyms are created by Trusted Platform Modules and attested by
Certificate Authorities. In the solution presented in [ACBM08b], the users utilize a set of
pseudonyms with the same reputation to collect electronic coins centralized at a third party. In
contrast to our solution, both approaches are vulnerable to identity-based attacks since users
can control an arbitrary number of pseudonyms. Another scheme presented in [MRM11]
proposes context-based, self-certified, and Sybil-free pseudonyms built using e-tokens. The
users, however, cannot change their pseudonyms once they are associated to a context. Fi-
nally, STARS [ZLK10] extends existing peer-to-peer reputation systems by traceability and
anonymity. Complete anonymity of honest clients is however not guaranteed since the scheme
reveals the identity of clients suspected to corrupt their reputation and is subject to false posi-
tives. In addition to peer-to-peer networks, the scheme introduced in [PS08, Ste09] unlinks the
activities of users active in different Internet communities, while supporting cross-community
reputation systems. As compared to our scheme, the focus is hence on the unlinkability of the
same user across several applications (instead of one in our case) through the utilization of
a identity management system. Moreover, the reputation scores are attributed by the users,
instead of a central entity in our scheme.
IncogniSense shares the most similarities with [MR07] and [WH09], which rely on periodic
pseudonyms and transfer of reputation between pseudonyms. As our work builds upon the
RuP algorithm [MR07], we have presented a detailed comparison in Section 7.2.3. Recall that
RuP requires the clients to create n temporary pseudonyms for each valid pseudonym and
relies on probabilistic proofs. As such, a malicious client can create multiple pseudonyms
and tamper with its reputation with a success probability of 1/n. Increasing n reduces
the threats to reputation manipulation, but increases associated overheads. In comparison
to RuP, IncogniSense is robust against reputation corruption and the clients generate only
one pseudonym per period. The protocol presented in [WH09], which extends the ideas
from [MR07], is based on the concept of k-anonymity [Swe02]. They assume the existence of a
third party server which forms groups of clients sharing the same reputation and distributes a
signature key per group to sign the pseudonyms. The clients must however trust each other
not to collude with the third party and/or other clients to reduce the anonymity set. Moreover,
the proposed protocol introduces additional overhead for the clients to create pseudonyms as
compared to [MR07] and our solution.
In the particular context of participatory sensing, [HKH12] makes the same assumptions
as in IncogniSense, i.e., the utilization of periodic pseudonyms and transfer of reputations
between pseudonyms. Instead of relying on cryptographic primitives, the proposed scheme
is based on a trusted third party that generates equivalence classes based on the reputation
values of the clients (cf. Section 3.3.2). In other words, this party dynamically creates groups
of clients sharing the same reputation. In comparison to our scheme, the dynamic nature of
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the proposed scheme optimizes the reduction in reputation. However, the trusted third party
knows the mapping between the pseudonyms and the unique identity of the clients as well as
the mapping between original and cloaked values. Consequently, users need to trust it not to
reveal this information to other parties.
7.7 summary
In this chapter, we have presented our anonymity-preserving reputation framework called
IncogniSense. Our framework is agnostic to both the applications and the applied reputation
algorithm. It utilizes periodic pseudonyms which are generated using blind signature and
relies on a secure reputation transfer mechanism between these pseudonyms. We have
introduced the concept of reputation cloaking in order to prevent malicious application
administrators from de-anonymizing the users by linking the reputation scores associated
with their contributions. As cloaking has an inherent trade-off between anonymity protection
and loss in reputation, we have explored the design space and extensively examined the
performance of several different schemes. We have especially studied their resilience against
linking attacks under various scenarios including the utilization of transient vs. permanent
reputation scores and constant vs. variable client populations. Based on this analysis, we have
provided guidelines for the choice of the appropriate cloaking scheme in accordance with
the application requirements and the preferences of the users. We have further conducted a
thorough threat analysis and demonstrated the robustness of IncogniSense against reputation
corruption. We have finally evaluated the feasibility of our approach by implementing a
proof-of-concept and measuring the incurred overhead in terms of energy consumption. The
results prove that the additional energy expenditure incurred by our approach is minimal.
It is hence a small price to pay for the enhanced privacy protection offered. To conclude,
IncogniSense protects users against malicious application administrators who aim at breaching
their privacy, while enabling the utilization of a reputation system. Moreover, it allows users to
select the applied cloaking scheme according to their preferences in terms of privacy protection
and reduction in reputation.

8CONCLUS IONS AND OUTLOOK
Study the past if you would divine the future.
Confucius
8.1 summary and conclusions
Encouraging contribution in participatory sensing applications and gaining widespread
acceptance among participants requires multiple challenges to be addressed, especially the
protection of users’ privacy. Within the scope of this thesis, we have contributed to tackle this
challenge by providing privacy-preserving schemes that follow two key directions. According
to our first research direction, we have presented approaches that are customizable by the
users according to their preferences. While existing solutions mainly focus on controlling
the collection and the release of data, we have gone one step beyond by involving users
in additional privacy decisions. For example, they can balance the tradeoff between loss
in reputation and privacy protection according to their individual conception. Moreover,
following our second research direction, we have reduced their dependency on central entities
and developed schemes that protect user privacy despite the presence of malicious application
administrators and third parties.
In particular, we have presented an collaborative and decentralized approach to preserve
the location privacy of the users. Our application-agnostic approach is based on the physical
exchange of collected sensor readings between users at opportunistic encounters. By doing
so, users jumble parts of their paths with other users at each exchange. We have validated
our approach based on a real-world dataset by measuring the impact of different exchange
strategies on the system parameters, including exchange ratios, as well as the distance between
original and jumbled paths. By running different outlier detection algorithms on realistic
jumbled paths, we have shown that almost no jumbled sensor readings can be identified by
potential malicious application administrators. Based on our evaluation, we have provided
guidelines for the selection of exchange and reporting strategies to apply based on the desired
privacy guarantees, the degree of trust in other users, and the willingness to equally share
the reporting overhead. Using our approach, the users can therefore configure the applied
exchange and reporting strategies depending on their preferences and directly control the
protection of their privacy.
Our path jumbling approach, however, relies on the collaboration of the participants in
the protection process. We have therefore proposed a scheme that assesses the trustworthy
behavior of the users contributing to the aforementioned approach. It computes and attributes
a trust level to each user based on statistics provided by the users about past exchanges. Based
on the attributed trust levels, malicious users that drop exchanged sensor readings or inject
incorrect sensor readings on purpose can be identified and subsequently excluded from the
data jumbling process. Despite the multi-hop nature of our scheme, our extensive evalua-
tions have shown that our approach performs well in identifying droppers and spammers
in a realistic setup. After only few exchanges and reports, the identification of droppers
significantly contributes to reduction in latency due to the exclusion of these users in further
exchanges. Ultimately, users can assess the trust level of encountered users with our approach
and leverage it to select the exchange and reporting strategies to apply according to their
personal preferences.
We have finally proposed an anonymity-preserving reputation framework that addresses the
inherent conflict between privacy and reputation. Our application-agnostic framework is based
on periodic pseudonyms and a secure reputation transfer between these pseudonyms. We
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have introduced the concept of reputation cloaking in order to prevent malicious application
administrators from de-anonymizing users by linking the reputation scores associated with
their contributions. As cloaking shows an inherent trade-off between anonymity protection
and loss in reputation, we have explored the design space and extensively examined the
performance of several different schemes. We have especially studied their resilience against
linking attacks under various scenarios. Based on this analysis, we have provided guidelines
for choosing the appropriate cloaking scheme based on the preferences of the users in terms
of loss in reputation and privacy protection. We have demonstrated the robustness of our
framework against reputation corruption. We have validated our approach by a proof-of-
concept implementation and shown that the additional energy expenditure incurred by our
approach is minimal.
This thesis presents major contributions towards the protection of privacy in participatory
sensing applications. Our solutions are controllable and configurable by the users in order to
reflect their personal and individual preferences. By involving users in the proposed mecha-
nisms and making them transparent, we strive for increasing the users’ trust in participatory
sensing campaigns and subsequently, foster their contribution to such applications. We have
designed all contributions assuming that application administrators and related entities can
be malicious and especially willing to breach the privacy of contributing participants. By
reducing the users’ dependency on these entities, we cater for solutions that improve their
privacy protection under such realistic scenarios. In conclusion, we have proposed, analyzed,
and validated novel user-controlled privacy-preserving approaches that are independent on
the integrity of the application administrators and involved third parties. This leads us to
expect a widespread improvement of the privacy protection under real-world conditions.
8.2 outlook
The contributions of this thesis lay the foundations for user-controlled privacy-preserving
solutions specially tailored to participatory sensing. Based on their design and realization,
different new research questions and challenges have come to light:
. usable and comprehensive interactions We have herein proposed technical
solutions that can be configured and controlled by the users according to their preferences.
However, providing appropriate user interfaces as support for this control is still a
challenge to be tackled. The utilization of small form factor mobile phones combined
with the complexity of the settings’ implications on the users’ privacy makes the design
of such interfaces very challenging. Indeed, users should not only be able to simply select
any settings, but also understand their choices and their potential consequences in a
user-friendly and usable way. This includes limiting the number of required interactions
to the minimum in order to reduce the users’ burdens while giving enough freedom to
the users to personalize the schemes. Tackling this challenge requires the evaluation of
the designed solutions by users of participatory sensing applications in order to explore
their preferences.
. large scale real-world deployments In addition to evaluate the appropri-
ateness of such interactions, long-term user studies would provide valuable insights
about how users make use of privacy-preserving solutions in the field. This includes
investigating if and how they change their privacy settings or which are the working
solutions and parameter sets. Outcomes of such studies could allow to refine the design
of the proposed solutions and tailor them to the real needs of users having tested them
under real-world conditions. A real-world deployment would also enable to gather
insights from a technical perspective about the performance of the developed schemes
and fine-tune their design to best fit the experienced conditions.
. privacy awareness Beyond the approaches proposed in this thesis, another challenge
to tackle is to increase the awareness of potential privacy threats resulting from the
8.2 outlook 115
utilization of mobile applications. While the public awareness has incrementally raised
in recent years, it still does not reach the same degree as in other domains, such as the
recording of license plates on cars and the utilization of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
cameras by the police. Surveillance by the governmental entities is often perceived as
a threat to the privacy of the citizens. In contrast, participatory sensing applications
may appear more inoffensive since they are not controlled by central and official bodies.
However, the development of new applications is open to anybody and the control
over these application is limited to the verifications conducted by the App stores before
the applications are released. Hence, innovative methods still need to be invented to
efficiently increase the awareness of the users about these particular privacy issues.
Existing solutions, such as textual warnings, may be insufficient to fulfill this goal, since
they are often discarded by the users without having been read.
. multi-party privacy protection While it has been shown in [TLH+10] that partic-
ipants value the location privacy of their friends, most of the current privacy-preserving
mechanisms focus on the protection of the participants themselves. Yet the privacy
of people in their surroundings may also be threatened. For example, faces of unin-
volved people can appear in the contributed images as shown in DietSense [RPH+07]
(cf. Section 2.1.1). In current systems, it is mostly the user’s responsibility to protect the
privacy of bystanders. However, malicious participants may also deliberately distribute
compromising information about others. Automated solutions to minimize the captured
data such that it does not violate the privacy of others remain to be developed.
. identity management Existing privacy-aware solutions tailored to the requirements
of mobile sensing applications often consider the identity and the location of the users
as two distinct kinds of information to protect. In domains orthogonal to mobile sensing
such as location-based services, location is, however, seen as part of the user’s identity.
By including additional information captured by onboard sensors, the concept of digital
identity introduced in these domains could be extended and applied in mobile sensing
applications. This would enable the investigation of new research questions related
to identity management in participatory sensing and refine the definition of identity
by including further privacy-relevant information, such as sensor data collected using
mobile phones.
In conclusion, participatory sensing applications are about to cross the chasm to mass
deployment, yet open challenges specially in the domain of privacy protection persist. Ad-
dressing these challenges would foster the contribution to participatory applications and
benefit both the research community as well as the society at large.
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L I ST OF ACRONYMS
3G 3rd Generation
CCTV Closed-Circuit Television
FN False Negatives
FP False Positives
GIS Geographic Information System
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
GPS Global Positioning System
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
ID Identifier
IP Internet Protocol
LOF Local Outlier Factor
MCC Matthews Correlation Coefficient
MDAV Maximum Distance to Average Vector
NFC Near Field Communication
PDV Personal Data Vault
RPM Reputation and Pseudonym Manager
RT Reputation Token
RuP Reputation using Pseudonyms
SMS Short Message Service
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TN True Negatives
TP True Positives
V-MDAV Variable-size Maximum Distance to Average
Vector
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AAPPENDIX
Information is not knowledge.
A. Einstein
We first provide background information about blind signatures in Section A.1. In particular,
we detail the blind RSA signature scheme utilized in Chapter 7. Based on these foundations,
we provide details about the underlying mechanisms used in the generation of pseudonyms
(see Section 7.2.1) and the generation of Reputation Tokens (RTs) (see Section 7.2.1) introduced
in Sections A.2 and A.3, respectively.
a.1 blind signatures , rsa signatures and blind rsa signatures
In [Cha83], Chaum proposed the first scheme to create blind signature based on a public-key
cryptographic system with signers and providers. The signer has a secret signing function
s 0 and its public inverse s, such that s(s 0(m)) = m for a message m. The provider has two
secret cryptographic functions c and c 0, where c 0 is the inverse of c. Hence, the provider can
send a ciphertext c(m) to the signer, which returns s 0(c(m)) to the provider. The provider
can then obtain the message s 0(m) signed by the supplier using the function c 0, such that
c 0(s 0(c(m))) = s 0(m). Anyone can then verify the signature on message m by checking that
s(s 0(m)) = m. Hence, the supplier signed the message m without knowing m, i.e., a blind
signature.
The RSA [RSA78] signature scheme can be used for implementing a blind signature
scheme [Gen08]. In RSA, the provider signs its own messages, i.e., the provider and the
signer are the same entity. A signature s of message m is s = memodn, where (e,n) is the
signature key, n = p · q and p and q are two arbitrarily chosen large prime numbers. The
parameter e, (e < n), is a relative prime to the totient of n,  (n) = (p- 1)(q- 1). For checking
the correctness of an RSA signature, the verifier needs a verification key (d,n), where d is
the inverse of emod (n), i.e., e · dmod (n) ⌘ 1. The verification of signature is done by
checking if sd is equivalent to mmodn.
In a blind RSA signature scheme, the provider and the signer are different entities. The
signer is a third party that does not know the content of the message to be signed. The blind
RSA signature scheme incorporates a blinding factor r to the RSA signature scheme and works
as follows. The provider of the message m, which is to be blind signed, selects a random
blinding factor rmod n and generates a blinded message m 0 = m · remod n. The blinding
factor r is a secret only known to the provider and (e,n) is publicly known. The blinded
message m 0 is sent to the signer, who returns the signature s 0 = (m 0)dmodn to the provider.
The signature s 0 on message m 0 is obtained using the signature key (d,n), which is a secret
only known to the signer. The provider can then calculate the signature s = mdmod n on
message m as
s 0 = (m 0)dmodn = (m · re)dmodn = md · re·dmodn = md · rmod n (14)
The provider then divides s 0 by r to obtain the signature s, i.e., s = s 0/r. Anyone can verify
the signature s on message m by checking if se is equivalent to mmodn.
a.2 generation of pseudonyms using rsa signatures
We assume that each client has a permanent identifier ID, a private key PR(dclient,nclient),
a public key PU(eclient,nclient), and it is registered with the RPM. The blind RSA signature
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scheme, which is presented in Section A.1, is the blind signature scheme used in the rest of this
appendix. For each T , the RPM generates a new private/public pair of signature keys common
to all clients: PR(dsignature,nsignature) and PU(esignature,nsignature). The client first
generates a private/public key pair PR(dP,nP) and PU(eP,nP) for its new pseudonym. The
client uses nP as its new pseudonym referred to as P and generates the corresponding
signature sP as follows. The client first prepares the message mP using nP , the RPM’s public
signature key for the time period T , PU(esignature,nsignature), and the blinding factor r
modulo nP , as follows:
mP = nP · resignature modnsignature (15)
The client creates a signature smP using a function of the concatenation f of the triplet
(mP , ID, T ) signed with its permanent private key to guarantee the authenticity of mP :
smP = f(mP k ID k T)dclient modnclient (16)
The client transmits mP, smP , its ID, and the time interval of validity T for P to the RPM for
blind signature. The RPM verifies the authenticity of mP and that the client has no existing
pseudonym for this time interval. After verification, the RPM generates the blind signature
sRPM signing mP :
sRPM = mP
dsignature modnsignature (17)
The client finally generates the pseudonym’s signature sP from the blind signature sRPM that
achieves the generation of P, which becomes Pcurrent:
sP = sRPM · r-1modnsignature (18)
a.3 generation of reputation tokens using rsa signatures
We assume that the RPM generates a set of transfer keys in the bootstrapping phase. Each
transfer key pair is associated to a reputation value and determines the reputation associated to
a given RT. For each RT, the client selects a random bit string IDRT as identifier and prepares
the message mRT for blind signature using the public transfer key corresponding to the RT’s
value:
mRT = IDRT · retransfer modntransfer (19)
The client signs the message mRT with the signature smRT using the private key PR(dPcurrent ,
nPcurrent) associated to Pcurrent. The real identity of the client is hence not revealed while
transferring reputation from one pseudonym to the next.
smRT = f(mRT k Pcurrent k Rscore)dPcurrent modnPcurrent (20)
The client transmits mRT , smRT , Pcurrent, and Rscore to the RPM for blind signature. The
RPM verifies thatmRT is used for the first time as well as the balance of the reputation account
of Pcurrent before decrementing it by Rscore. After verification, the RPM blindly signs mRT
with the corresponding private signature key. The client finally uses the blind signature to
generate the final signature of the RT.
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